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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Political Shibboleths: A Study of Religious Rhetorical Forms  
 
in the Contemporary American Presidency. (May 2008) 
 
David C. Bailey, B.A., Southwest Baptist University; 
 
M.A., Missouri State University 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Kurt Ritter 
 
 
 From Jimmy Carter’s self-identification as a “born again Christian” in the 1976 
presidential campaign to George W. Bush’s declaration of “Christ” as his favorite 
political philosopher “because he changed my heart” in a Republican primary debate of 
the 2000 campaign, presidential speeches and campaigns are often laced with religious 
language. Such an observation is nothing new. However, many scholars and political 
observers do not know what to make of such religious references. Such language is often 
dismissed as either shameless pandering to religious constituencies or something 
hopelessly out of place in American politics. This dissertation attempts a deeper analysis 
of this controversial subject by identifying how presidents use the rhetorical resources of 
religion by employing religious argument patterns stemming from the Jewish and 
Christian religious traditions in presidential speeches. Specifically, this dissertation 
explores how the last five presidents (Jimmy Carter through George W. Bush) have used 
such religious rhetorical forms in attempts to strike a symbolic chord within the larger 
American public. The religious rhetorical forms explored herein, if employed judiciously, 
can serve as political shibboleths—or passwords—which indicate a basic level of  
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identification with the public thanks to the basic elements, such as transformation, 
atonement, and renewal, which comprise the mythical core of these forms.  
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
 
  
    v
To my first debate coach Mr. Elwin Roe 
 
who taught me the enduring power of speech 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
                     
 
  
    vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 The most deserving acknowledgments and thanks go to my family. Thanks to my 
loving wife Jodee for being my best friend and constant encouragement. You are my 
strength. Thanks also to my son Ethan who was born as the final pages of this dissertation 
were being written. Daddy loves you.  
  This dissertation would not have been possible without the guidance of my 
doctoral committee. Thanks to Dr. James A. Aune for challenging me to view the topic of 
religion through a wider lens. Thanks to Dr. C. Jan Swearingen for encouraging me to 
think more deeply about how religious discourse influences American political rhetoric. 
Thanks to Dr. Leroy G. Dorsey for helping me think about how religion and religious 
forms operate publicly at the mythological level. A special thanks to my advisor Dr. Kurt 
Ritter—the father of this project. Thank you for allowing me to use your work and ideas 
as a springboard for my own. You are a great scholar, mentor, teacher, and friend.  
 Thanks to the College of Liberal Arts at Texas A&M University for its financial 
support of the archival research contained herein. Thanks also to the very professional 
archival staffs of the Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George Bush, and William J. Clinton 
presidential libraries for their dedication and patience in helping me find many of the 
items I needed. There are many other friends and colleagues whom I should thank; 
Jeremiah Hickey for being a good friend and an excellent sounding board for all things 
professional and personal, Nancy Street for encouraging my development as a teacher, 
and Brian Quick for introducing me to a great department. These and many others have 
made this project possible. My sincere appreciation and thanks to you all.  
                   
             
  
    vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
               Page 
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………...iii 
DEDICATION…………………………………………………………………………….v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………………………………………………………………..vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………………..vii 
CHAPTER  
 
I  INTRODUCTION: RELIGIOUS RHETORICAL PATTERNS  
IN A POLITICALWORLD……………………………………………….1 
 
Research Questions………………………………………………..4 
Shibboleth…………………………………………………………5 
Identification and Consubstantiality………………………………6 
Religious Rhetorical Form………………………………………...7 
Review of Scholarship…………………………………………...12 
Outline of Chapters………………………………………………19 
 
II  RECONSIDERING RELIGIOUS RHETORIC IN POLITICAL  
DISCOURSE: CIVIL RELIGION, CIVIC PIETY, OR RELIGIOUS  
RHETORICAL FORM?............................................................................28 
 
   American Civil Religion…………………………………………32 
   The Contract of Civic Piety……………………………………...43 
   The Religious Rhetorical Form Construct……………………….46 
   Theoretical and Methodological Benefits of Religious  
Rhetorical Form………………………………………………….50 
 
III  DEFINED BY DECLENSION: THE MORALISTIC  
RHETORICAL TRAJECTORY OF JIMMY CARTER’S  
ENERGY JEREMIAD…………………………………………………...62 
 
   The American Jeremiad………………………………………….66 
   Rhetorical Trajectories…………………………………………...74 
   Jimmy Carter’s Energy Jeremiad………………………………...76 
   Carter’s Jeremiad as a Failed Shibboleth………………………...92 
 
                  
 
 
  
    viii
CHAPTER               Page 
 
IV  THE POWER OF AMERICAN PROMISE: THE POLITICAL 
POSTMILLENNIALISM OF RONALD REAGAN’S ECONOMIC 
JEREMIAD……………………………………………………………..103 
 
 The Postmillennial American Jeremiad………………………...106 
   Ronald Reagan’s Postmillennial Jeremiad……………………...114 
The Reagan Economic Jeremiad as Political Shibboleth……….143 
 
V  “KICKING THE VIETNAM SYNDROME”: GEORGE H.W. BUSH, 
INCOMPLETE NATIONAL REDEMPTION, AND OPERATION  
DESERT STORM………………………………………………………155 
 
   Atonement as Religious Rhetorical Form………………………159 
   America’s Public Guilt over Vietnam…………………………..165 
   “Kicking the Vietnam Syndrome”……………………………...170 
   An Incomplete Redemption…………………………………….178 
 
VI  WILLIAM J. CLINTON’S “NEW COVENANT”: A PROPHECY  
OF NATIONAL DELIVERANCE……………………………………..191 
 
   Deliverance Prophecy as a Religious Rhetorical Form………...197 
   Deliverance and American Exceptionalism…………………….201 
Bill Clinton’s Prophecy of American Deliverance……………..204 
Deliverance, Not a Jeremiad……………………………………220 
 
VII  ENACTING TRANSFORMATION: GEORGE W. BUSH  
AND THE PAULINE CONVERSION NARRATIVE………………...229 
 
Cultural Prevalence and Features of the Pauline Conversion 
Narrative………………………………………………………..233 
Conforming Bush’s Conversion Narrative to the Pauline 
Form…………………………………………………………….246 
   Bush’s Pauline Conversion Narrative as Political Shibboleth….261 
 
VIII  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS………………………….......270 
   Major Findings………………………………………………….270 
   Normative Considerations……………………………………...279 
   Limitations……………………………………………………...285 
Future Scholarship and the Future of Religion in  
American Politics……………………………………………….285 
 
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………291 
  
    ix
               Page 
VITA……………………………………………………………………………………324
  
    1
 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: RELIGIOUS RHETORICAL PATTERNS  
 
IN A POLITICAL WORLD 
 
 
“Then said they unto him, Say now Shibboleth: and he said Sibboleth: for he could not 
frame to pronounce it right. Then they took him, and slew him at the passages of the 
Jordan . . .” 
Judges 12:61 
 
 
 On December 13, 1999 Republican presidential hopefuls— Steve Forbes, George 
W. Bush, Gary Bauer, John McCain, Orrin Hatch, and Alan Keyes—gathered in Des 
Moines, Iowa at the Des Moines Civic Center to participate in the state’s only Republican 
presidential primary debate of the season. The nationally-televised contest exhibited all 
the characteristics of presidential primary debates including testy exchanges like the one 
between Governor Bush and Senator McCain about the role of soft money in elections, 
and Senator Hatch’s punchy one-liner comeback at multi-millionaire Steve Forbes who 
said that Hatch’s tax plan was really code for “hold onto your wallet”—“Steve, I couldn’t 
even lift your wallet.”2 
Despite each candidate’s desire to strike a decisive blow early in the debate, the 
defining moment of this contest would come in the form of a surprising answer to an 
anonymously-posed question from the audience in the closing minutes. Veteran reporter 
John Bachman of Des Moine’s WHO-TV, who co-moderated the debate with NBC-TV’s 
Tom Brokaw, asked the candidates: “What political philosopher or thinker do you most  
________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of the journal Rhetoric & Public Affairs. 
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identify with and why?”3 Steve Forbes and Alan Keyes offered John Locke and the 
founding fathers respectively as their primary political influences because of the 
important philosophical and political roles they played in the foundation of the American 
political structure. Bachman next directed the question to Governor Bush prompting the 
following exchange:  
 Bachman: “Governor Bush, a philosopher/thinker and why?” 
 Bush: “Christ. Because he changed my heart.”  
Bachman: “I think that the viewer would like to know more on how he has 
changed your heart.” 
Bush: “Well if they don’t know it’s going to be hard to explain. When you turn 
your heart and your life over to Christ—when you accept Christ as the Savior, it 
changes your heart, and changes your life. And that’s what happened to me.”4 
 
The exchange drew significant applause from the immediate audience at the Des Moines 
Civic Center—including Orrin Hatch seated to Bush’s immediate left onstage that night. 
The reference also provoked imitation from Bush’s opponents as both Hatch and Gary 
Bauer included references to Christ and other overtly-Christian themes in their 
subsequent answers to the question.  
The days and weeks following the debate would reveal that Bush’s answer 
resonated throughout the media and the electorate. His comments received extensive 
attention from many mainstream media commentators who were far less enthusiastic than 
the Iowa audience had been about the reference to Christ. Cokie and Steven Roberts used 
the reference to take Bush to task regarding his corporation-friendly, tax-cutting image; 
arguing that if Christ was indeed his favorite political philosopher, his policies should 
reflect Jesus’ warning “that it’s easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than 
for a rich man to achieve the kingdom of heaven . . .”5 Jim Squires of The Toronto Star 
and Mary Dejevsky of The (London) Independent joined others in casting doubt upon 
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Bush’s sincerity.6 Squires suggested that Bush’s comments did indeed reflect “an 
American religion . . . It’s called marketing.”7 The Washington Post’s Hanna Rosin was 
more sophisticated in her analysis, offering that Bush was “pioneering a more personal 
religious style in his courtship of evangelical votes. . . . Bush seeks to connect to his 
fellow born-again Christians ‘from the heart,’ as he likes to say.”8 
Religious leaders varied in their reactions to Bush’s comments. Some such as 
Rabbi Abraham Foxman, national director of the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai 
B’rith, and Episcopal Bishop C. Christopher Epting were troubled by the presence of 
such an overtly-religious reference in a political debate.9 In contrast, other religious 
voters believed that Bush’s reference to his personal experience with Christ did not go far 
enough. Mark Holbrook, president of the Evangelical Christian Credit Union, saw the 
reference to Christ as “a throwaway line . . . I was disappointed he didn’t take the 
opportunity to personalize and internalize his faith.”10 Such sentiments were not shared 
by Dr. Richard Land, president of the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the 
Southern Baptist Convention. With more than 38,000 churches and 15 million members 
nationwide, the Southern Baptist Convention is the largest organized body of Protestant 
Christians in the United States.11 Land, who watched the debate from his home in 
Nashville, Tennessee that evening recalled: “I was watching the debate with my wife and 
daughter in the room, neither of whom are political junkies. And when they heard that 
[Bush’s] answer they both stopped what they were doing, looked at me and said 
‘Wow.’”12 Bush’s public pronouncement of his personal faith in such a political context 
obviously struck a raw nerve with some; but even more significantly, it struck a 
harmonious chord with others.  
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This dissertation examines the use of religion in the rhetoric of recent American 
presidents, seeking to explain how they employ religious themes as they attempt to 
navigate between the raw nerves and harmonious chords of the American audience. It 
investigates the extent to which religious history and culture in the United States provides 
presidents with the rhetorical resources—what historian John F. Wilson calls “religio-
mythic materials”13—to strike such harmonious chords with the public and foster a sense 
of identification between themselves and the public. Most importantly, this dissertation 
investigates the extent to which these rhetorical resources manifest themselves as 
religious rhetorical forms—distinctive and recognizable patterns of discourse which 
emerge from America’s religious and intellectual history. In the case of George W. Bush, 
for instance, his reference to personal religious conversion was a noteworthy rhetorical 
and political occurrence in its own right. However, what made his expression of faith 
rhetorically powerful was not its uniqueness but, in a sense, its commonality to the 
religious conversion experiences of evangelical voters and the mythical appeal of the idea 
of personal transformation for those less inclined to view Bush’s statement through an 
exclusively religious prism.  
Research Questions 
The guiding question behind this dissertation is: How do contemporary American 
presidents employ the rhetorical resources of religion when endeavoring to identify with 
the American public? Such a research question also prompts me to investigate whether or 
not presidents employ religion in ways other than those recognized by present 
scholarship? I posit that contemporary American presidents do indeed use religious 
rhetoric in a manner that has heretofore largely escaped the notice of scholars who 
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explore the rhetorical nexus of religion and politics. I call this approach religious 
rhetorical form. For instance, Bush’s statement of faith was a truncated version of the 
Pauline conversion narrative—a rhetorical form with deep roots in Christian history and 
literature. While a fuller description of this form may be found in chapter VII of this 
dissertation, the Pauline conversion narrative is at its core a narrative of personal 
religious salvation modeled after the conversion accounts of the Apostle Paul found in 
the book of Acts in the New Testament of the Christian Bible.14 As Ernest Bormann, 
Nathan Hatch, Perry Miller and others have demonstrated, the testimonial elements of 
this form became a rhetorical staple of the First Great Awakening and a particular 
favorite of the evangelical Protestant denominations whose ranks swelled during and 
after the Great Awakening.15 The form remains popular in evangelical congregations 
even today. In a nation with more than 300,000 religious congregations16 and where 46% 
of the population claims to have been “born again,” this religious rhetorical form can (as 
in the case of George W. Bush) have significant rhetorical and political effects.17 I further 
posit that religious rhetorical forms such as the Pauline conversion narrative can, when 
used skillfully, enable presidents to strike symbolic chords within the public 
consciousness.  
Shibboleth 
While religious rhetorical forms may be used to accomplish a number of 
presidential rhetorical and political objectives, I will explore how contemporary 
American presidents use religious rhetorical forms as American political shibboleths. 
That is to say that they employ such discursive patterns to establish themselves as leaders 
who can identify with the basic hopes and aspirations of the American people. A 
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shibboleth is a password. This metaphor is taken from the twelfth chapter of the book of 
Judges. As religious studies scholar Jo Ann Hackett of Harvard University explains, the 
term was used by the ancient Gileadites to distinguish themselves from their Ephraimite 
enemies who were attempting to escape to safety back across the Jordan after being 
defeated in battle: “Ephraimites who wanted to escape would simply claim not to be 
Ephraimites; the Gileadites discovered these impostors by having them pronounce the 
word [shibboleth] properly . . . The two dialects had different pronunciations for the same 
word . . .”18 
Although an obscure military term from biblical history, the notion of certain 
messages acting as shibboleths has been noted by other scholars in both religious and 
political contexts.19 Whether in religious or political contexts, shibboleths are ways of 
distinguishing group members from outsiders. While he does not use the term shibboleth, 
political scientist Matthew Moen finds that Ronald Reagan’s references to social issues 
such as abortion and school prayer in his state of the union messages increased 
significantly during election years—intended, Moen argues, to placate the Christian 
Right.20 In their recent book The God Strategy, David Domke and Kevin Coe advance a 
similar thesis—that the proliferation of religious language by presidents and presidential 
candidates is a strategic way to win the support of narrowly-defined religious 
constituencies such as evangelicals.21 
Identification and Consubstantiality 
While religious rhetoric can be and certainly is used to foster such narrow appeal, 
I argue that the use of religious forms enables presidents and presidential candidates to 
appeal to both narrowly-defined religious constituencies and the broader public thanks to 
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the mythical elements (the mythical core) of the rhetorical forms they use. Thus, in 
contrast to Moen, Domke, and Coe this dissertation suggests that recent presidents 
incorporate religion and religious rhetorical forms into their rhetoric to achieve a broader 
rhetorical purpose. Contemporary presidents use these forms largely as attempts to 
demonstrate their commonality with the wider public—not just evangelicals or the 
Christian Right. This not only has the potential to increase the effectiveness of their 
persuasive messages, it has the additional benefit of shaping the public’s conceptions of 
them and their presidencies. Kenneth Burke referred to this important aspect of the 
persuasive process as “identification and consubstantiality.”22 This project seeks to 
expand upon Burke’s identification thesis by examining the degree to which 
identification and consubstantiality can occur at the communal rather than individual 
level as a result of the use of religious form. To do this, my dissertation will investigate 
the function of religious rhetorical form in presidential discourse, particularly the degree 
to which it may be used to demonstrate symbolic commonality with the public.  
Religious Rhetorical Form 
Religious rhetorical forms occur within presidential rhetoric in far more 
variegated ways than generally recognized by many scholars. At present, much of the 
scholarship that focuses upon religious form in American political rhetoric focuses upon 
only one form—the American jeremiad. While, as will become apparent throughout this 
dissertation, the jeremiad remains a highly influential religious form, contemporary 
presidents can and do have an array of other rhetorical resources when it comes to form.  
A second reason why the presence and variety of religious rhetorical form has not 
received a great deal of scholarly attention has to do with the fact that instances of form 
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are, I argue, often misconstrued as components of American civil religion. In 1967, 
sociologist Robert N. Bellah reintroduced the concept (which originally appeared in the 
writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau) to academic literature. After analyzing a series of 
presidential inaugurals, Bellah concluded that a civil religion existed in America. As 
Bellah put it: 
Although matters of personal religious belief, worship, and association are 
considered to be strictly private affairs, there are, at the same time, certain  
common elements of religious orientation that the great majority of Americans 
share. These have played a crucial role in the development of American  
institutions and still provide a religious dimension to the whole fabric of 
American life, including the political sphere. This public religious dimension 
is expressed in a set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals, that I am calling  
American civil religion.23 
 
While Bellah resists the characterization, his argument is predicated upon the use 
of religion as a descriptive metaphor for either American nationalism or belief in a series 
of principles which are understood to make up an American identity. Despite this 
relatively narrow conceptualization, civil religion has become the dominant descriptive 
term for occasions upon which religious rhetoric is incorporated into political discourse. 
While I do not deny the existence of civil religion in some manifestations of U. S. 
nationalism or as a valid theoretical perspective from which to understand religion in 
American public life, I do question whether all forms of religious rhetoric in political 
discourse are civil religious in nature. I posit that what is often called civil religious 
rhetoric, is in reality often the use of religious rhetorical form—a distinction which will 
be explored in more detail in chapter II of this dissertation. 
 The concept of rhetorical form is, naturally, an important theoretical and 
methodological concern in this dissertation. Before discussing this concept, it is 
important to distinguish rhetorical form from the concept of genre. A genre, to quote 
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literary critic Northrop Frye, “establishes the identity of a work of literature in two ways: 
it indicates what the work is, and it suggests the context of the work, by placing it within 
a number of works like it.”24 Presidential inaugurals, for instance, illustrate these dual 
functions of genre. This definition of genre is reflected in the works of genre critics such 
as Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson,25 William L. Benoit, Joseph R. 
Blaney, and P.M. Pier,26 Celest M. Condit,27 and B.L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel28 
wherein the rhetorical situation determines the genre and the content of the discourse. 
Rhetorical form, on the other hand, is a recurrent pattern of argument which can appear in 
a variety of situations and is far less dependent upon the rhetorical situation. Although 
Campbell and Jamieson argue that genres are “constellation[s] of recognizable forms 
bound together by an internal dynamic,”29 further inquiry into the potentially symbiotic 
relationship between the distinct elements of form and genre is required. What are 
rhetorical forms? How are they comprised? Why and how are rhetorical forms influential 
in political discourse? I will endeavor to answer these questions about rhetorical forms 
throughout this dissertation and, in so doing, help to clarify how genre and form are 
distinct.  
I posit a tripartite definition of rhetorical form. I will begin by adopting rhetorical 
scholar Ernest Bormann’s notion that forms are “recurring patterns of discourse.”30 Such 
discursive patterns manifest themselves as recurring narratives, argument patterns, 
metaphors, and the like. More recently, the work of rhetorical analyst Barry Brummett 
further develops Bormann’s idea. Brummett’s work Rhetorical Homologies explains the 
necessity of locating not just key words in a political text, but rhetorical patterns which 
bear a formal resemblance to patterns from a different discursive sphere. As Brummett 
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explains, a formal resemblance (or homology) is more than just a case where two 
different texts use a similar argument pattern; it is when the use of a pattern from one 
context “facilitates the work of political and social rhetoric, or influence” within 
another.31 Just how religious rhetorical forms facilitate the work of presidential rhetoric 
will become apparent in the five case studies profiled herein.  
However, it is not enough to simply identify patterns that transcend various 
discursive spheres; these patterns must also have an intellectual and cultural history to be 
properly considered a rhetorical form. Because my concern is with religious rhetorical 
forms, I will look to discursive patterns from the rich rhetorical storehouses of 
Christianity and Judaism as they have been employed throughout American cultural 
history. Examples of these include the American jeremiad as employed by Jimmy Carter 
(Chapter III) and Ronald Reagan (Chapter IV) and the deliverance theme as used by Bill 
Clinton (Chapter VI). The long cultural and religious history of these rhetorical forms 
enriches both their meaning-making potential and their inter-textuality.  
Thirdly, rhetorical forms must somehow speak to the mythical needs of a 
rhetorically constituted public. As will become apparent in each of these case studies of 
presidential rhetoric, the religious forms employed by presidents are often reducible to a 
central essence—what I call a mythical core. While the religious form may itself be a 
shibboleth to those religious constituencies able to recognize it, the mythical core of a 
particular form is readily apparent to virtually any listener. As I will explain in chapter 
VI, religious voters certainly recognized the basic features of Bill Clinton’s use of the 
deliverance narrative during the 1992 campaign. However, the notion of national 
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renewal—the mythical core of the form as Clinton employed it—was apparent to the 
entire national audience whether religious or not.  
In his germinal work Counter-statement, Kenneth Burke writes that “form is the 
creation of an appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that 
appetite.”32 As Burke proceeded to explain, “If, in a work of art, the poet says something, 
let us say, about a meeting, writes in such a way that we desire to observe that meeting, 
and then, if he places that meeting before us—that is form.”33 Hence, the use of certain 
recurring patterns of religious discourse creates within a public an expectation or desire 
to hear and see the story played out in the way the form suggests. In the case of George 
W. Bush’s allusion to his own conversion during the Republican primary debate in 1999, 
the form of a sinner having been brought to repentance set the stage for his rhetorical 
management of the disclosure, just weeks before the 2000 election, of his 1976 arrest for 
driving while intoxicated. While the revelation undoubtedly broached questions in the 
minds of some voters about his character and the sincerity of his religious language, the 
Bush campaign’s allusions to Bush’s conversion experience in 1986 supplied a plausible 
response to the arrest grounded in the transformative elements of Bush’s faith. As Bush’s 
brother, Florida Governor Jeb Bush put it, “Twenty-four years ago, my brother was a 
different person. . . . he wasn’t ready to be president”—the younger brother hastened to 
add that George W. had been “transformed” by his faith.34 This case is one of many 
instances explored in this dissertation in which the use of religious rhetorical form 
appears to have enabled presidents to construct important identificational connections 
between themselves and the public. 
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This dissertation focuses upon the contemporary presidential era beginning with 
the administration of Jimmy Carter. The Carter presidency is the most logical place to 
begin this exploration for two reasons. First, Carter was distinct from his immediate 
predecessors in that he had a penchant for openly discussing his Christian faith and 
infusing religious language into his political decisions. Political scientists Andrew Flint 
and Joy Porter argue that, Carter almost single-handedly “reawakened faith-based 
politics” by bringing “the vocabulary of born-again salvation permanently into America’s 
political consciousness.”35 While Carter was far from the first president to use religious 
appeals in his rhetoric,36 he was more open about his personal religious faith than 
previous presidents. The religious discourse of previous presidents generally took the 
form of some type of civil religion; Carter broke this mold by proclaiming himself to 
have been “born again”—an intensely personal statement of religious faith which (like 
George W. Bush’s allusion to his conversion narrative) initially endeared him to many 
religious voters.37 Second, beginning this investigation from the Carter administration 
forward permits me to examine five presidencies and nearly twenty-five years (1976-
2000) of contemporary presidential rhetoric. This vantage point enables me to assess the 
degree to which religious rhetorical form is a characteristic of contemporary presidential 
rhetoric.  
Review of Scholarship 
This investigation resides at the confluence of two streams of scholarship—the 
already vibrant literature on presidential rhetoric and the growing body of 
transdisciplinary literature exploring the intersection between religion and politics. 
Modern research into presidential persuasion began in 1960 with the publication of 
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political scientist Richard E. Neustadt’s influential work Presidential Power: The Politics 
of Leadership. Neustadt argues that, in addition to the considerable executive powers of 
the office, presidents are able to wield “the power to persuade.”38 While Neustadt focuses 
primarily upon persuasion as manifested in negotiating power among governing elites, 
his interest in persuasion inspired subsequent studies of presidential rhetoric. 
The study of presidential rhetoric took on renewed vigor in 1987 with the 
publication of Jeffrey K. Tulis’ The Rhetorical Presidency. In addition to coining the 
phrase “the rhetorical presidency,” Tulis argues that the character of presidential 
speechmaking had fundamentally changed since the administrations of Theodore 
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Before Roosevelt and Wilson, Tulis explains, 
presidents were likely to direct their speeches principally toward the Congress when 
attempting to accomplish legislative and policy initiatives. Since Roosevelt and Wilson, 
the focus of presidential speeches dramatically shifted—presidential messages would 
hereafter be “addressed to the people at large” and rhetoric directed toward the public 
would “become a principal tool of presidential governance.”39 As such, scholars of 
presidential rhetoric seek to understand the persuasive and constitutive elements of 
presidential discourse.  
In their oft-cited work Deeds Done in Words, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and 
Kathleen Hall Jamieson explore how the situational characteristics of presidential 
rhetorical genres influence the functions and effects of presidential rhetoric. In the case of 
presidential inaugurals, for instance, Campbell and Jamieson write that they “transcend 
the historical present by reconstituting an existing community, rehearsing the past, 
affirming traditional values, and articulating timely and timeless principles that will 
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govern the administration of the incoming president.”40 In this way, presidential rhetoric 
is both persuasive—it has the power to change, reinforce, or otherwise alter public 
opinion; and constitutive—presidents have the power to shape the audience’s conception 
of itself, the president, or the nation.41 
While an important touchstone for my dissertation, the genre approach of 
Campbell and Jamieson is distinct from this project because Campbell and Jamieson are 
interested in how a given situation (e.g. a presidential inaugural) influences the pattern of 
discourse used upon that occasion. In contrast, my dissertation posits that religious forms 
of discourse from America’s Christian and Jewish traditions are adapted for use in 
various political situations. Thus, the patterns explored in this study are not products of 
the various political situations in which they may be used, but are transcendent of them.  
David Zarefsky’s analysis of Lyndon B. Johnson’s use of war metaphors in his 
anti-poverty initiative of 1964 also merits discussion in relation to this project because it 
illustrates the persuasive power of presidential rhetoric. Johnson’s open declaration of 
war on poverty in his 1964 State of the Union Address went on to become one of the 
rhetorical and political signatures of his administration. In particular, the war metaphor 
galvanized proponents of the bill in that “It defined the objective and encouraged 
enlistment in the effort, it identified the enemy against whom the campaign was directed, 
and it dictated the choice of weapons and tactics with which the struggle would be 
fought.”42 Zarefsky’s analysis not only reveals the potential power of presidential 
rhetoric, it supports the notion that presidents and their advisors are constantly engaged in 
the process of seeking the right words which, in the right situations, will assist in the 
accomplishment of the administration’s objectives. Zarefsky’s work is an important 
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intellectual ancestor of my dissertation given its inquiry into religious rhetorical forms as 
both potential shibboleths and potentially valuable rhetorical tools of recent presidential 
administrations. Many scholars from political science and communication report that 
presidential rhetoric is potentially effective with regard to: its impact upon the American 
economy,43 the framing of public policy choices for the electorate,44 impact upon a 
president’s public approval,45 the power to define public issues,46 the potential for a single 
speech to have a decisive effect upon an election,47 and the potential utility (under certain 
circumstances) of televised foreign policy speeches48 to name but a few areas of potential 
influence. While the breadth of scholarship in presidential rhetoric is quite impressive, 
much remains to be learned about how American presidents use religion in their rhetoric. 
Although scholars from disciplines as diverse as literature, political science, 
history, and sociology had long recognized the influence of religion upon American 
politics,49 communication scholars were, as Roderick P. Hart has noted, slower to explore 
this dynamic nexus.50 This began to change in 1977 (the same year Jimmy Carter took 
office) with the publication of Roderick Hart’s path breaking book The Political Pulpit 
and the beginning of Ernest Bormann’s explorations of rhetorical forms and influential 
symbolic themes in the history of religious and political rhetoric. Using sociologist 
Robert N. Bellah’s formulation of civil religion as his starting point, Hart argues that 
there is an extant “civic piety” in the United States—an unspoken contract between the 
government and organized religion stipulating guises of “complete separation” and 
“existential equality” between the two parties.51 Additionally, Hart’s contract stipulates 
that, while far from completely separate, government “will refrain from being overly 
religious” and religion “will refrain from being overly political.”52 While Hart’s contract 
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metaphor and criticisms of Bellah’s formulation of civil religion have been and will 
continue to be debated by scholars,53 his most trenchant point of analysis is found in the 
important observation that “religion provides a wealth of symbolic force for political 
leaders who associate themselves with such forces.”54 
  That same year, Ernest Bormann also turned his attention to religio-political 
rhetoric in an essay entitled “Fetching Good out of Evil” published in the Quarterly 
Journal of Speech. Bormann identified the “fetching good out of evil” motif as a 
rhetorical form a—“recurring pattern of discourse”—which exhibited remarkable 
influence in instances of religious and political rhetoric during periods of crisis such as 
the French and Indian War and the American Civil War.55 The form, itself a subspecies of 
the influential jeremiad form often utilized by the Puritan ministers of the colonial era,56 
proclaimed that the community’s current crisis was God’s judgment for its collective 
sins. Redemption could be found if the community would recognize its sinfulness and 
work hard to correct its moral and spiritual deficiencies.57 Bormann argues that Lincoln’s 
renowned Second Inaugural Address utilized this form “to try to impel the North to 
continue the war to a successful conclusion . . .” and ultimately to “rebuild and restore a 
sense of national community after its destruction during that conflict.”58 In the years that 
followed, Bormann’s work continued to highlight the existence of and potential rhetorical 
power of similar rhetorical forms and the religious ideas implicit to them.59 
This stream of scholarship was further enriched in 1980 by Kurt Ritter’s 
influential essay on the use of the jeremiad form in modern presidential nomination 
acceptance addresses. While the jeremiad had long been recognized as an important 
rhetorical form in Puritan and colonial America, Ritter argues that the form was alive and 
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well in the speeches of modern presidential candidates who “offer[ed] to lead the people 
through repentance back to their fundamental national values and, thereby, restore 
America to its former greatness.”60 Hart, Bormann, and Ritter illustrate that religion and 
forms of religious discourse are important inventional sources for presidential speeches--
they supply political rhetors with powerful symbolic elements quite useful in crafting 
effective suasory appeals.    
 The study of religious rhetoric in politics has been reinvigorated by a number of 
factors. The popular interest in apocalyptic prophecies surrounding the year 2000, the 
rhetorical responses to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the increasingly 
prominent role of religious rhetoric in the last two national political campaigns, and the 
manifestly religious rhetoric of President George W. Bush have all conspired to reignite 
scholarly interest in the topic.61 This dissertation seeks to contribute to this important 
discussion by exploring the ways in which presidents use religious rhetorical forms as 
political shibboleths—passwords designed to help them accomplish rhetorical and 
political objectives and to create a sense of identification with the American public.  
As previously noted the conjoined concepts of “identification and 
consubstantiality”62 are central components of Burke’s broader concept of symbolic 
action. For Burke, human beings must use symbolic action in the form of rhetoric to 
transcend the differences inherent to their existence. Human beings are separated one 
from another by geography, socio-economic class, and by religion and politics. However, 
Burke argued that humans can use rhetoric to come together in unity. His explanation is 
worth quoting at some length: 
Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one 
another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity. 
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If men were wholly and truly of one substance, absolute communication  
would be man’s very essence. It would not be an ideal, as it now is, . . . rather,  
it would be as natural, spontaneous, and total as with those ideal prototypes of  
communication, the theologian’s angels, or ‘messengers.’63  
 
As Burke more succinctly put it, “Rhetoric is concerned with the state of Babel after the 
Fall.”64 Seen from this perspective, one primary function of political rhetoric is to 
transcend the differences inherent to large national audiences and create a sense of unity 
by upholding commonly-held virtues and ideals. This goal of political rhetoric has been 
noted by Campbell and Jamieson who argue that one of the objectives of presidential 
inaugurals is to “unif[y] the audience by reconstituting its members as the people . . .”65 
Consubstantiality—the point where the receiver of the message has become 
convinced that the sender is like him or her—is the ultimate goal of suasory 
communication according to Burke. As he explained, “To identify A with B is to make A 
‘consubstantial’ with B.”66 Obviously, there is much persuasive value in A becoming 
convinced that he or she is of the same substance as B. One sees much evidence of 
consubstantiality taking place in those who identify with the religious tone and form of 
George W. Bush’s presidential campaign rhetoric. As previously noted, evangelical 
leaders such as Richard Land are quite impressed with Bush’s religious vocabulary: “I 
think that there’s no question that this president expresses his faith in overtly evangelical 
terms in a way that is much more recognizable, much more identifiable as being quote, 
‘one of us’ than the presidents that I’ve known in my lifetime.”67 Land is clearly not alone 
in this sentiment. Exit poll results compiled by the Cable News Network (CNN) indicate 
that Bush was favored by “white evangelicals” who consider themselves “born again” by 
78% to only 21% for Senator John Kerry.68 The findings of such exit polls (while 
sometimes deemed unreliable) appear to be confirmed by the 2004 Religion and Politics 
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Post-Election Survey which found that “the groups that voted for Bush also approved of a 
strong role for religion in the process and report that it played a vital role in their 
decision.”69 While party affiliations and issue positions certainly played significant roles 
in candidate choice, there can be little doubt that Bush’s use of religious rhetoric helped 
enable him to mobilize a core constituency. 
There is also evidence to suggest that Bush’s use of religious rhetoric may have 
struck harmonious chords even among those disinclined to support him. In his recent 
book God’s Politics, liberal evangelical author Jim Wallis tells of an elderly West 
Virginia voter who was “more conflicted than ever” about choosing a candidate in 
2004.70 Wallis explained that while she had serious reservations about the war in Iraq and 
Bush’s economic policy, “she said, she liked the way he talks about his Christianity and 
brings his faith into what he’s doing.”71 Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, known to 
be an outspoken critic of the Bush administration, has admitted that in spite of his 
opposition to many of Bush’s policies he is “moved by his [Bush’s] reference to the 
Scriptures.”72 In short, these accounts and statistics suggest that Bush’s religious appeals 
appear to effect his perception among the public. This study will attempt to determine 
both the degree to which identification and consubstantiality result from presidential use 
of religious rhetorical forms, and how religious rhetorical forms may foster this 
identification.   
Outline of Chapters 
The case studies examined in this dissertation are those which illustrate most 
clearly the potential use of certain religious rhetorical forms as political shibboleths. 
Chapter II will initiate this effort by outlining religious rhetorical form as a theoretical 
  
    20
and methodological approach distinct from both civil religion as defined by Robert 
Bellah and Roderick Hart’s notion of a contract of civic piety. This comparison is 
necessary because it will establish the utility of religious rhetorical form as an approach 
to understanding religious rhetoric in presidential discourse.  
Chapter III explores how President Jimmy Carter utilized the jeremiad to address 
America’s energy crisis of the late 1970s. In contrast to other studies which focus solely 
upon Carter’s energy jeremiad as manifested in his infamous “malaise speech,” I explore 
all of Carter’s major energy speeches in order to note the increasingly moralistic 
trajectory of his messages. This chapter paints a revealing, and often painful, picture of 
an American president (and a good man) acting as a socio-political and cultural prophet. 
Although Carter was widely respected for his personal humility and the strength of his 
convictions, a series of rhetorical and political missteps undermined his use of the 
jeremiad as a political shibboleth.  
Chapter IV also examines the jeremiad but looks to President Ronald Reagan’s 
increasingly optimistic use of the form throughout his presidency in relation to the state 
of the American economy. From his first inaugural address to his farewell, Reagan 
adapted the traditionally judgmental and moralistic character of the Puritan rhetorical 
form to make it far more palatable to a 1980s American audience. The economy was in 
trouble not because the people had sinned, but because they had been led astray by the 
false prophets of collectivism. In contrast to Carter, Reagan’s jeremiad was 
postmillennial in its orientation—continually expressing the belief that the American 
economy could and would improve by hard work and renewed faithfulness to the belief 
in limited government which (in Reagan’s view) had made America great. Reagan’s use 
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of the jeremiad form throughout the 1980 campaign and his administration was far 
gentler, more inclusive, and far less faithful to the Puritan jeremiad than Carter’s had 
been. Not surprisingly, Reagan’s version of the form was much better received by the 
public. Their diverse uses of the jeremiad form may illustrate both the remarkable 
adaptability of such forms and that such shibboleths may either help or hinder an 
administration or campaign. 
Although President George H. W. Bush is often marginalized by rhetorical 
analysts because of his well documented disdain for rhetoric, his use of the atonement 
form reflects the tendency of contemporary presidents to use religious rhetorical forms. 
Chapter V analyzes Bush’s use of the atonement form throughout the Persian Gulf War 
of 1991. Prior to the war, Bush used the form to suggest, on numerous occasions, that any 
war in the Persian Gulf would not be another Vietnam. At the end of the conflict, Bush 
employed the form in order to maintain that America’s success in expelling Saddam 
Hussein’s military forces from Kuwait had ended the “Vietnam syndrome” and the 
lingering effects of it. The national redemption enacted by Bush was quite short-lived. He 
soon found his ability to respond to the humanitarian crises in Iraq following the war had 
been severely hampered by his continual pledges to avoid another Vietnam-style conflict.  
Chapter VI discusses President Bill Clinton’s use of deliverance form throughout 
his presidential campaign and his administration. Clinton entered the race for the 
presidency in 1992 promising to renew America’s economic and political promise. While 
some scholars have argued that Clinton’s campaign rhetoric is reflective of a political 
jeremiad,73 this chapter argues that Clinton’s rhetoric had far more in common with the 
deliverance prophets of ancient Israel who promised that divine national restoration was 
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at hand. Such a distinction is quite important to the study of rhetorical forms as they 
operate within religious political discourse. This chapter demonstrates that while 
prophetic forms of discourse do indeed play an important role in American discourse, 
there is a greater variety of prophetic rhetorical form than what has been recognized by 
rhetorical scholarship to date. In short, this chapter illustrates a degree of complexity 
about prophetic religious rhetorical form in presidential rhetoric which is yet to be widely 
recognized.  
Chapter VII investigates President George W. Bush’s use of the Pauline 
conversion narrative throughout his 2000 campaign discourse, but particularly in his 
campaign biography A Charge to Keep. In this chapter I argue that the Bush campaign 
modified Bush’s own religious conversion experience to fit more closely the 
requirements of the Pauline form. This modification had a number of rhetorical and 
political benefits for Bush since it enabled him to create a sense of consubstantiality with 
evangelical voters, enabled him to declare his previous personal transgressions out of 
bounds for public scrutiny, and allowed him to name the Reverend Billy Graham as his 
sole spiritual mentor when in fact he was not. By noting these benefits I do not mean to 
imply that Bush’s religious conversion was not genuine. However, I concur with former 
Bush administration insider David Kuo who notes that “George W. Bush’s religious 
orientation was the most carefully controlled aspect of his public image.”74 Bush’s use of 
the Pauline conversion form enabled him to satisfactorily manage his public image in 
such a way as to appear consubstantial with evangelicals while maintaining the image of 
a “compassionate conservative.”   
  
    23
Finally, in chapter VIII, I discuss the rhetorical and democratic implications of the 
vigorous emergence of religious form in presidential discourse. I will offer some 
normative observations of the phenomenon and cautiously evaluate the future prospects 
of religious rhetoric as a political shibboleth in America.  
This dissertation will certainly not address every element of the confluence of 
religious and political rhetoric; but this study will provide a valuable contribution to our 
current understanding of this important rhetorical and political phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER II  
 
RECONSIDERING RELIGIOUS RHETORIC IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE:  
 
CIVIL RELIGION, CIVIC PIETY, OR RELIGIOUS RHETORICAL FORM? 
 
 
While attempting to sketch the contours of the ideal political state in his 1762 
work Of the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
boldly asserts in Chapter Eight of Book IV that “no state has ever been founded without 
religion serving as its base. . . .”1 A few lines later Rousseau explains that the religion to 
which he refers is not any particular spiritual religion, but “that of the Citizen.”2 
Throughout the chapter Rousseau extols the virtues of this citizen’s religion; the chief 
aims of which are the promotion of political stability and good citizenship via agreement 
on what he calls the “dogmas of civil religion” which included: “The existence of the 
powerful, intelligent and beneficent, prescient, and provident Divinity, the life to come, 
the happiness of the just, the punishment of the wicked, the sanctity of the social contract 
and the laws . . .”3 In writing these words Rousseau not only coined the phrase civil 
religion but offered the germ of a new theoretical perspective from which to study how 
the state and religion interact. At its core, Rousseau’s concept consists of three elements: 
(1) every political society has as its foundation an extant civil religion which promotes 
good citizenship at the individual level and political stability for the ruling regime, (2) 
civil religion entails the veneration of the values, laws and institutions of the state, and 
(3) an explicit rejection of any actual religion as an adequate basis for a civil society.  
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In a sense, Rousseau’s observation about a vibrant religious component in 
political society was nothing new. Scholars from Plato to the contemporary era have 
recognized important connections between religion and politics. In 1835 French aristocrat 
turned accomplished social observer Alexis de Tocqueville commented at length about 
the sociological and political functions of American religion. Among his discoveries 
Tocqueville specifically cites: ministers willing to engage political topics from their 
pulpits, elected politicians who recognized the political utility of religious denominations 
and consequently tried to avoid offending them, and even a New York court case wherein 
a witness’ testimony was ultimately dismissed because he declared himself an atheist.4 
These observations led him to conclude that in spite of constitutionally-imposed religious 
disestablishment “from the beginning, politics and religion [in America] contracted an 
alliance which has never been dissolved.”5 Tocqueville is even more specific a few pages 
later when he suggests that despite Rousseau’s insistence to the contrary, Christianity in 
the American case may have formed much of the basis of an American civil faith: “The 
Americans combine notions of Christianity and of liberty so intimately in their minds, 
that it is impossible to make them conceive the one without the other. . . .”6 Efforts like 
these have resulted in a corpulent body of literature and a dizzying array of theoretical 
explanations of the phenomenon of religion and politics in general, and of religious 
political rhetoric in particular.  
Rather than review the entire intellectual corpus on the relationship between 
religion and politics, this chapter confines itself to a comparison of three contemporary 
theoretical and methodological approaches to understanding the dynamic discursive 
relationship between religion and politics—American civil religion, the contract of civic 
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piety, and religious rhetorical form. Focusing upon these three approaches allows for an 
expansive, but detailed, view of how the scholarly community presently understands the 
subject of religious rhetoric as it pertains to American political discourse.  
Of these three, American civil religion has become the dominant, if not altogether 
unified, contemporary theoretical construct. Despite its value in helping interpret political 
texts which reference transcendent values inherent to civil religion and the prominence of 
the civil religion construct in contemporary literature, civil religion alone fails to provide 
a satisfactory theoretical account of presidential uses of religious rhetoric. This is 
particularly true in contemporary presidential communication where figures such as 
Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush use very personal religious references by discussing 
their own religious conversions.  
Roderick Hart’s formulation of a contract of civic piety also informs much of our 
present understanding of religious political rhetoric. While the particulars of the contract 
will be discussed later in this chapter, Hart’s view of religious rhetoric in political 
discourse is more instrumental than Bellah’s because he argues (quit correctly) that 
religion is a powerful rhetorical tool for those political figures who must enlist either 
active or tacit public support in order to govern. Hart’s contract (itself an interesting 
rhetorical artifact) stipulates that guises of complete separation and existential equality 
exist between the two parties—the government will remain in its realm, mainstream 
religion will remain active only rhetorically.7 Moreover the government agrees to refrain 
from being overly religious and mainstream religion will refrain from being overly 
political while neither party will divulge the details of the contract. Although students of 
political rhetoric have often noted the dangers of candidates appearing to be too religious, 
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the rhetorical presidencies of Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush who 
each employed religious rhetoric quite frequently indicate that perhaps the term of the 
contract have changed. Although the contract of civic piety has not received the same 
degree of scholarly attention as Bellah’s civil religion, it too has shaped much of the 
discussion in our discipline regarding this dynamic area of scholarship—so much so that 
the Journal of Communication and Religion dedicated a whole issue to the discussion of 
Hart’s thesis in 2002 and Hart’s book The Political Pulpit was expanded and republished 
in 2005. Like civil religion, the contract of civic piety is unable to account for the 
presence of well-documented patterns of religious discourse, such as the jeremiad, which 
continue to emerge in American political discourse.  I am not suggesting that either civil 
religion or the contract of civic piety fail to help us understand the religious discourse to 
be found in some instances of presidential rhetoric; however, I do posit that the 
theoretical construct of religious rhetorical form—which I introduced in the previous 
chapter—is an important dimension of how contemporary presidents use religious 
rhetoric, and is therefore a fruitful alternative methodological tool for conducting 
rhetorical analyses of contemporary presidential rhetoric. Additionally, this chapter will 
demonstrate how the religious rhetorical form construct provides a deeper conceptual 
understanding of the potential effectiveness of such presidential rhetoric, and how it is 
blessed with more conceptual clarity than either the civil religion or civic piety 
constructs.  The most effective way to proceed is to review the literatures of both civil 
religion and civic piety and note several conceptual problems with their respective 
applications to rhetorical analysis of contemporary religious presidential rhetoric. Next, I 
will review the tenets of the religious rhetorical form construct and end by considering 
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several brief examples of presidential rhetoric which illustrate the utility of the rhetorical 
form construct.  
American Civil Religion 
As Rousseau himself acknowledged in The Social Contract, the idea of civil 
religion is not without historical pedigree. In 399 B.C.E. Socrates was brought to trial in 
Athens on charges of impiety toward the gods and corruption of the city’s youth. 
Although his true crime was philosophy by way of dialectic, Socrates’ accusers 
convinced the assembly of jurors that his teachings were injurious to their religion—and 
therefore the state.8 The practice of a civil religion was even more influential in ancient 
Rome. From the vestal virgins who were the keepers of the sacred flame of Rome to the 
official title of its emperors—pontifex maximus (literally “chief preist”)—Roman religion 
was corporate, communal, and above all political. Roman religion afforded the political 
value of stability thanks in no small part to its malleability—a trait it shares with modern 
conceptions of civil religion.9 For both of these powerful ancient cultures such loosely-
defined but strictly-enforced civic creeds were not just attractive ideas, but “the social 
glue of [the] ideal state.”10 Religious historian Sydney Ahlstrom writes that the 
worldview of America’s early colonists was profoundly shaped by what he considers to 
be civil religious rhetorical themes of “mission, an abundant land, a noble hero, and a 
favoring Providence.”11 While the themes Ahlstrom highlights may be more accurately 
termed instances of religious rhetorical form, his assertion illustrates the degree to which 
the civil religion construct has permeated current scholarship and the interpretation of 
American rhetorical history. While there can be little doubt that a civil religion existed in 
ancient Greece and Rome, and at various points throughout human history when church 
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and state were virtually identical (as in the early Puritan settlements in America), one 
may reasonably question the degree to which civil religion remains a viable theoretical 
construct in modern American presidential rhetoric. To engage this question, we must 
turn to a transdisciplinary review of the contemporary civil religion literature.  
In 1967 sociologist Robert N. Bellah revived Rousseau’s terminology in an oft-
cited and reprinted article entitled “Civil Religion in America” published in the journal 
Daedalus. Bellah posits that the appearance of religious themes such as “Exodus, Chosen 
People, Promised Land, New Jerusalem, and Sacrificial Death and Rebirth” in rhetorical 
sites such as presidential inaugurals and founding documents such as the Declaration of 
Independence point to the existence of a distinctive “national cult” which he called “civil 
religion.”12 As Bellah famously insisted: “The existence of this highest level of religious 
symbolism in the political life of the republic justifies the assertion that there is a civil 
religion in America”13 
Although Bellah is sometimes credited with single-handedly reintroducing civil 
religion, his seminal article was part of a larger theory-building dialogue Bellah himself 
helped reignite among historians and sociologists concerning religion in public life—a 
discussion which reached its zenith in the 1960s and 70s.14 These discussions ultimately 
produced five distinct conceptualizations of American civil religion: folk religion, 
transcendental universal religion of the nation, religious nationalism, democratic faith, 
and Protestant civic piety.15 An entire book-length study could easily be devoted to 
highlighting the similarities and differences of each conceptualization along with their 
respective strengths and weaknesses. However, this analysis focuses upon the variety of 
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civil religion most consistently applied in the literature on presidential rhetoric—the 
notion that civil religion exists as a transcendent universal religion of the nation.  
Bellah’s work—which fits squarely within the transcendental universal religion of 
the nation conceptualization—was based largely upon religious historian Sidney Mead’s 
contention that Americans (en mass) have practiced both a trans-denominational 
Protestant orthodoxy and a “religion of the democratic society and nation” since the 
nineteenth century.16 Mead argues that this religion “was articulated in terms of the 
destiny of America, under God, to be fulfilled by perfecting the democratic way of life 
for the example and betterment of mankind.”17 In Mead’s (and later Bellah’s) 
conceptualization, American civil religion was both particular to America in regard to its 
covenantal responsibility to promote values such as freedom and democracy around the 
world and universal in light of its assumption of a universal Deity to whom the nation 
would be held accountable. As Martin E. Marty explains, the other four conceptions of 
civil religion would be “faiths for the part, while it [the universal transcendent civil 
religion] would be a faith for the whole.”18 Mead flatly rejects the notion that civil 
religion is simply a form of American nationalism. After quoting lengthy passages from 
the likes of presidents Madison, Lincoln, and Eisenhower and Supreme Court Justice 
William O. Douglas he opines: “How can anyone suppose that Madison and Lincoln and 
Douglas and Eisenhower in these representative pronouncements represented an 
idolatrous worship of the nation, or the civil state, or of ‘the American Way of Life’?”19 
 The term American civil religion appears at times to elude specific definition. 
This observation is not intended to diminish the scholarship of Robert Bellah or that of 
any other of its proponents, but to simply recognize the lack of conceptual clarity that 
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accompanies it. Throughout his writings Bellah defines American civil religion in several 
different ways. In his original essay Bellah defined the concept in distinctively 
Durkheimian terms as “a collection of beliefs, symbols, and rituals with respect to sacred 
things and institutionalized in a collectivity.”20 Elsewhere Bellah defines American civil 
religion as “that religious dimension, found . . . in the life of every people, through which 
it interprets its historical experience in the light of transcendent reality.”21 In 1980, Bellah 
produced a third definition with an even more explicitly religious metaphor: “the worship 
of a higher reality that upholds the standards the republic attempts to embody.”22 
While his definition of the concept has evolved—morphing from symbolic to 
religious terms—Bellah’s view can be distilled into three central premises. First, 
American civil religion is an attempt to communicate and account for America’s role in a 
larger transcendent reality. For instance, in his 1975 work The Broken Covenant: 
American Civil Religion in Time of Trial, Bellah resembles a modern-day prophet 
chastising Americans for sins such as promoting a violent and intolerant culture. His 
passionate conclusion to the book clearly illustrates the depth of his convictions about 
America and its civil religion: 
We certainly need a new ‘Great Awakening.’ The inward reform of  
conversion, the renewal of an inward covenant among the remnant that  
remains faithful to the hope for rebirth, is more necessary than it has ever  
been in America. The great experiment may fail utterly, and such failure 
will have dark consequences not only for Americans but for all the world. . . . 
One of the tenets of the early Puritans that we could well remember is that 
the millennium is brought by God, not man. . . . We do not know what the  
future holds and we must give up the illusion that we control it, for we know 
that it depends not only on our action but on grace. While recognizing the 
reality of death, we may return finally to Winthrop’s biblical injunction: 
Let us choose life.23 
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It is small wonder that Edwin S. Gaustad called this work a “jeremiad with footnotes.”24 
Thus, Bellah’s conceptualization is deeply grounded as much in his personal faith as in 
his theoretical description of empirical realities. While one can certainly admire the 
conviction with which Bellah writes, conceiving of civil religion in this way introduces a 
host of theoretical and methodological problems which will be addressed later in this 
chapter. 
Scholars who embrace the transcendent universal religion of the nation 
conceptualization see its broad political institutionalization as the second major 
characteristic of civil religion. Following the influence of Sidney Mead, Bellah and other 
proponents of the theory find evidence for civil religion in the speeches of presidents,25 
Madison’s writings about the Constitution,26 sermons and religious services,27 and even 
America’s bicentennial celebration in 1976.28 As noted earlier, the presence of Biblical 
archetypes such as “Exodus, Chosen People, Promised Land, New Jerusalem . . .” to 
name a few are taken as evidence of an extant civil religion.29 These studies clearly 
illustrate that America’s public religious consciousness is deep and wide; but can it 
rightly be called an institutionalized public religion? Is it a coherent, unified, and 
universal religion of the nation, or are the rhetors in each of these studies using stock 
metaphors, images, and patterns of religious discourse to add greater persuasive force to 
their rhetoric? Precisely what is it that has become institutionalized?  
Like Rousseau, Bellah’s civil religion (if properly practiced) is assumed to have 
the effect of promoting responsible citizenship at the individual level and legitimizing the 
authority of the civil government at the communal level.30 This can only be the case 
however if the civil religion upholds and venerates the ideal principles of the state—those 
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which the state uses to define both good citizenship and its own identity. This third major 
element of civil religion comes through most clearly in Habits of the Heart wherein 
Bellah and colleagues discuss the union of Biblical rhetoric to republican ideals. While 
the term civil religion is never used in this book, the authors specifically cite Martin 
Luther King Jr. as the quintessential example of such a union between religious rhetoric 
and political ideals. As they explain: 
King’s articulation of the biblical and republican strands of our national 
history enabled a large number of Americans, black and white, to recognize 
their real relatedness across difference. King characterized legal disenfran- 
chisement, poverty, and unemployment as institutionalized denials of 
personal dignity and social participation—glaring failures of collective 
national responsibility.31 
 
In the case of King, he was acting as prophetic spokesperson for principles such as 
justice, inclusion, and equal protection under the law—principles synonymous with the 
laws of “nature’s God” as propounded in the Declaration of Independence. Thus, we see 
that any viable civil religion must promote the ideal principles of the state. Indeed, as a 
number of political science scholars have noted, this is likely the primary reason for the 
existence of civil religion in any society in the first place.32 Perhaps the clearest parallel 
between Bellah’s civil religion and the contemporary presidency can be found in the way 
American presidents often attempt to use religious rhetoric to venerate ideals such as 
freedom. As we will see later in this chapter, such occasions also illustrate how the civil 
religion and rhetorical form constructs work together at times to produce powerful 
political discourse. 
 Bellah and other proponents of civil religion often argue that the fourth element of 
American civil religion is that it is inherently nonsectarian. They seem to want to argue as 
Rousseau did that established religions are themselves inadequate to the task of unifying 
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an entire nation. While perhaps an appropriate feature for a “religion of the nation,” it 
should be noted that the Biblical archetypes which, according to Bellah, under gird the 
nonsectarian civil religion—“Exodus, Chosen People, Promised Land, New Jerusalem, 
Sacrificial Death and Rebirth”—all appear to emerge from either the Jewish or Christian 
traditions. As such, it may well be asked: how truly nonsectarian is American civil 
religion? 
 American civil religion has become the dominant theoretical explanation of the 
intersection of religion and politics. In Bellah’s home discipline of sociology, the concept 
has generated interest and contentious debate among an entire generation of sociologists. 
At the theoretical level, John A. Coleman and Gail Gehrig have contributed to the civil 
religion literature by endeavoring to define elements of Bellah’s original work more 
precisely.33 Coleman considers civil religion to be “the set of beliefs, rites, and symbols 
which relates a man’s role as citizen and his society’s place in space, time, and history to 
the conditions of ultimate existence and meaning.”34 This definition shifts the focal point 
of the construct from a transcendent universal covenant toward a symbolization system 
able to legitimize the extant political structure and promote the values of a given society. 
This finding neatly dovetails with those of Gehrig who suggests that modern American 
civil religion performs integrative, legitimating, and prophetic roles.35 Thus, while the 
transcendent and universal elements of Bellah’s civil religion have not been specifically 
repudiated by scholars, most studies now conceptualize civil religion in terms of its 
symbolic import—particularly in light of its priestly (one who speaks to the Almighty in 
behalf of the nation) or prophetic (one who speaks to the nation on the behalf of the 
Almighty) functions.36 
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Many scholars of religion and public affairs have largely accepted either Bellah’s 
notion of civil religion or its modified premises constructed by Coleman and Gehrig and 
have designed studies attempting to detect the presence and functions of civil religion in 
various contexts including: American history,37 the American populist movement,38 
newspaper editorial pages during a July 4th, “honor America” weekend in 1970,39 Richard 
Nixon’s 1972 presidential campaign,40 and within the general population.41 While most of 
these studies found the presence of civil religion, the findings of Thomas and Flippen 
who analyzed the content of one hundred randomly-selected newspaper editorials on or 
about July 4, 1970 indicate little evidence for the existence of the construct. Accordingly, 
they theorize that perhaps the construct is “more the creation (and fantasy) of the liberal 
political intellectual elite than active faith among the masses.”42 
 Thomas and Flippen are not the only critics of Bellah’s civil religion construct. 
The perspectives of sociologist Richard K. Fenn, historian John F. Wilson, and Roderick 
P. Hart are representative of the critiques of the civil religion construct. Fenn’s critique is 
by far the most acerbic. He argues that American society has become so diversified that 
religion—of any type including civil religion—cannot constitute a sustainable basis for 
social cohesion.43 The point is expressed by his assertion that “religious values seem to 
have little demonstrable relationship to what people actually do in work and politics.”44 
Fenn’s reluctance to accept civil religion is clearly grounded in a distrust of the rhetorical 
and sociological effects of religion. Indeed, he dismissively relegates religious expression 
to the realm of “nonrational aspects of individual behavior [such] as play, or the 
exploration of human relationships, or activities intended to relieve boredom. . .”45 Fenn’s 
criticism may have been more salient when he first wrote these words in 1972 prior to the 
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rise of the Religious Right as a potent force in American politics, the overt religiosity of 
the Carter presidency, and the nearly ubiquitous use of religious form and imagery by the 
occupants of the White House since that time.  
 In contrast, historian John F. Wilson believes that religion has been and remains 
an important force in American history. Wilson argues that religion (among other 
functions) establishes a storehouse of “religio-mythic materials” which do much to shape 
the collective beliefs of the national community.46 In this sense, Wilson agrees with 
Bellah’s notion that religious elements retain powerful symbolic (rhetorical) influence in 
American culture. For this reason, Wilson claims that—of all the various 
conceptualizations of civil religion—Bellah’s is the most fruitful.47 However, he finds 
that Bellah’s evidence “is inadequate to sustain the hypothesis” of a well-institutionalized 
and differentiated American civil religion.48 Essentially Wilson grants Bellah’s 
contention that Biblical rhetorical archetypes are an important feature of American 
political discourse, yet they simply do not rise to the level of a differentiated religion. 
Wilson also expresses his uneasiness with the potential for “highly nationalistic” features 
to arise from a civil religion construct.49 
One of the first communication scholars to engage the concept of civil religion 
was Roderick P. Hart. In his 1977 book The Political Pulpit, Hart challenges Bellah’s 
notion of civil religion claiming that it is a “hypostatization” of what are actually the 
rhetorical elements of religious discourse.50 Hart does not deny that American political 
culture has a religious element, but (much like Wilson) argues that Bellah “overreacted to 
the discourse he inspected” by assuming that the presence of religious discourse in 
  
    41
political rhetoric was evidence of a civil religion.51 Hart summarizes his critique of the 
civil religion construct in this way: 
If the American civil religion is a religion (and, as we have seen, there is 
little reason to suspect that it is), it is a largely symbolic religion. As a  
‘religion,’ it does not take verifiable action. It does not give alms to the  
poor. It does not even hold bingo games. Rather, it is a religion which  
exists within and because of discourse. Since it does nothing it is doomed 
to tag-along status existentially.52  
 
Despite civil religion’s chilly reception from Professor Hart, the concept has become a 
viable theoretical explanation of religio-political rhetoric—particularly in studies of the 
presidency. 
 James David Fairbanks considers civil religion to be one of the defining 
characteristics of contemporary presidential rhetoric. However, Fairbanks does not 
subscribe to Bellah’s notion of a transcendent faith. Rather, he recognizes that the 
religious rhetoric so often a part of presidential addresses provides a vocabulary of “basic 
symbols of transcendence” which are used as rhetorical resources in a variety of 
situations.53 The rhetorical employment of such symbols of transcendence is something 
quite apart from inferring a transcendent national covenant based upon the existence of 
such symbols. While Fairbanks and others54 continue to label all instances of religious 
symbol using as civil religion, I will soon highlight the differences between the two and 
argue that such a conflation—while tempting at times—is problematic theoretically and 
methodologically.  
 Richard Pierard and Robert Linder have compiled perhaps the most wide-ranging 
study of civil religion and the presidency in their 1988 book Civil Religion & the 
Presidency.  In contrast to Fairbanks, Pierard and Linder argue that American civil 
religion “represents an alliance between politics and religion at the national level, resting 
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on a politicized ideological base.”55 The ideological base to which they refer appears as 
an amalgam of Bellah’s transcendent universal religion of the nation and the religious 
nationalism varieties of civil religion. Four premises inform their analysis: “(1) there is a 
God; (2) his will can be known and fulfilled through democratic procedures; (3) 
American has been God’s primary agent in modern history; and (4) the nation is the chief 
source of identity for Americans in both a political and religious sense.”56 This they posit 
is the civil religion of the nation. Not surprisingly, they identify the president as the 
“‘pontifex maximus’ of American civil religion—principal prophet, high priest, first 
preacher, and chief pastor of the American nation.”57 Pierard and Linder argue that many 
American presidents have fulfilled the role of chief priest by employing civil religion in 
their discourse. However, Pierard and Linder’s research is limited by the same problem 
as other explorations—many of the instances of religious rhetoric they call references to 
civil religion may be interpreted as instances of religious rhetorical form.  
 Although more sophisticated in her analysis, one finds a largely similar use of 
civil religion in Vanessa Beasley’s You, the People. Beasley is less concerned than 
Pierard and Linder with noting the existence of civil religion in a wide range of 
presidencies. Her concern is primarily with the function of civil religion—which she 
argues is to “associate American national identity not just with a certain set of shared 
beliefs but also with a particular type of shared feelings.”58 While her shared belief 
hypothesis is both significant and compellingly argued, the use of civil religion retains its 
conceptual fuzziness. For instance, Beasley notes that the use of the “chosen people” 
motif by American presidents is a civil religious theme. If this is the case, from what 
branch(es) of civil religion theory do these themes emerge? What are the specific rites 
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and rituals of this faith? Could the use of the “chosen people” motif not be more easily 
explained as an instance of rhetorical form stemming from the deliverance form as 
discussed in chapter VI of this dissertation? In short, we must consider that not all 
instances of religious political rhetoric are civil religious in nature.59 
The Contract of Civic Piety 
 Although it lacks the long intellectual pedigree and wide transdisciplinary 
attention of Robert Bellah’s formulation of civil religion, Professor Roderick Hart’s idea 
that religious discourse in the American political realm is best explained as a secret 
contract between the government and organized religion has also influenced the scholarly 
conversation on the subject. Hart’s contract metaphor is as controversial as it is 
intriguing. Referring to the U.S. government as the first party and organized religion as 
the second party, Hart produces a fairly elaborate document that would make any 
attorney proud but puzzles some scholars due to its defining metaphor. The essential 
stipulations of Hart’s contract are as follows: 
 1. The guise of complete separation between the first party and the second  
party will be maintained by both parties. 2. The guise of existential equality 
between the first party and the second party will be maintained by both parties, 
but the second party’s realms shall be solely that of the rhetorical. 3. First  
party rhetoric will refrain from being overly religious and second party rhetoric 
will refrain from being overly political. 4. Neither of the aforementioned  
parties shall, in any fashion whatsoever, make known to the general populace  
the exact terms of the contract contained herein.60 
 
Like any contract, this one appears to be a binding and inflexible agreement 
between two parties. Therein lays much of the problem. Conceiving of the relationship 
between two “parties” as dynamic as organized religion and the American government as 
an unchanging, mutually-binding agreement seems to fly in the face of the fact that both 
are in a constant state of flux. Not only does the composition of America’s religious 
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populace change over time, but so does the composition of the American government 
with every single election. Since the people who make up each of these parties change 
quite frequently, how can we be sure that the new members and leaders of organized 
religion will continue to agree to the terms their predecessors allegedly agreed to with the 
leadership of the U.S. government and vice versa?  
Perhaps even more troubling are the problems with the individual stipulations 
Hart constructs. The increasing prominence of religious discourse on the campaign trail 
and the frequency with which religious leaders invite candidates to address their 
congregations hardly makes it look as though either party is interested in even the guise 
of complete separation. The administration of George W. Bush wherein religious 
organizations have received funding to be used to dispense various social services hardly 
looks like a “second party” that abides by its agreement that its realm is “solely that of 
the rhetorical.” The third stipulation is problematic for its vagueness. What does it mean 
that religion will not be “overly” political or that politics will not be “overly” religious? 
Finally, the notion that these stipulations exist as part of a secret bargain between religion 
and politics seems not only ill-founded but hyperbolic on its face.  
The contract of civic piety has produced a wide variety of opinions about its 
veracity and the implications it holds for discourse in the American public sphere. Ronald 
Lee chides Hart for looking to religious rhetoric as a pragmatic discursive tool only. He 
claims that religion remains an important moral force because the “ideological 
narratives” of American politics “are frequently structured by religion.”61 Carolyn Marvin 
agrees with Hart that religion can perform certain pragmatic functions, but argues that 
American nationalism which she believes to be grounded in “the rich rhetoric of 
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patriotism” which ultimately endows the government with the power to demand the 
bodily sacrifices of its citizens “is far more central” than any sort of rhetorical power 
religious rhetoric alone can manifest.62 Robert V. Friedenberg agrees with Hart’s notion 
of a contract between organized religion and the government and heartily insists that 
“religious rhetoric in this nation is not overtly political.”63 Nneka Ifeoma Ofulue would 
likely differ with Friedenberg’s assertion. Indeed, Ofulue’s analysis of President Bill 
Clinton’s apologetic appeal to the biblical persona of King David reveals just how useful 
religious narratives can be in accomplishing political purposes.64 Michael E. 
Eidenmuller’s analysis of the rhetoric of the conservative evangelical Promise Keepers 
organization challenges Hart’s findings by suggesting that it is quite difficult for 
mainstream religion to maintain the kind of nonsectarian character necessary to be 
understood as instances of civic piety or civil religion.65 Martin J. Medhurst finds the 
contract of civic piety to be useful descriptor of the interaction of religion and politics 
prior to the late 1970s (ironically just as The Political Pulpit was being published), but 
argues that the prominence of abortion as a political issue and the rise of the Religious 
Right (among other factors) have caused the contract to become outdated such that a new 
theoretical construct is now necessary to help clarify the relationship.66 
 Are there problems with civic piety as Hart conceptualizes it? Certainly. Is the 
construct without scholarly merit? Certainly not. Although it is vague, Hart’s idea that 
politicians must avoid the appearance of being overly religious helps explain the fact that 
American presidents make substantial, carefully calculated rhetorical efforts, to avoid the 
appearance of being too religious in order to enhance their appeal to the mass 
electorate.67 Nevertheless, I contend that a new construct—religious rhetorical form—is 
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valuable and needed because it helps to explain in more detail the discursive relationship 
between politics and faith in America.   
The Religious Rhetorical Form Construct 
In the previous chapter I posited that contemporary American presidents utilize 
religious rhetorical forms—distinctive yet commonly recognizable patterns of argument 
drawn from the religio-mythical reservoir of Christianity and Judaism—in order to 
accomplish various rhetorical and political objectives. These patterns possess an 
intellectual and cultural history which enables them to speak to the mythical needs of a 
diverse American audience. Although this is a new construct, its basic elements already 
exist in well-established form in the literature of public mythology and the rhetorical 
analysis of political rhetoric.  
When speaking of public mythology it is important to realize that one is not 
speaking of a fictitious fairy tale, but rather the collective set of commonly-held beliefs 
which shape much of the substance of a given culture. Cultural historian Richard Slotkin 
explains that: “A mythology is a complex of narratives that dramatizes the world vision 
and historical sense of a people or culture, reducing centuries of experience into a 
constellation of compelling metaphors.”68 Similarly, Joseph Campbell defines myth as a 
set of “clues to the spiritual potentialities of the human life” having much to do with “the 
experience of meaning.”69 For Slotkin and Campbell, myths are far more than obscure 
features of literary or cultural history—they are crucial components of a culture’s daily 
lived experience in the world. They provided a culturally-based treasure trove of what 
Richard L. Greene calls “traditional metaphor addressed to ultimate questions.”70 In 
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America, our cultural mythology often takes on a distinctively religious form and 
substance. As religious historian Sydney E. Ahlstrom explains: 
Christianity here wears a garment of American weaving and American  
adornment. The religious history of the country is quite as striking as its 
political; it has had as many and as marked epochs; the influences which  
have shaped it have to be sought for in more numerous and more diverse  
sources; and those influences are more actively at work now than are those 
which produce political changes.71 
 
In his own eloquent way, Ahlstrom recognizes the degree to which Americans as a 
people have incorporated religion into their socio-political discourse. Consider the 
following two examples. American history records all too painfully how Americans had, 
for several centuries, few qualms about systematically destroying the Native American 
tribes in part because of their rhetorical mythology which allowed them to view 
themselves as a “New Israel” or “chosen people” conquering and subduing the Promised 
Land. In 1898 Senate candidate Albert J. Beveridge famously expanded such ideas—this 
time with a distinctively missionary frame—by claiming that the same Providential 
power which had led Americans to tame the frontier was leading them now to “unfurl[ed] 
our banner” and Christianize the rest of the globe in the name of “liberty and 
civilization.”72 Ernest Lee Tuveson and John B. Judis have correctly recognized that 
Beveridge’s argument has become part of a coherent millennial vision which has been 
used to justify everything from Theodore Roosevelt’s “big stick” diplomacy of the early 
twentieth century to America’s invasion of Iraq in 2003.73 
Two important observations about such rhetoric must be made. First, both of the 
notions of millennial mission and subjugation of the Promised Land are inherently 
religious in substance. The observation that both of these religious motifs enjoy a 
prominent place in American political culture is neither unique nor surprising. However, 
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what is much less well understood is that each of these themes has become a consistent 
and distinctive pattern of argument in American political discourse. In the Promised Land 
form we find (1) a covenant people (2) chosen to possess a special land as a part of their 
divine inheritance and (3) an admonition to go forth and conquer the land in the name of 
the Almighty. In the case of the millennial missionary form we find: (1) an evil world (2) 
a just covenant people possessed of (3) a divine mission to redeem the world. Secondly, it 
must be noted that the basic premises of these patterns are so common in American 
cultural history that many Americans past and present quickly accept their political 
validity without question. Aiding the acceptance of these patterns is the fact that they are 
mythically satisfying to an American audience—that is to say that they confirm long-
standing presuppositions about the exceptionalism of America. In the case of these two 
forms the exceptionalism is realized via the accomplishment of a divine mission or by 
leading the world to the accomplishment of a just cause. American presidents and 
politicians who use one or more of these patterns of religious argument may be 
interpreted as saying shibboleth—adopting and adapting a religious pattern of argument 
which identifies with and is complimentary to certain religio-mythic elements of the 
American public.  
For instance, George W. Bush just days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 proclaimed that in the challenge to defeat terrorism that nation had found “our 
mission and our moment.”74 While additional exposition of his meaning was unnecessary, 
Bush gave it proclaiming that: “The advance of human freedom—the great achievement 
of our time . . . now depends on us. . . . We will rally the world to this cause by our 
efforts, by our courage.”75 Throughout this address one sees the footprints of the 
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missionary rhetorical form—an evil world which a covenant people is destined to redeem 
by its actions. Bush’s rhetoric would have sounded strange indeed if not for the fact that 
the missionary form has been part of the American cultural consciousness since Puritan 
times.76 
The approach I outline here is not entirely new. Pattern-based approaches to the 
study of political discourse have a long history in the communication discipline where 
many scholars have devoted considerable attention to the study of rhetorical genres.77 
Fewer studies have focused upon exploration of the religious argument patterns which 
occur in political discourse.78 The rhetorical form construct differs from genre studies in 
that most genre studies are situationally-grounded (e.g. inaugurals, state of the union 
addresses, etc.), whereas the patterns explored in the rhetorical form construct tend to cut 
across various genres and are used in response to a wide array of rhetorical exigencies. 
The rhetorical form construct is also distinct from explorations of religious argument 
patterns because it acknowledges that such patterns emanate not just from one particular 
denomination or religious tradition, but from the religio-mythical reservoir of America’s 
religious culture.79   
While the present study centers on religious rhetorical form in the contemporary 
presidency, it is important to clarify that the rhetorical form construct is not limited to 
either religion or the presidency. At its core, the rhetorical form construct is an approach 
which seeks to identify the discursive patterns which emerge in political rhetoric and then 
use the components, intellectual history, and mythical appeal of these patterns to aid in 
conducting rhetorical analyses of political rhetoric. As a theoretical construct and 
methodology it is based upon three principles. First, the religious rhetoric of 
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contemporary American presidents often appears in the form of distinctive, yet 
commonly-recognizable, and recurrent patterns of discourse. Second, that these patterns 
emerge from a rich religio-mythical reservoir of a variety of religious traditions. And 
third, that the premises and conclusions inherent within these patterns often aid presidents 
in achieving rhetorical and political objectives because they appeal to basic mythical 
needs within the public consciousness.  
 While an approach such as the one I have outlined will not solve all of the 
problems inherent to this dynamic area of study, I propose the inclusion of the religious 
rhetorical form construct as a compliment to the civil religion and civic piety constructs 
and as an aid in the rhetorical analysis of religious political rhetoric. I conclude this 
chapter by noting three benefits this approach affords coupled with brief illustrative 
examples. 
Theoretical and Methodological Benefits of Religious Rhetorical Form 
First, the religious rhetorical form construct allows scholars to avoid the 
unwarranted assumptions of the civil religion and civic piety constructs. Civil religion 
assumes the existence of a transcendent universal reality wherein God looks upon 
America with particular favor and requires special service. As Wilson and Hart have both 
noted, we must look upon the claims of a transcendent universal religion of the nation 
with a healthy degree of skepticism. Such assumptions are problematic not for their 
veracity or lack thereof, but because such assumptions are untestable and thus beyond the 
scope of reliable academic inquiry. Religious rhetoric typically frames events and defines 
people in transcendent terms to be sure; nevertheless, we simply assume too much if we 
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believe that America enjoys a privileged covenantal relationship with God simply 
because such an assertion is found throughout American rhetorical discourse.  
Such a relationship certainly exists by the rhetorical enactment of classic texts like 
Lincoln’s Second Inaugural; but Bellah assumes too much when he suggests that the 
Almighty views America in the same way American political rhetors say he does. As 
Lincoln himself admitted: “Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each 
invokes His aid against the other.”80 Certainly we cannot assume that Lincoln’s use of 
religion in this eloquent speech reflected the full unadulterated truth of how God saw the 
American nation. We can (and must) assume however that rhetors North and South used 
the religious materials they had within their stock of cultural memory and religious 
tradition to explain the war and its causes according to their perspectives. This 
observation does not deny the tremendous potential rhetorical power of religious 
discourse. Quite the contrary since political discourse is, in John F. Wilson’s words “shot 
through”81 with religious meaning. However, we must accept the most parsimonious 
explanation—that the religious features of such texts are intended to convey meanings 
based upon the interpretations of the rhetors, not the Almighty. 
The religious rhetorical form construct also enables us to avoid the unwarranted 
assumption of a secret alliance between organized religion and the government found in 
Hart’s contract metaphor. This assumption is problematic because, as illustrated by the 
increasing prominence of religio-political rhetoric since Hart first articulated the contract, 
the terms of said agreement can be no more binding or permanent that the ever-changing 
people and ideas which comprise the two “parties.” Both government and organized 
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religion have changed too much in the intervening years to define the relationship 
between them in such an unchanging—contractual—manner.  
Second, the religious rhetorical form construct allows for a more nuanced 
identification of the religious elements of presidential rhetoric than does the civil religion 
construct. One major problem of much of the scholarship reviewed here is that it 
considers any religious reference, regardless of its function or apparent rhetorical 
features, to be civil religious discourse. I do not claim that none of the instances of 
presidential rhetoric noted by Bellah or others are civil religious, but it is certainly 
overreaching to claim that every instance of religion in a presidential address is civil 
religion.  
We should consider the rhetorical presidency of Jimmy Carter as a helpful point 
of contrast between civil religion and religious rhetorical form. While some claim that 
Carter’s rhetoric was civil religious, it contained a number of major violations of 
American civil religion. Michael James Adee identifies nominal, doctrinal, and structural 
violations of civil religion in Carter’s rhetoric. For this analysis, the nominal and 
structural violations are most important for our purposes. Much of Carter’s rhetoric fails 
to fit within the civil religion paradigm, Adee argues, because he explicitly identified his 
God and his religious tradition as distinctly Christian. In his candidacy announcement on 
December 12, 1974 Carter identified himself as “a farmer, an engineer, a businessman, a 
planner, a scientist, a governor, and a Christian.”82 Carter’s penchant for proclaiming 
himself a “born again Christian” is also quite distinct from a nonsectarian tradition of 
civil religion. Carter’s God was not some transcendent other but one with whom he 
enjoyed a personal relationship. Additionally, as Adee observes, Carter’s religious 
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rhetoric fails to be civil religious on a structural level. His use of the jeremiad as the 
dominant rhetorical form in his speeches about the energy crisis is perhaps the clearest 
evidence of his employment of form rather than civil religion. Carter’s jeremiad featured 
the well-established promise, declension, and prophecy format of the form,83 allows us to 
see that he was using a religious rhetorical form rather than, as Adee calls it, a “patently 
generic” form of civil religion.84 While it is certainly possible that Carter may have used 
the jeremiad form in a civil religious way, it would be poor analysis to hastily call his 
language civil religion given that it conforms so clearly to the stylistic features of the 
jeremiad. Thus, an analysis using the rhetorical form construct would help avoid such 
mislabeling and will allow the analyst to determine the degree to which civil religion and 
rhetorical forms may work together in a given discourse.  
Third, the rhetorical form construct is more advantageous than either the civil 
religion or civic piety constructs when it comes to doing rhetorical analysis. Rhetorical 
form affords rhetorical analysts a veritable treasure trove of tools to consider the creation 
and functions of political discourse. The forms identified throughout this dissertation—
the jeremiad, the atonement form, the deliverance form, the Pauline conversion 
narrative—enable us not just to observe that a particular text uses religious language, but 
to analyze such texts to discover rhetorical details about their creation, how they interact 
with and spring from the religio-mythic materials of American culture, and why such 
texts may be persuasive. Careful examination of the forms which under gird political 
discourses can shed light upon (although certainly not fully explain) why the public 
accepts certain messages while rejecting others. One problematic feature of both the civil 
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religion and civic piety constructs is a paucity of analytical tools compared to those 
provided by exploring the rhetorical form of a discourse.  
Despite the conceptual and methodological problems with the civil religion and 
civic piety constructs which I have outlined here, I do not argue that either should be 
abandoned as theoretical concepts. Rather, each should be either reconceputalized or used 
in tandem with rhetorical form. Since ancient times civil religion has had to do with the 
veneration and propagation of the ideals of the state. Indeed, from Plato, to Rousseau, to 
Robert Bellah, this appears to be the primary function of civil religion—to promote the 
extant political arrangement and assure loyalty and citizenship among the society by 
promoting the civic values (and discouraging the civic vices) of that society. As Bellah 
would likely agree, American presidents and other political rhetors certainly do this. On 
January 20, 2005 George W. Bush delivered his Second Inaugural Address. While his 
inaugural was the primary exigency for the address, freedom was its central subject. 
While Bush used the rhetorical form of millennial mission to appeal to the national 
consciousness on this occasion, he spoke of freedom in what can only be described as 
civil religious terms: 
There is only one force of history that can break the reign of hatred and 
resentment and expose the pretensions of tyrants and reward the hopes of  
the decent and tolerant, and that is the force of human freedom. . . . The  
best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the  
world. America’s vital interests and deepest beliefs are now one. From the 
day of our founding, we have proclaimed that every man and woman on this 
earth has rights and dignity and matchless value, because they bear the image 
of the maker of heaven and earth. . . . Fancying these ideals is the mission that  
created our nation. It is the honorable achievement of our fathers. Now it is  
the urgent requirement of our nation’s security and the calling of our time.85 
 
Bush spoke of freedom as the central principle of the nation—one which also holds the 
key to the nation’s future as much as it is a hallmark of its past.  
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Although their motives were certainly less partisan and militaristic that Bush’s, 
one finds similar marriages between religious language and national ideals in classic 
American texts such as Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” and Lincoln’s Second 
Inaugural. For King, the marriage was between a jeremiad critiquing of the nation for 
failing to live up to the principles of justice, inclusion, and equality as found in the 
Declaration of Independence. Lincoln too combined the jeremiad form with values such 
as justice and reconciliation. Thus, civil religion and religious rhetorical form can (and 
do) stand together in instances where the rhetor clearly identifies and venerates a national 
principle.  
 Likewise, the theoretical and methodological utility of the contract of civic piety 
can be enhanced by using it alongside rhetorical form. On several occasions President 
Bill Clinton used religious rhetorical form while paying homage to some stipulations of 
the contract of civic piety. As detailed in chapter VI, Clinton employed the deliverance 
form throughout the 1992 campaign using the new covenant as its defining metaphor. 
Yet, Clinton never explicitly acknowledged the religious heritage of either the metaphor 
or the form. Additionally, he showed a high degree of democratic and rhetorical 
sensitivity (his critics would say cowardice) when, according to speechwriter Michael 
Waldman, Clinton expunged large portions of the new covenant metaphor from the early 
drafts of his First Inaugural Address—particularly those portions which referred to the 
responsibility of average citizens in helping to bring about the promised deliverance.86 
Thus, Clinton, who was quite adept at using the deliverance form, may have been eager 
to avoid the appearance of being too religious on the politically-hallowed occasion of his 
inaugural.  
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 The nexus of religious and political rhetoric is a dynamic one featuring many sets 
of interpretive, theoretical, and methodological problems. The rhetorical form construct I 
propose will not solve all of these, but may provide a clearer theoretical picture and a 
more comprehensive set of methodological tools than currently exist for the analysis of 
contemporary presidential religious rhetoric. As such, it has the potential to provide new 
insights which will help guide future scholarship of such rhetoric. The following chapters 
will both continue to demonstrate the utility of this approach, and reveal the rhetorical 
complexity of presidential religious rhetoric.  
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CHAPTER III  
 
DEFINED BY DECLENSION: THE MORALISTIC RHETORICAL  
 
TRAJECTORY OF JIMMY CARTER’S ENERGY JEREMIAD 
 
In a nation that was proud of hard work, strong families, close-knit communities, and our 
faith in God, too many of us now tend to worship self-indulgence and consumption. 
Human identity is no longer defined by what one does, but by what one owns. But we’ve 
discovered that owning things and consuming things does not satisfy our longing for 
meaning. We’ve learned that piling up material goods cannot fill the emptiness of lives 
which have no confidence or purpose. 
        Jimmy Carter1 
 
The days and weeks following any presidential campaign mark, for the victors, a 
turn from the elation and ecstasy of electoral victory to the frantic preparation inherent to 
the assumption of the presidential office. This was certainly the case when former 
Governor of Georgia James Earl Carter defeated President Gerald R. Ford in the 1976 
presidential campaign. The election night celebrations had barely ended before the 
president-elect and his staff were barraged by an array of decisions ranging from cabinet 
appointments, to the future of the ongoing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), to 
logistical and symbolic considerations about whether to walk or ride in the motorcade up 
to the Capitol for the inaugural ceremony.  
In the midst of the typical tumult of a presidential transition, Carter’s thoughts 
continually returned to the forthcoming rhetorical act wherein he would not only be 
“invested with the office of the presidency”2 but would present his vision of America—
his inaugural address. Carter wanted to use the auspicious occasion to challenge the 
nation to return to its “first principles.”3 For Carter, this return to first principles had to 
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include an appropriate response to the nation’s growing energy crisis—a problem which 
would bedevil him throughout his entire presidency. In his presidential memoir, Carter 
recalled that although there was little mention of it in his speech, the problem of energy 
and the need he perceived for the entire American populace to conserve energy and “stop 
looking to the federal government as a bottomless cornucopia”4 was foremost in his mind 
on the day of his inauguration. 
Such desires to return America to first principles were hardly new in the annals of 
inaugural discourse. Indeed, Woodrow Wilson’s first inaugural (which Carter claimed as 
his favorite) contained numerous warnings of “inexcusable waste” of natural resources 
along with excoriations of those who would use the government for “private and selfish 
purposes”5 rather than the common public good. In this spirit, the original draft of 
Carter’s inaugural prominently featured the conditional promise of II Chronicles 7:14 in 
the exordium: “If my people who are called by my name, shall humble themselves and 
pray, and seek my face, and turn from their wicked ways; then will I hear from heaven, 
and will forgive their sin, and will heal their land.”6 The stark language elicited calls for 
greater rhetorical caution from several Carter aides. Chief pollster Patrick Caddell, for 
one, argued in a memorandum to the president-elect that such a quotation “could be 
interpreted as your suggesting that the American people humble themselves and turn from 
their wicked ways and their sins, but you’ve been arguing all along [in the campaign] that 
the government was bad but the people were good.”[italics added]7 Caddell’s prescient 
warning and a frank conversation with his wife Rosalynn prompted Carter to reluctantly 
abandon the potentially-inflammatory verse in favor of the far-more-benign Micah 6:8.8 
While Carter wisely avoided denouncing the American people as sinners in his inaugural, 
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he would later prove unable (and unwilling) to countenance the nation’s energy sins and 
break free of the rhetorical constraints imposed upon him by the moralistic elements of an 
ancient religious rhetorical form so prominent in American discourse that historian 
Sacvan Bercovitch calls it “a national ritual.”9 
 Carter’s reluctance to don the prophetic mantle in his inaugural certainly did not 
prevent him from doing so in his rhetorical campaign to address the energy crisis. 
Although noteworthy studies have been devoted to the failure of Carter’s energy crisis 
rhetoric, particularly his infamous “malaise” speech of July 15, 1979,10 that scholarship 
fails to provide a convincing explanation as to why his many rhetorical efforts to address 
the crisis failed. Carter ascended to the White House after capturing a majority of the 
popular vote, and defeating an incumbent president. He enjoyed relatively high public 
popularity until the summer of 1977 when his approval rating began a slow but steady 
decline toward its nadir of sixteen percent in August of 1978.11 While some have 
suggested a relationship between Carter’s energy rhetoric and his faltering public opinion 
after the July 15, 1979 speech, it seems advisable to analyze the totality of Carter’s 
energy campaign (from February 2, 1997 to July 15, 1979) and the religious rhetorical 
form in which it was cast before positing a potential relationship between Carter’s 
rhetorical failure and declining popularity. Additionally, while the general scholarly 
consensus remains that Carter’s energy campaign was a failure, the previous scholarship 
provides an array of incomplete explanations for that failure ranging from bad 
management skills and infighting among his presidential advisors,12 to his criticism of the 
public as “profligate,”13 to his use (or misuse) of the jeremiad form.14 While each of these 
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findings certainly help explain Carter’s rhetorical failure, I posit that the moralistic 
rhetorical trajectory of Carter’s energy jeremiad resulted in a failed shibboleth.  
 This chapter offers a fresh reading of Carter’s energy campaign through an 
analysis of the religious rhetorical form Carter employed—the American jeremiad. While 
a number of important studies have recognized the presence of this rhetorical form in the 
rhetorical presidencies of both Jimmy Carter and his successor Ronald Reagan,15 they do 
not consistently recognize the important differences in their respective performances of 
the jeremiad. Chapters III and IV of this dissertation offer a parallel examination of how 
the jeremiad was used by each president, noting the disparate rhetorical trajectories of 
their jeremiads. These chapters provide instructive case studies of the varied uses of the 
jeremiad form itself and raise important questions about its conceptualization in 
contemporary scholarship on religious political rhetoric. The current chapter will begin 
this larger examination of the use of religious rhetorical forms in the contemporary 
presidency by exploring how Jimmy Carter adopted a jeremiad with a decidedly 
moralistic trajectory which was progressively condemnatory, featured a progressively 
expansive declension, and apocalyptic expressions of imminent doom.  
This chapter will commence by reviewing the history and extensive literature on 
the jeremiad while acknowledging the unanswered questions raised by contemporary 
scholarship, analyzing the manifestations and features of the jeremiad in Carter’s ill-fated 
rhetorical campaign for a national energy policy, and finally discussing the rhetorical and 
political implications inherent to Carter’s unsuccessful shibboleth.  
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The American Jeremiad 
Of all the religious rhetorical forms discussed throughout this dissertation, no 
other has achieved either the astounding intellectual status or as broad a use throughout 
the history of American political rhetoric as the American jeremiad. It has been called 
“America’s oldest rhetorical form”16 and has been identified by countless authors as a 
corrective rhetorical form offering “a rhetoric of indignation, expressing deep 
dissatisfaction” all in the name of “challenging the nation to reform.”17 More recently, 
several studies have noted that while the jeremiad maintains a corrective tone, its primary 
telos may be conservative in instances where the rhetor intends to protect the extant 
political order, call attention to the nation’s idyllic vision of itself, or even unify the 
nation in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.18 Since it is employed 
by rhetors in pursuit of both socio-political change and conservation of the status quo, it 
is often referred to as a secular rhetorical form—or perhaps more accurately—a 
secularization of a religious rhetorical form.  
Of course, the historical foundations of the secular American jeremiad are neither 
secular nor American. As implied by its namesake, the basic elements of the form 
emerged from the religious beliefs and practices of the ancient Hebrews as set forth in the 
sacred texts of Judaism. The Pentateuch describes the religious experience of the 
Israelites as being uniquely covenantal in form and practice. The nation of Israel was 
covenantally bound to the Almighty.19 Indeed the ancient Hebrew word for covenant 
means “bond” or “fetter.”20 Historically, the covenant was both communal, since the 
entire nation of Israel was bound to it, and conditional since the nation could (through its 
sin) destroy the covenantal relationship along with the protections and blessings it 
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provided. As biblical scholar Bernhard W. Anderson explains, the Mosaic covenant 
featured “a strong conditional note, for its endurance depends on the people’s obedience 
to the covenant commandments.”21 The Book of Jeremiah predicts the fall of Jerusalem to 
the Babylonians because of its dalliances with the pagan polytheism of its Canaanite 
neighbors—a particularly serious offense in light of Israel’s religious status as God’s 
chosen people. In the opening chapters of the book, God appoints Jeremiah to “utter my 
judgments against them, for all their wickedness in forsaking me; they have burned 
incense to other gods, and worshipped the works of their own hands.”22 
Jeremiadic rhetoric has been an important feature of American rhetorical history 
since the colonial era.23 While the Puritans of New England were hardly the only 
practitioners of religious rhetoric to immigrate to the American shores, the fact that they 
most assiduously practiced the jeremiad form in their political sermons combined with 
the abundance of surviving sermon texts from the New England colonies provides the 
clearest view of the development of the jeremiad form in America.24 Governor John 
Winthrop’s 1630 lay sermon, A Model of Christian Charity, is usually cited as the classic 
statement of the Puritan’s jeremiadic rhetorical vision. Winthrop’s sermon from the deck 
of the Arbella described the colonial endeavor in distinctively covenantal terms by 
equating the civic and religious challenges of the new Massachusetts Bay settlement: 
For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of 
all people are upon us. So that if we shall deal falsely with our God in  
this work we have undertaken, and so cause Him to withdraw His present 
help from us, we shall be made a story and a by-word through the world: 
we shall open the mouths of enemies to speak evil of the way of God and  
all professors for God’s sake; we shall shame the faces of many of God’s 
worthy servants, and cause their prayers to be turned into curses upon us, 
till we be consumed out of the good land whither we are going.25 
 
  
    68
As Winthrop’s famous words acknowledged, these religious separatists were imbued 
with the powerful notion that their excursion into the New World was far more than a 
simple geographic migration—it was in the later words of Samuel Danforth, a divine 
“errand into the wilderness.”26 The Reverend John Cotton initially anointed the errand 
with a jeremiadic sermon he preached to the Winthrop party prior to their departure. 
Cotton’s sermon God’s Promise to His Plantations identified the party as a new Israel—a 
covenant people chosen by God for a special purpose.27 
To the Puritans, the divine errand included both a sense of redemptive mission 
and a notion of their own exceptionalism. The Puritan colonists sought to make New 
England a bastion of pure religion against what they perceived to be the spiritual and 
ecclesiastical bankruptcy propagated by Catholicism’s dominance throughout most of 
Europe which, they believed, had also infected the Anglican Church.28 Many Puritans 
earnestly longed for the day when their descendants would return to England and redeem 
it once and for all by spiritual and physical force from the corrupt practices of the 
Catholic Church. When this vision failed to materialize, they began to look inward in an 
effort to establish a utopian theocracy—a Zion wherein God’s millennial kingdom could 
begin to take shape on the Earth.   
Grandiose utopian and redemptive visions aside, the Puritan society was, as many 
Puritan ministers were quick to point out, much like biblical Israel in that it perceived 
itself to be covenantally bound to God. Eminent literary and cultural historian Perry 
Miller, whose thorough account of the religious, social, and political elements of life in 
colonial-era New England remains one of the finest and most detailed explorations, 
explains that: 
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in the migration to Massachusetts all entered into a covenant, among  
themselves and with the Lord. In the one compact the people were dedicated  
both to theological and to social duties. So John Cotton, preaching the  
farewell sermon to the departing fleet in 1630, Thomas Hooker, delivering  
an address before his flight from England in 1633, and John Winthrop, 
expounding the purpose of the migration aboard the Arbella in 1630, replying  
to Antinomians in 1637, or at last in 1645 describing the character of covenant 
liberty to the General Court—these leaders were fully equipped from the 
beginning with a consistent doctrine, sustained by logic and studded with  
Biblical proofs, which reached from the throne of God to the deliberations of  
the General Court of Massachusetts Bay, which conceived of their society as 
in covenant with God like Israel of old, which supplied meanings and directions 
not alone for theological speculation but for the civil polity as well.29 
 
Miller’s description of the jeremiad’s covenantal background accurately represents one of 
the reasons for the popularity of the form. The jeremiad was uniquely suited to the 
Puritan cosmology which found a religious meaning behind any event good or bad. 
“There is” Miller writes with regard to the daily events of life in New England an 
“implicit recognition of a causal sequence: the sin exists, the disease breaks out; the sins 
are reformed, the disease is cured.”30 
Ministers and civic leaders (often one in the same) continually warned, and in 
some cases utterly excoriated, their audiences for offenses ranging from sleeping during 
religious services, to the excessive materialism which developed as the colonies became 
more prosperous, to the ever-present problems of drunkenness and sexual promiscuity.31 
The purpose of these warnings was ultimately to preserve God’s covenant with New 
England by rectifying the offending behavior. If any particular sin was allowed to remain 
it would spread like a plague throughout the region and threaten the very survival of 
God’s “New Jerusalem.” In Puritan theology sin led to more than questionable morality, 
it placed the very survival of the covenant and covenant people in jeopardy.  
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This aspect of the covenantal framework from which the jeremiad derives its 
rhetorical power is best understood by noting the rhetorical structure of the jeremiad. 
David Howard-Pitney provides the clearest and most historically accurate description of 
the American jeremiad’s basic elements, arguing that the form unfolds in a promise—
declension—prophecy pattern.32 In the “promise” phase, the audience is reminded of 
God’s covenant with them. As Winthrop said of what was about to become the 
Massachusetts Bay colony: “the Lord will be our God and delight to dwell among us, as 
His own people. . . .”33 
Yet, the goal of such sermons was to continually bring the community back into 
proper confines of the civic and religious covenant. As such, a “declension” was 
necessary to enumerate the ways in which the covenant community was failing to meet 
the demands of the covenant. A minister could choose to focus on one or two of the 
community’s most dangerous transgressions or list a host of sins being committed by the 
community. The authors of the Result—a report presented by the Massachusetts Synod in 
1679 which sought to outline the causes for New England’s perceived spiritual 
backsliding—had elected the latter and went to great pains to list the communal 
transgressions of the entire Massachusetts colony.34 As Miller notes, the declension was 
the defining feature of colonial-era jeremiads—so much so that a minister’s homiletical 
reputation would rise or fall depending upon how vividly he could portray the 
community’s failures and the potential consequences thereof.35 
The rhetorical form culminated with both a prediction and a choice. The 
“prophecy” phase, like its rhetorical counterpart in the rhetorical style of the Book of 
Jeremiah, provides the hope of restoration. The hope is of course conditional, predicated 
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upon the response of the audience. As Winthrop put it, later generations would either 
look back to them and say “Lord make it like that of New England” or, if they failed to 
reform, Winthrop and his band would “shame the faces of many of God’s worthy 
servants and cause their prayers to be turned into curses . . . .”36 
Reflecting one of the unresolved questions about the telos of the American 
jeremiad, Sacvan Bercovitch claims that jeremiads such as Winthrop’s, though they 
appeared as foreboding as any from the Book of Jeremiah, were less warnings of doom 
and more a message of hope and “unshakable optimism.”37 After all, the Puritans 
reasoned, God would not bother to discipline his chosen people if they had not been 
destined to find their way out of declension and once again return to God’s favor.38 While 
these tensions will be dealt with more comprehensively later, Bercovitch’s trenchant 
observations about the effects of such jeremiads are worth noting. “The passengers,” 
Bercovitch observes of those aboard the Arbella, “were entering into [a] covenant with 
God, as into a marriage bond . . . .”39 Thus the jeremiad, largely as used by the Puritans, 
became perhaps the dominant feature in the rhetorical landscape of American history. As 
many authors have noted, the form has been employed by numerous rhetors throughout 
colonial history, the American Revolutionary era, the abolitionist movement, the civil 
rights movement, and on various occasions in contemporary political rhetoric.40 
Since its identification by Perry Miller, scholars across the humanities disciples 
have recognized its historical and contemporary prominence and methodological utility. 
Some authors likely overstate the jeremiad’s importance by finding it everywhere a 
socio-political rhetor simply criticizes his or her opponents or speaks against some 
shortcoming of American society.41 Yet, there can be no doubt that—as evinced by the 
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voluminous literature on socio-political jeremiads—it is an important concept in the 
study of religious political rhetoric. More than a decade after Miller introduced the 
concept to the academic community, historian Sacvan Bercovitch reinterpreted the 
jeremiad form by emphasizing the interplay between its corrective function and (in his 
view) optimistic orientation. Bercovitch argues that the jeremiad form supported the 
Puritans’ utopian cosmological vision to “give the kingdom of God a local habitation and 
a home” thanks to the implicit message that those rebuked by God had also been chosen 
for a special destiny.42 Emphasis upon this positive side of the sometimes foreboding 
prophetic warnings was used “in part by the American Puritans as a vehicle of social 
control” and “as a crucial justification of their New England Way.”43 Miller’s death in 
1963 precluded any sort of formal debate between them; yet their differing interpretations 
of the jeremiad have elicited a lively debate in the scholarly literature.44 
Following Bercovitch’s interpretation, David Howard-Pitney focuses upon the 
form’s corrective potential and the optimistic outlook of the jeremiad as used by African-
American rhetors from Frederick Douglass to Martin Luther King and beyond. Howard-
Pitney’s thorough analysis reveals a good deal about the rhetorical malleability of the 
form—a feature that the communication literature has been slower to recognize and 
which has not yet been meaningfully or consistently applied to presidential rhetoric. For 
instance, Howard-Pitney observes that the form exhibits an “ebb and flow of optimism 
about American promise and progress” and that notable African-American rhetors such 
as Douglass, W. E. B. DuBois, and King “vacillated with regard to America’s 
perfectibility.”45 Howard-Pitney’s work presents the jeremiad as a highly-adaptable, 
dynamic rhetorical form which can either preserve the status quo (e.g. Booker T. 
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Washington) or serve as a harsh rebuke against a profligate nation for having forgotten 
the meaning of its mission (e.g. Douglass, DuBois, King). While Howard-Pitney suggests 
that the rhetorical trajectories of these jeremiads were defined by the “ebb and flow of 
optimism about American promise,” this interpretation overlooks one of Perry Miller’s 
previously-noted observations that Puritan-era jeremiads were evaluated by their 
declensions. As I will demonstrate, Miller’s original idea about defining a jeremiad 
according to its declension offers a meaningful way in which to address the unresolved 
issue of whether to interpret jeremiads as primarily corrective, conservative or both. This 
approach raises the possibility of viewing the jeremiad as a variable rhetorical form 
adaptable to either purpose based upon who gets blamed for the community’s trespasses.   
Starting with the publication of several highly-influential essays by Ernest 
Bormann and Kurt Ritter in the 1970s and 1980s,46 public address scholars began 
seriously investigating the jeremiad form in the sermons of the American colonial era,47 
as a shaper of national identity and public memory in contemporary American film,48 as 
socio-cultural critique by intellectuals and social movement leaders,49 and as a prominent 
feature of presidential campaigns.50 This extensive body of scholarship tells us that the 
American jeremiad is a common feature of socio-political rhetoric with the apparent 
potential to promote socio-political change by presenting itself as a provocative gadfly 
swarming in the face of a nation or group that is portrayed as failing to live up to its own 
principles.  
As noted previously, several more recent studies have begun to explore the 
corrective/conservative dichotomy of the jeremiad in more detail. In his analysis of 
Robert F. Kennedy’s rhetorical response to the death of Martin Luther King, John M. 
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Murphy finds that the jeremiad as employed by Kennedy actually reinforced the status 
quo because of the way Kennedy used it to recall America’s enduring values and idyllic 
past. According to Murphy, Kennedy’s rhetoric found little wrong with America’s basic 
socio-political structure. It was only the violation of American ideals that led to violations 
of an American covenant such as racial injustice and the assassinations of King and other 
Civil Rights leaders. As Murphy notes, this particular manifestation of the jeremiad 
“clearly limits the range of political choices that are available even as it creates social 
cohesion.”51 
Rhetorical Trajectories 
Dionisopoulos and colleagues provide a thoughtful method of addressing the 
interpretive problems of the corrective/conservative dichotomy in socio-political 
jeremiads by introducing the notion of “rhetorical trajectories.”52 Borrowing the term 
from a 1984 article in the Quarterly Journal of Speech by Leland M. Griffin,53 they posit 
that over time political rhetors develop ways of talking about the issues which most 
concern them and develop rhetorical tropes and strategies which will “ensure emphasis of 
certain ideas and visions rather than others.”54 In King’s jeremiadic rhetoric for instance, 
these authors detect both moral and pragmatic trajectories. Their findings are worth 
quoting at some length: 
King established a rhetorical progression marked by dual trajectories. The  
first was a moral trajectory marked by oppositional god and devil terms such 
as justice and injustice, freedom and oppression, and morality and immorality. 
The second was a pragmatic trajectory marked, ironically, by the term “dream,” 
and developed as a vision that would be achieved by pragmatic acts leading 
to inclusion in the benefits of a good society for those who had been left out. 
During the 1950s and the early 1960s, these trajectories were convergent since 
King offered jeremiads that located the enemy of the civil rights movement in 
unfulfilled fundamental values, not in individuals and certainly not in the  
American political system.55 
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As these authors note, King’s dual trajectories collided later in his career when his 
jeremiads followed the moralistic rhetorical path at the expense of the pragmatic 
trajectory.  
 Dionisopoulos and colleagues’ description of rhetorical trajectories—the overall 
orientation of a set of discourses as described above—is useful in understanding how 
Carter and Reagan used their respective jeremiads because this methodological 
perspective can enable us to determine qualitative differences between their two calls for 
national repentance. However, Murphy and Dionisopoulos and colleagues do little to 
explain how the rhetorical trajectories of jeremiads are defined. While it is undoubtedly 
helpful to look to the god and devil terms as Dionisopoulos and his colleagues do, the 
picture is incomplete. Mark Stoda and George Dionisopoulos endeavor to bring clarity to 
this determination of rhetorical trajectory in a more recent study of Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn’s scathing critique of America at a 1978 Harvard University 
commencement address. They find that Solzhenitsyn’s critique angered the American 
audience largely because it “was unprepared to accept this message from this 
messenger.”56 However, because Solzhenitsyn’s message was a broad scathing critique of 
Western (particularly American) society for a lack of courage in confronting the threats 
of communism and for the West’s excessive materialism, a more parsimonious 
explanation may be offered. Solzhenitsyn’s jeremiad featured a declension that was 
simply too broad, too all-encompassing, and too strong for his American audience to 
stomach.  
 The extensive investigations of the jeremiad raise two important issues which 
will be addressed by the remainder of this chapter. First, How can we distinguish between 
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corrective and conservative jeremiads when both texts use a similar form? Put another 
way: What makes one jeremiad “conservative” in the way Murphy uses the term, while 
another discourse using the same form can be said to use the jeremiad to accomplish a 
radical reform agenda as described by Howard-Pitney? Second, How can we account for 
the apparent success of some jeremiadic discourses while others fail? In other words: 
Why does the public appear to heed the warnings of some such as Reagan who speak in 
this prophetic form while largely ignoring the prophetic warnings of others such as Carter 
and Solzhenitsyn?  
Jimmy Carter’s Energy Jeremiad 
 Just one week after his inaugural address, Jimmy Carter met with many of the 
nation’s religious leaders at the first annual national prayer breakfast of his 
administration. He told them the behind-the-scenes story about choosing Micah 6:8 over 
II Chronicles 7:14 for inclusion in his inaugural address. Like the one-time Sunday 
school teacher he was,57 he could not let the story pass without highlighting a religious 
application. The story—particularly the objections of those on his staff who claimed the 
people would not understand the original verse—was “illustrative of the problem that we 
face.” “Sometimes” he said, “we take for granted that an acknowledgment of sin, an 
acknowledgment of the need for humility permeates the consciousness of our people. But 
it doesn’t.”58 Referencing theologian Paul Tillich’s famous dictum that true religion 
involves continual soul-searching and reflection, he concluded that “Sometimes it’s 
easier for us to be humble as individuals than it is for us to admit that our Nation makes 
mistakes.”59 Carter went on to opine that average American citizens, religious leaders, 
and politicians including himself were often guilty of what he called the “worship [of] 
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our Nation.”60 For Carter, it would simply not do to speak about America in platitudes. 
Real patriotism—like real religion in Carter’s mind—involved perpetual evaluation, 
reflection, and, when necessary, rebuke. As religious biographer Wesley Pippert noted of 
Carter: “His central theme is that persons, and nations, are fallible and sinful and require 
forgiveness; that persons, and nations—perhaps especially the United States—are 
‘afflicted,’. . . and need to learn humility. . . .”61 
 This observation about Carter’s manifestly religious outlook and its effect upon 
his approach to presidential leadership is not surprising for those acquainted with his 
rhetorical presidency and the religious rhetoric he employed as president and in his quest 
for the office.62 However, it is noteworthy that he, like the biblical Jeremiah and the 
colonial-era Puritan ministers who developed the jeremiad form on this continent, 
showed an early willingness to cast prophetic blame. One detects this most clearly in the 
1977 prayer breakfast speech wherein Carter revealed his willingness to call the nation to 
account for what he perceived to be its cultural and political sins. For Carter, presidential 
leadership also had to be spiritual and moral leadership, thus a corrective chastising 
message would be necessary at times. Even at this early stage in his presidency, however, 
the scope of Carter’s declension was actually far more expansive than those of either the 
prophet Jeremiah or the Puritan ministers. Not only did he cast judgment on the profligate 
masses, he cast it upon himself and others within his administration and the federal 
government. This feature of his jeremiad is most notable in his near embarrassment for 
having pulled his rhetorical punches in the inaugural address. 
 We politicians, we leaders, in that sometimes excessive degree of patriotism,  
 equate love of others with love of ourselves. We tend to say that, because I  
am a Congressman, because I am a Governor, because I am a Senator, because  
I am a Cabinet member, because I am President of the people, and because I  
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love the people and because I represent them so well, then I can justify their love 
myself.63 
 
It would have been unthinkable for Jeremiah or John Winthrop to have included 
themselves in the same category as their rhetorical audiences. Not only would such an 
inclusion have eroded their prophetic authority, it would have failed to fit the theological 
and cosmological underpinnings of the jeremiad form because it was the sinners who 
were endangering the community’s very survival by placing the covenant at risk.  
 Carter’s remarks to the 1977 national prayer breakfast clearly established two of 
the three the basic elements of his jeremiad’s moralistic rhetorical trajectory. While his 
prophetic warning would become shriller as his administration progressed and the energy 
crisis deepened, this early speech demonstrated both his willingness to condemn the 
nation and the degree to which he was willing to blame the entire nation—including 
himself—for national sin. The trajectory of his jeremiad would also evolve to incorporate 
apocalyptic elements as he portrayed the energy crisis as an outgrowth of a lack of moral 
and spiritual strength in America, and asserted that the people would have to help solve 
the energy crisis yet at the same time harbored doubts about their ability to rise to the 
challenge. 
 One week after the prayer breakfast, Carter embarked upon what would become a 
long and ultimately ill-fated rhetorical campaign of seven major speeches featuring the 
energy crisis as either the primary focus of each address or an important element of other 
national problems. Carter’s first televised national address on February 2, 1977 
mentioned energy as only one of a number of important projects he hoped to address 
during his presidency. Yet Carter’s decision to address the public sitting next to an open 
fire in the White House library while wearing a cardigan sweater on that winter night left 
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little doubt about the seriousness with which Carter viewed the energy crisis. In this first 
address of Carter’s developing energy jeremiad he used “waste” as a ubiquitous devil 
term and identified it as the ultimate source of the projected energy shortfall. “The 
amount of energy being wasted” he said “which could be saved is greater than the total 
energy that we are importing from foreign countries.”64 While Carter did not reveal the 
exact methodology he or his staff used to arrive at this statistic, it conveyed a sense of a 
serious, yet avoidable national crisis. Neither the nation nor government was blameless 
for the crisis he observed, yet his message left the impression that he believed that the 
public’s penchant for waste was the real source of the problem. Consequently, he 
indicated that the public would have to help bear much of the burden for solving the 
crisis:  
 All of us must learn to waste less energy. Simply by keeping our thermostats, 
 for instance, at 65 degrees in the daytime and 55 degrees at night we could  
 save half the current shortage of natural gas. There is no way that I, or anyone 
 else in the Government, can solve our energy problems if you are not willing 
 to help. I know that we can meet this challenge if the burden is borne fairly 
 among all our people—and if we realize that in order to solve our energy  
 problems we need not sacrifice the quality of our lives.65 
 
Despite the confusion that ensued from Carter’s seemingly contradictory assertions that 
sacrifice would be required (e.g. lowered thermostats in winter), but that the quality of 
life for Americans would remain intact,66 Carter’s assertion of public responsibility for 
the energy crisis was entirely consistent with his remarks at the 1977 prayer breakfast and 
with the basic message of declension inherent to the jeremiad form. Yet, this penchant for 
public blame would not only become a staple component of Carter’s energy jeremiad, it 
would grow in his subsequent energy speeches to include far more than just the mass 
public and would become a moral, spiritual, and political challenge. 
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 In April of 1977 Carter delivered two major addresses on energy. The first on 
April 18 was designed, as Carter later wrote in his presidential memoir, to provide 
members of Congress with “maximum encouragement from the folks back home” and “to 
arouse and sustain public interest in the energy issue.”67 The opening lines of the speech 
promised “an unpleasant talk” regarding “a problem that is unprecedented in our history,” 
one which was in fact “the moral equivalent of war.”68 Aside from Carter’s stated desire 
to arouse the public to lobby Congress for the legislation he was about to propose, the 
stark exordium reflected a renewed sense of urgency about the worsening crisis 
exacerbated by continued decreases in U.S. oil production and increasing demand. The 
bulk of the address consisted of ten principles which would guide the program Carter was 
about to send to Congress. The “cornerstone” of these principles was a reduction of 
national energy demand via conservation. Leading up to this principle Carter returned to 
his claim that the U.S. was “the most wasteful nation on Earth.”69 The only way the crisis 
could possibly be resolved, he argued, was “if the Government takes responsibility for it 
[the energy plan] and if the people understand the seriousness of the challenge and are 
willing to make sacrifices.”70 Such sacrifices “will be painful—but so is any meaningful 
sacrifice.”71 Again, the not so subtle implication was that the sinful American public was 
to blame for the problem and would soon be forced to pay for it. More importantly, the 
moralistic trajectory of Carter’s jeremiad had begun to take an increasingly apocalyptic72 
turn. Failure to follow his proposed energy plan could very well lead to a “national 
catastrophe.”73 
 Two days later, Carter presented his plan to Congress covering much of the same 
ground. Interestingly, Carter appeared to pull back from the apocalyptic tone of the 
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previous message to the public. Although he began much as he had a few days before by 
explaining that he did not expect to receive much applause for his “sober and difficult 
presentation,”74 he resisted defining the energy crisis as a moral or spiritual crisis, 
preferring instead to characterize it as a political problem with a series of policy-oriented 
solutions. Only once did he claim that failing to act on his recommendations would result 
in “impeding catastrophe” and only once did he use the previously ubiquitous devil term 
of “waste” when discussing the nation’s energy consumption.75 In contrast to his previous 
energy speeches, the April 20th speech to Congress was a thorough and detailed 
presentation of his comprehensive energy plan aimed at conservation and increased 
domestic production of fossil fuels and alternative energy sources. Absent was any 
mention of the “sacrifices” required of the American people. Only once in this speech did 
Carter talk about the need for individual Americans to cut their use of gasoline, but even 
this was quickly followed up with his optimistic assessment that “I believe that the 
American people can meet this challenge.”76 Carter’s jeremiad in the April 20th speech to 
Congress was still quite stark, yet his criticisms were more oblique and directed toward 
the oil and gas industries, automakers, and the various political interests who sought to 
maintain the status quo. Carter’s choice to use in this address a jeremiad possessed of a 
pragmatic, policy-oriented trajectory ultimately paid political dividends with the 
Congress in the form of its willingness to create a Department of Energy—a specific 
proposal within his congressional speech and one of Carter’s few legislative triumphs to 
emerge from the energy crisis.  
 These energy addresses reveal that Carter curiously chose to employ a jeremiad 
with a moralistic trajectory when speaking to the general public but largely abandoned 
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this approach before Congress in favor of a more focused and pragmatic declension 
wherein he chastised specific groups of sinners such as profiteering oil companies and 
automakers who made inefficient gas-guzzling automobiles. His pragmatic jeremiad not 
only pointed out their sins, but offered focused policy initiatives to regulate their 
corporate behavior. While Carter’s efforts to regulate corporate energy wasters ultimately 
failed to gain congressional approval, he certainly enjoyed more success with his speech 
to Congress. Had Carter’s remaining energy jeremiads maintained the trajectory he used 
on April 20, 1977 he may have avoided or at least minimized the cataclysmic rhetorical 
and political failures to come.  
 Carter presented his next major energy speech to Congress on November 8, 1977. 
This address began on a positive and pragmatic note. He thanked Congress for acting on 
his proposal to create the Department of Energy to oversee the energy crisis and help 
regulate prices and expressed thanks for approving his nomination of James Schlesinger 
to head the new Cabinet-level agency. Nevertheless, Carter was unable to restrain himself 
from defining the ongoing legislative efforts in the same all-or-nothing fashion as he had 
in his earlier addresses. The legislators working on the energy plan would, he argued, 
prove “the strength and courage of our political system.”77 As he had done in the address 
to the public in April of 1977, Carter established the struggle over energy policy as the 
defining challenge of his presidency and, even more significantly, as the defining 
challenge of the American political system. Of course the problem with such an approach 
is that if the challenge is not met with victorious results. Logical consistency would 
dictate that the public interpret failure to pass an energy bill as tantamount to a failure of 
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the American governmental structure and its leaders. To illustrate the seriousness of the 
crisis he reenacted a statement he had received from a concerned American: 
 A few weeks ago, in Detroit, an unemployed steelworker told me something 
 that may reflect the feelings of many of you. ‘Mr. President,’ he said, ‘I don’t 
 feel much like talking about energy and foreign policy. I’m concerned about 
 how I’m going to live. . . . I can’t be too concerned about other things when I  
 have a 10-year-old daughter to raise and I don’t have a job and I’m 56 years 
 old.’ Well, I understand how he felt, but I must tell you the truth. And the truth 
 is that you cannot talk about economic problems now or in the future without 
 talking about energy.78 
 
While his intentions were undoubtedly honorable, Carter’s decision to include this 
statement in the speech made him appear dismissive and aloof to the cares of this and 
other average American citizens. This rhetorical misstep served to reinforce the growing 
public perception in late 1977 and early 1978 that Carter’s energy quest was a quixotic 
one pursued at the expense of other more pressing domestic concerns such as low wages, 
unemployment, and inflation.  
Additionally, Carter’s rhetorical rebuke of the unfortunate steelworker rang with 
the harshness of a prophetic censure delivered in the name of absolute truth. Although 
Carter, for the first time, used this major address to assign some of the responsibility for 
the energy crisis on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), but with 
hardly a pause he argued that America was ultimately to blame for its own problems: 
“The world price is set by a foreign cartel—the governments of the so-called OPEC 
nations. . . . Our biggest problem, however, is that we simply use too much and waste too 
much energy.”79 Thus, even when presented with the opportunity to blame a powerful 
foreign organization for the crisis, Carter chose to chastise the nation for what he saw as 
its fundamental sin of wasteful over-consumption.  
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 More than a year passed before Carter once again took up the energy battle in a 
major televised address. In the meantime, the fight continued on the rhetorical and 
legislative fronts through 1978 and into the spring of 1979 with Carter’s comprehensive 
energy plan ultimately stalling in spite of his intensive lobbying efforts and public 
statements encouraging Congressional passage.80 In the spring of 1979 political instability 
in Iran coupled with a series of OPEC-driven increases in the price of oil resulted in 
domestic price increases and decreased production by U.S. oil companies.81 These factors 
led to long gas lines and further depressed the already sullen economic outlook of the 
public. Carter and his aides came to understand that bold presidential action was required 
to contain the crisis.  
 On April 5, 1979 Carter again took to the nation’s living rooms to announce his 
plan to deal with the country’s immediate energy problems. Ostensibly the address was 
designed to announce that Carter would use the provisions of the National Energy Act of 
1978 to gradually introduce price decontrols into the U.S. oil market. The plan operated 
under the assumption that the previous policy of keeping the price of oil artificially low, 
while an attractive short-term option for consumers buying gasoline and heating oil, 
created a disincentive for domestic oil companies to produce more to meet the shortfall. 
The speech further proposed a “windfall profits” tax on oil companies to indirectly 
recoup consumer losses from the price increases which would inevitably follow in the 
wake of removing price controls.  
Despite the address’ explicitly pragmatic exigence, Carter used it as an 
opportunity to elaborate upon the energy jeremiad he began in 1977. While this energy 
speech was “briefer and tougher” than the 1977 speeches, Carter failed to heed the advice 
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of his Assistant to the President for Communications Gerald Rafshoon who counseled 
him to blame the crisis on Congress, the oil companies and the OPEC cartel.82 He began 
by noting that the energy crisis was “very serious—and its getting worse.”83 In what may 
be one of the longest lists of public expostulations by an American president (5 
paragraphs containing 179 words), Carter enumerated the symptoms manifested by the 
nation’s energy disease. These admonishments included: too much use (and waste) of 
energy, too much dependence upon foreign oil, lack of sufficient domestic energy 
production, too much government “redtape” [sic] hindering development, inevitable rises 
in the prices of energy, too little use and development of alternative energy sources like 
solar energy, and problems with nuclear power as evidenced by the incident at 
Pennsylvania’s Three Mile Island.  
 After citing some of the nation’s many energy problems he passionately implored 
the audience to listen to his prophetic warning: “The energy crisis is real . . . I said so in 
1977, and I say it again tonight, almost exactly 2 years later. Time is running short.”84 In 
an attempt to communicate the urgency of the problem, Carter resurrected the recent 
specter of Three Mile Island, but only to suggest that the national shortage of fossil fuels 
was ultimately more dangerous than the infamous nuclear accident because America’s 
“national strength” was “dangerously dependent” upon it.85 National extrication from the 
crisis, he explained, would be difficult and would require all Americans to use less oil but 
pay more for it. Carter proceeded to offer a clumsy explanation about how decontrol of 
oil prices would contribute to inflation in the short-term but would decrease it in the long 
run. Of course, decontrol of domestic oil prices was only part of his response plan. A 
“windfall profits tax” was also required, he argued, to keep oil companies from hording 
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“the profits which they have not earned.”86 While this part of the message was certainly 
aimed at domestic oil producers, Carter curiously and confusingly made it sound as 
though this was just another sin of the American general populace—one which required 
atonement and corrective action. “Unless you speak out,” he warned “they [oil 
companies] will have more influence on Congress than you do. . . . Unless your voice is 
heard, once again the selfishness of a few will block action which is badly needed to help 
our entire Nation.”87 Thus, Carter’s return to his energy campaign brought a return to the 
moralistic trajectory of his jeremiad. This renewed campaign was marked by threats of 
impending doom and condemnation of the general public. While each of Carter’s energy 
speeches featured dire warnings, expostulations, and the definition of the energy crisis as 
a serious political crisis, his infamous energy speech on July 15, 1979 would prove to be 
the pinnacle of his moralistic energy jeremiad.  
 As the energy crisis deepened and gas lines lengthened during the summer of 
1979, the Carter administration (and Carter himself) seemed uncertain about how to 
handle the crisis. Scheduled to give another energy address to the nation on July 4th, 
Carter abruptly cancelled the speech and retreated to Camp David where he spent the 
next 11 days meeting with his advisors, officials from all levels of government, and social 
and religious leaders. While he received advice about everything from the oil crisis to his 
personal leadership style, Carter seemed most interested in an idea Patrick Caddell 
mentioned to him in a report entitled “Of Crisis and Opportunity” in April of that year.88 
Caddell’s thesis was that the crises and socio-political upheavals of the 1960s and 70s 
had done significant damage to America’s collective confidence and had resulted in a 
deep public pessimism. Carter’s meetings at Camp David seemed to confirm Caddell’s 
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findings and provided him with fresh examples of the deep spiritual crisis he already 
believed to have long beset America. When this advice is considered alongside his 
willingness to admonish the American public it is little wonder that Carter chose to 
confront the national malaise (a term Carter never used in the speech) with a major 
address.89 
 Carter’s most accusatory and apocalyptic speech of the energy campaign began, 
somewhat oddly, with something approaching an admission of shared guilt for the 
national condition. Speaking as the head of the national government, he acknowledged 
that the scope of his rhetoric had “become increasingly narrow, focused more and more 
on what the isolated world of Washington thinks is important. . . . and less and less about 
our Nation’s hopes, our dreams, and our vision of the future.”90 “Why” he wondered in a 
frustrated tone “have we not been able to get together as a nation to resolve our serious 
energy problem?”91 The nation’s problems, he argued, “are much deeper—deeper than 
gasoline lines or energy shortages, deeper even than inflation or recession.”92 For 
evidence of the breadth and depth of the crisis, Carter turned to the words of many of the 
people with whom he had met during the Camp David retreat or who had written to him 
about the state of the nation during that time. Carter read nineteen quotations which 
spoke to the sullenness of the national mood or offered advice or criticisms of Carter or 
the government at large. Five of these quotations chastised Carter personally for a series 
of missteps including “managing the Government” rather than leading the nation, failing 
to make himself accessible to the public, and responding the energy crisis by “issu[ing] 
us BB guns.”93 
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 While his belief in the basic goodness of America and Americans had been 
confirmed during the retreat, it also reinforced “some of my longstanding concerns about 
our Nation’s underlying problems.”94 The heretofore unnamed “underlying problems” 
were severe indeed—so much so that “all the legislation in the world can’t fix what’s 
wrong with America.”95 The decidedly pessimistic assessment revealed the tragic 
trajectory of the rhetorical path Carter had crafted for this energy campaign. The nation’s 
energy problems were not simply matters of errant or myopic policy, but reflected an 
erosion of the nation’s once robust moral and spiritual core. America’s former greatness, 
Carter explained, was a product of its confident national spirit which he defined simply as 
“confidence in the future.”96 Although the concept of the “American Dream” has always 
eluded specific definition, it has nonetheless endured as a central rhetorical motif in 
American discourse.97 The idea of progressive upward mobility—that things will be 
better for the children’s generation than for their parents’—is perhaps the defining 
hallmark of the American Dream. It is the loss of faith in this particular idea that Carter 
initially defined as the heart of the crisis of confidence.  
However, Carter’s declension went beyond even this indictment—not only were 
Americans loosing faith in the American Dream, but in American democracy. Carter’s 
pointed and expansive declension is worth quoting at some length: 
 Our people are losing that faith, not only in government itself but in their  
ability as citizens to serve as the ultimate rulers and shapers of our  
democracy. As a people we know our past and we are proud of it. Our  
progress has been part of the living history of America, even the world.  
We always believed that we were part of a great movement of humanity  
itself called democracy, involved in the search for freedom, and that belief  
has always strengthened us in our purpose. But just as we are losing our 
confidence in the future, we are also beginning to close the door on our past.98 
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Like a Puritan minister, Carter’s declension continued by cataloguing a list of political 
and spiritual offenses including: “worship of self-indulgence and consumption,” a lack of 
optimism about the nation’s future, low voter turnouts, decreasing productivity of 
American workers, failure to “save for the future,” and “a growing disrespect for 
government and for churches and for schools, the news media, and other institutions.”99 
The prophetic rhetorical cadence of the declension was reinforced by the notion that the 
speech was “not a message of happiness or reassurance, but it is the truth and it is a 
warning.”100 Although the speech included some specific injunctions against the 
government and special interest groups for exacerbating the energy crisis, its prophetic 
message was aimed squarely at the whole of American society—a society Carter 
characterized as being in peril of forsaking the American dream, its democratic system, 
and its spiritual strength.  
 What was Carter’s answer to the crisis of confidence about which he spoke? At 
the policy level, Carter proposed a halt on any future increases in oil imports and 
simultaneously hinted at huge increases in funds and resources devoted to the 
development of alternative energy sources. Additionally, he pledged that an energy 
security corporation would be created to coordinate these conservation and development 
efforts.  
However, the most important steps had to be taken by the people. The “deeper 
problems” he spoke of could be addressed only by rebuilding national confidence. As a 
solution to this grave crisis Carter’s proposed corrective was sorely lacking in specifics. 
He called upon Americans to “say something good about our country” when the chance 
arose, and to carpool and use public transportation in the name of patriotism.101 What was 
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clear however, was the stark choice to be made and the dire consequences for failing to 
regain national confidence. 
 We are at a turning point in our history. There are two paths to choose. One 
 is a path I’ve warned about tonight, the path that leads to fragmentation 
 and self-interest. Down that road lies a mistaken idea of freedom, the right 
 to grasp for ourselves some advantage over others. That path would be one 
 of constant conflict between narrow interests ending in chaos and immobility. 
 It is a certain route to failure.102 
 
 As had happened before his inaugural address two and a half years earlier, there 
were some within his administration who questioned Carter’s decision to rebuke the 
public so harshly. Presidential advisor Stuart Eizenstat, Vice President Walter Mondale, 
and Energy Secretary James Schlesinger all believed the idea of a major energy speech 
about a lack of public confidence to be ill-conceived. On July 10th—five days before the 
speech—chief speechwriter Gerald Rafshoon sent a memorandum to Carter expressing 
grave doubts about employing such a strategy.  
 We must look carefully at each self-deprecating remark and each negative  
 comment about America. We’d hear them thrown back ad nauseam during 
 a campaign, even on the day after the speech. ‘Jimmy Carter thinks America 
 has lost its spirit. . . . After three years in office, Jimmy Carter says that he’s  
 failed to lead this country . . . and he’s right.’ People listen to Presidential 
 speeches the way they listen to rock music. If they heard the same words a 
 hundred times they still wouldn’t know any of the words. But they ‘receive’  
 the tone, the beat, the rhythm.103 
 
In spite of Rafshoon’s well-founded fears, Carter’s July 15th energy speech initially 
succeeded in enhancing Carter’s public perception as indicated by an eleven percent 
bounce in his public approval rating.104 One particularly enthusiastic gentleman from 
Everett, Massachusetts wrote to Carter to say he thought the speech was “terrific” and 
offered his assistance in “whipping the asses” of anyone opposed to his leadership.105 
However, the accepted resignations of three cabinet members days later on July 19th 
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combined with the depth and breadth of his declension again created the impression of an 
administration quick to blame the public, but lacking any substantial ideas or solutions to 
either the energy crisis or the national malaise.  
Although there is a general scholarly consensus that Carter’s malaise speech 
failed, there are a wide array of explanations as to why. Dan F. Hahn correctly notes that 
Carter called for a “societal rebirth” but fails to acknowledge his use of the jeremiad 
form.106 Accordingly, Hahn makes it appear as though Carter was simply rhetorically 
brutalizing the public (hence Hahn’s title “Flailing the Profligate”) rather than employing 
the type of expansive declension derived from the jeremiad form. In a more sophisticated 
analysis of Carter’s July 15th energy jeremiad, Craig Smith and Kathy Smith find that this 
speech was a fundamental “mishandling of the jeremiad form.”107 Strictly speaking, 
however, Carter did not mishandle the jeremiad in the exact way Smith and Smith 
propose. Carter’s harsh rebuke commingled with exhortations to take corrective action—
in this case by conservation and adoption of his policy recommendations—was entirely 
consistent with the jeremiads of the Old Testament and the Puritan era. However, as 
Smith and Smith also note, Carter did err in his use of the jeremiad by critiquing himself 
among the sinners. His creation of a declension so expansive as to include the prophet 
himself as a target of exhortation not only defied the conventions of the jeremiad form 
but caused Carter to out-Puritan the Puritans. In a presidency already plagued by the 
energy crisis and legion economic woes, Carter’s moralistic jeremiad proved to be more 
than the public could take and consequently contributed substantially to the ultimate 
demise of his presidency.  
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The foregoing discussion indicates that Jimmy Carter’s energy jeremiad was 
marked by a moralistic rhetorical trajectory which grew progressively more virulent and 
expansive with nearly every speech up until its culminating address on July 15, 1979. 
This analysis suggests that it was his use of a harsh, expansive declension which defined 
the rhetorical trajectory of Jimmy Carter’s jeremiad. While this is a noteworthy finding in 
its own right, I will conclude by noting the political and rhetorical implications inherent 
to Carter’s employment of such a moralistic jeremiad.  
 Carter’s Jeremiad as a Failed Shibboleth  
Scholars and political observers alike have often been critical of the thirty-ninth 
president’s rhetorical prowess. Eugene McCarthy reportedly called him an “oratorical 
mortician.”108 Although scholars of presidential rhetoric often attribute Carter’s rhetorical 
shortcomings to his penchant for casting prophetic judgments upon the American public, 
these studies focus only upon the culmination of Carter’s energy jeremiad on July 15, 
1979.109 I have attempted to demonstrate that the best way to understand Carter’s 
condemnatory rhetoric is to document its progression from speech to speech throughout 
his energy campaign. More importantly, my analysis of Carter’s energy campaign sheds 
light upon the question of distinguishing between conservative and corrective jeremiads. 
Carter’s energy jeremiad became progressively more condemnatory, exhibited a broad 
declension which included everyone (including himself) and even suggested that the 
American public and its political institutions might lack the strength or will to solve the 
problems presented by the energy crisis. While the condemning tone and occasionally 
apocalyptic features of his rhetoric may not be especially surprising, the breadth of 
Carter’s declension certainly is. Even when events such as OPEC price hikes and the 
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unwillingness of domestic oil companies to expand production provided Carter with 
someone else he could plausibly blame, he chose to blame the public and himself and 
(like a Puritan) to reason that the nation’s problems must ultimately stem from a lack of 
spiritual acuity. Political jeremiads may fail because they are delivered by the wrong 
messenger,110 but political jeremiads certainly will fail if the audience perceives that the 
rhetor blames them for the problems about which he or she is speaking. This sense of 
betrayal by audiences becomes even more palatable since as communication scholar 
Mary Stuckey notes we look to our presidents to be “the nation’s chief storyteller . . . We 
take from him not only our policies but our national self-identity.”111 
Of course, careful students of rhetorical history must give Carter credit for one 
aspect of his energy rhetoric—his jeremiad was largely consistent with both the original 
prophetic model and the Puritan jeremiad. Except for his unfortunate tendency to include 
himself112 and his administration in the list of sinners as perhaps a misguided attempt at 
identification, Carter’s jeremiad was remarkably similar to the Puritan variety in 
particular; always finding fault with its own community while still believing that the 
same community was God’s representative on Earth. In this way, Perry Miller’s analysis 
of the jeremiad as a “confused” rhetorical form appears to be confirmed in Carter’s 
case.113 Even when spiritual or temporal victory was achieved, the Puritan jeremiahs 
would admonish their flocks to guard against the sin of pride whereby they could undo 
their newly-acquired victory. Even when Carter’s April 1977 message to Congress 
produced favorable results, he still showed a willingness to chastise Americans who in 
November of that year failed to see the urgency of the energy crisis. While a lack of 
rhetorical prowess undoubtedly contributed to this and other rhetorical miscues, Carter’s 
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rhetoric certainly matched its historical and religious American analog. However, as we 
will see in the following chapter, the jeremiad is an extremely malleable rhetorical 
form—so much so that Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, used the very same form but 
found radically different results thanks to his choice to emphasize the “promise” and 
“prophecy” elements rather than the declension.  
Obviously, Carter’s energy jeremiad failed as a political shibboleth. The 
American public simply would not accept Carter’s blame. Interestingly, Carter’s policy 
ideas about decontrol of oil prices and the need for a Department of Energy have endured 
and remain as important aspects of America’s energy policy to this day. Thus, we are left 
with the conclusion that Carter’s failure was not entirely a matter of bad policies, but of 
the strict application of a rhetorical form ill-suited to provide the comfort and reassurance 
so desperately needed during the economic and social turbulence of the late 1970s. Carter 
had announced his presidential candidacy in December of 1974 by pledging to reunite the 
Watergate-weary nation with “a belief in the greatness of our country.”114 Unfortunately, 
a sense of national greatness was absent from Carter’s energy rhetoric due to the 
moralistic trajectory of his jeremiad. This desire for national reassurance was perhaps 
best reflected by commentator Bill Bishop who years later opined that Carter’s rhetoric 
ultimately made possible the election of his successor: “The cock-sureness of Reagan 
stood in such high and enviable contrast to the brooding and searching Carter. We picked 
the happy ending of Hollywood over the heat and dust of Plains, Ga.”115 As such, Carter’s 
energy jeremiad is a compelling example, although a negative one, of the rhetorical 
power of religious rhetorical forms in American political discourse.  
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CHAPTER IV  
 
THE POWER OF AMERICAN PROMISE: THE POLITICAL  
 
POSTMILLENNIALISM OF RONALD REAGAN’S ECONOMIC JEREMIAD 
 
I’ve not taken your time this evening to merely ask you to trust me. Instead, I ask you to 
trust yourselves. That’s what America is all about. Our struggle for nationhood, our 
unrelenting fight for freedom, our very existence—these have all rested on the assurance 
that you must be free to shape your life as you are best able to, that no one can stop you 
from reaching higher or take from you the creativity that has made America the envy of 
mankind. One road is timid and fearful; the other bold and hopeful. In these 6 months, 
we’ve done so much and have come so far. It’s been the power of millions of people like 
you who have determined that we will make America great again. You have made the 
difference up to now. You will make the difference again. Let us not stop now. 
Ronald Reagan1 
 
Just four months after the culmination of Jimmy Carter’s energy jeremiad, former 
Governor of California Ronald Wilson Reagan declared his presidential candidacy with a 
speech at the New York Hilton on November 13, 1979. Like most candidacy 
announcement speeches Reagan’s was full of optimistic assessments of the American 
character and destiny—elements commensurate with the promise and prophecy elements 
of the jeremiad form.2 Reagan opined that America was “a living, breathing presence, 
unimpressed by what others say is impossible, proud of its own success,  . . . always 
impatient to provide a better life for its people in a framework of a basic fairness and 
freedom.”3 Nevertheless, not all was right with America. The indomitable American spirit 
was in danger, Reagan argued, not from an energy crisis or a crisis of public confidence, 
but from leaders who failed to grasp the greatness of America. With thinly veiled 
references to Jimmy Carter’s energy jeremiad Reagan declared: 
Much of this talk has come from leaders who claim that our problems are  
too difficult to handle. . . . They tell us we must learn to live with less, and  
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teach our children that their lives will be less full and prosperous than ours  
have been; that the America of the coming years will be a place where—because 
of our past excesses—it will be impossible to dream and make those dreams  
come true. . . . The crisis we face is not the result of any failure of the  
American spirit; it is a failure of our leaders to establish rational goals and  
give our people something to order their lives by.4 
 
The failures of American leadership were most evident, Reagan argued, in the dilapidated 
state of the American economy which was suffering from inflation, unemployment, and a 
declining standard of living. The national economy might indeed have been in decline, 
but it was the nation’s leaders who were responsible for it, not the American people: “The 
people have not created this disaster in our economy; the federal government has. It has 
overspent, overestimated, and over-regulated.”5 
 As Carter before him, Reagan argued that the nation was indeed at an important 
crossroads which would define its collective destiny. Yet his outlook for the future was 
more confident than Carter’s. Where Carter had expressed some doubts—apparently born 
of frustration—that the nation would overcome the energy crisis, Reagan invoking 
Massachusetts colonial governor John Winthrop’s famous metaphor from Christ’s 
Sermon on the Mount6 confidently predicted that “we will become that shining city upon 
a hill.”7 Although presidential candidacy announcements are routinely characterized by 
such optimism, Reagan’s was particularly idyllic. The remainder of this analysis will 
demonstrate that Reagan’s optimism was not only apparent in his announcement speech, 
but in the rhetorical trajectory of the jeremiad he used to promote his economic recovery 
plan and its first and most definitive legislative component—the 1981 Economic 
Recovery and Tax Act (ERTA).  
 Reagan’s rhetorical presidency has been a subject of intense interest for scholarly 
authors. This robust body of literature has produced two points of general consensus with 
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regard to Reagan’s presidential rhetoric. First, it is widely understood that Reagan had a 
penchant for employing jeremiads throughout his presidential and pre-presidential 
rhetorical career.8 Second, there is widespread consensus in both the academic and 
popular presses that Reagan’s messages were thoroughly-laced with hopeful and 
optimistic themes.9 This, however, creates a serious interpretive problem because biblical 
and Puritan-era jeremiads were typically used to chastise the covenant people for their 
failures. How can the rhetorical optimism of Reagan be reconciled with the often dark, 
moralistic tone of the American jeremiad? 
One explanation for this convergence undoubtedly lies in the malleability of the 
jeremiad form. As this chapter and the preceding one demonstrate, the jeremiad was 
useful to both Carter and Reagan, but for different reasons. I argue that President 
Reagan’s evolving economic jeremiad exhibited a consistent theme of political 
postmillennialism characterized by narrow declensions, and overwhelming emphasis 
upon the promise and prophecy elements of the jeremiad. Reagan used these elements to 
herald the coming fulfillment of American greatness provided the proper actions were 
taken. These actions, Reagan argued, included the passage and implementation of 
substantial tax and budget cuts and the elimination of some government regulations upon 
business called for in the ERTA. I will also note that, despite its narrow declension, the 
postmillennial trajectory of Reagan’s more sanguine jeremiad still served as a bitter 
rebuke to his socio-political opponents who, according to his rhetoric, were the dangerous 
enemies of the great shinning city, threatening its very existence. I will begin by recalling 
the basic elements of the American jeremiad form which make it a plausible rhetorical 
counterpart to a postmillennial rhetorical trajectory. This chapter then analyzes Reagan’s 
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performance of this jeremiad in support of the 1981 ERTA along with his assessments of 
the recovery efforts in his second inaugural in 1985, his 1988 (farewell) speech to the 
Republican National Convention in New Orleans, Louisiana, and his farewell address to 
the nation in January of 1989. Finally, I will discuss why Reagan’s economic jeremiad—
regardless of the mixed success of his economic stimulus program—ultimately proved to 
be an influential shibboleth in American political rhetoric.  
The Postmillennial American Jeremiad  
 As noted in the previous chapter the American jeremiad is among the most 
powerful, ubiquitous, and yet, according to erudite historian Perry Miller, “confused” 
religious rhetorical forms in American political discourse.10 The inherent confusion of the 
jeremiad form arises from the complex historical and theological factors operant in 
American colonial history. Fancying themselves a type of ancient Israel, the Puritans 
interpreted their migration to the New World as an exodus from the religious and political 
corruption (bondage) of Europe. The exodus to North America was for far more than 
their personal or spiritual liberation. In bringing them out of Europe the Almighty 
established covenantal expectations of them as his chosen people. God intended, the 
Puritans believed, for their divine “errand into the wilderness” (as Samuel Danforth later 
called it11) to result in the eventual redemption of the entire world but especially England. 
This collective belief resulted in perhaps the closest thing to an actual social contract that 
has ever existed in America—a colonial theocracy in covenant with the Almighty and 
bound to each other as well by the obligations of said covenant. As historian Sacvan 
Bercovitch explains this covenant was akin to “a marriage bond” and, for the Puritans, it 
revealed the entire reason for their existence in the world.12 
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The theological and psychological problems with this grandiose vision came 
when the Puritans attempted to realize their lofty ambitions in the often harsh American 
wilderness. Although they were utterly convinced of their status as a chosen people, they 
were perplexed when God allowed them to be afflicted with Indian wars, famine, 
drought, and the like.13 The only logical conclusion, they reasoned, was that sin was 
among them—surely they collectively, or at least certain individuals within the 
community, had offended the Almighty and broken the covenant in some way. In a 1679 
Synod, Massachusetts Puritan congregations actually enumerated the offenses they 
believed to be threatening the survival of their colony: lack of proper religious devotion 
topped the list followed by, swearing, falling asleep during religious services, dressing 
too ornately, drunkenness, and sexual promiscuity to name a few.14 As such, Puritan 
clergy developed regularly-delivered ritualized sermon types specifically calculated to 
call the community back into the proper covenantal relationship with God. Accordingly, 
the sermons delivered on community artillery days, fast days, thanksgiving days and 
election days were developed as rhetorical subgenres which endeavored to do just that.15 
These sermons were quite remarkable in their consistent employment of the jeremiad 
form as a corrective calculated to challenge the community with its current shortcomings 
and recommend immediate action to restore the covenant.16 Even in those rare times of 
tenuous peace when they were not trying to annihilate their Native America neighbors or 
in seasons of economic prosperity when all appeared to be well, the community was 
exhorted to be particularly watchful that it did not commit the mortal sins of pride and 
spiritual complacency.17 
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While the acerbic declensions of colonial-era jeremiads could be quite harsh, they 
were all based upon the ultimate assumption that positive change was not only possible, 
but foreordained. As Sacvan Bercovitch explains, the denunciations had a positive 
purpose—one which was only further evidence of the special quality of the community’s 
covenantal relationship with God: “The purpose of their jeremiads was to direct an 
imperiled people of God toward the fulfillment of their destiny, to guide them 
individually toward salvation, and collectively toward the American city of God.”18 
Despite the fact that in Puritan society “the elect distinguished themselves by their dread 
of failure, by continual contrition and repentance,”19 Bercovitch convincingly argues that 
the Puritans interpreted their migration to New England as yet another chapter in God’s 
ongoing narrative of human redemption. “Their rhetoric” he writes, “opens out into a 
literal-prophetic historiography which unites the Reformation thrust and the history of 
redemption. . . . It was reserved for the American Puritans to give the kingdom of God a 
local habitation and a name.”20 Cultural historian Ernest Lee Tuveson writes that this 
originally Puritan idea became one of the dominant motifs of American rhetoric and 
literature—allowing Americans from the colonial era to the present day to see themselves 
as both the perfection of God’s plan on Earth and the chosen instruments used by God to 
prosecute the divine work of socio-political (and therefore spiritual) redemption across 
the globe.21 As such, the “chosen nation” (or various communities within it) may be 
subject to the corrective motives of the jeremiad, but such jeremiads must (unlike Jimmy 
Carter’s) end on a hopeful, expectant note to maintain fidelity to the assertion of divine 
destiny.  
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Aside from occasioning a lively debate among history scholars,22 such relatively 
optimistic interpretations of the jeremiad demand serious investigation of the degree to 
which the same rhetorical form can be used by various rhetors under different auspices to 
either praise and preserve or denounce a community. Historian David Howard-Pitney’s 
exploration of the jeremiads used by African-American rhetors such as Frederick 
Douglass, Booker T. Washington, W.E.B. Du Bois, Ida B. Wells, and Martin Luther 
King, in pursuit of civil rights revealed jeremiads which greatly “vacillated with regard to 
America’s perfectibility.”23 King’s jeremiads, for instance, evolved along a moralistic 
trajectory which would have culminated in a sermon entitled “Why America May Go to 
Hell”—a sermon King would have delivered on Sunday April 7, 1968 had he not been 
assassinated on April 4.24 While several communication studies have observed the 
jeremiad’s potential to either uphold or challenge the status quo,25 there remains a need 
for a more nuanced understanding of how conservative jeremiads should be differentiated 
from corrective jeremiads.  
Several studies have explored Reagan’s use of the jeremiad in economic 
discourse. Amos Kiewe and Davis Houck offer an impressive study of every major 
economic speech by Reagan, yet their analysis fails to explain precisely how Reagan used 
a judgmental rhetorical form to expound increasingly optimistic themes.26 Richard L. 
Johannesen’s study of Reagan’s economic jeremiad acknowledges that his economic 
jeremiad constituted a “balancing of lamentation with optimism” and that this was a 
typical feature of Reagan’s rhetoric.27 The analysis of Reagan’s jeremiad in this chapter 
seeks to contribute to the findings of these earlier studies by explaining how Reagan 
executed this balance by employing the themes of political postmillennialism in his 
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economic discourse. As such, this chapter provides a more complex reading of Reagan’s 
economic rhetoric than have these studies because it allows us to not only accurately 
identify Reagan’s rhetorical form as the jeremiad, but charting its specific features such 
as its description of (1) progressive improvement steadily achieved not by government, 
but by the people themselves, and (2) the prediction of a glorious future wherein the 
American promise would be fulfilled in spite of the existence of highly-motivated 
opponents and contrary evidence about the success of Reagan’s economic program.  
 Because I argue that Reagan’s jeremiad was postmillennial in its trajectory, it is 
important to carefully define this term before proceeding. In traditional Christian 
eschatology one finds several different approaches to understanding the end times: 
amillennialism, premillennialism and postmillennialism. While each of these approaches 
is more complicated in actual practice than the space for this discussion will allow here, 
all of these approaches are concerned with the role of the millennium—a period of a 
thousand years of peace and tranquility wherein the lion shall lay down with the lamb, the 
implements of war will be useful only for legitimate commerce, and God Almighty (or 
his representatives in the postmillennial view) literally reigns upon the Earth.28 
Amillennialism, the belief in no earthly millennial at all, has important standing in 
Christian history as the oldest of these millennial views. Jesus’ immediate disciples 
believed that their Lord’s return was imminent and were therefore unconcerned about 
long-term millennial theology—a view that began to change as the centuries went by. 
This amillennial view of the early disciples was largely shared by no less than St. 
Augustine of Hippo whose classic work City of God proclaimed that the cities of God and 
man were distinct and that the inherent sinfulness of humanity precluded any such 
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millennial paradise because “human nature as a whole would have to be miraculously 
transformed first.”29 However, the decline of this degree of millennial skepticism 
throughout the centuries eventually gave rise to the premillennial and postmillennial 
views. As such the influence of amillennialism has declined considerably.  
Premillennialism on the other hand is decidedly more influential and is perhaps 
the dominant view among contemporary evangelical Protestants.30 As the moniker 
implies, premillennialists believe that Jesus Christ will return to Earth to retrieve his 
followers prior to the establishment of his actual millennial reign upon the Earth. This 
view, which is further complicated by competing doctrines of whether the rapture will 
occur prior to, in the middle of, or after the seven-year period known as “the great 
tribulation,” largely predominates in both the multi-million-dollar-a-year book and film 
industries that cater to contemporary evangelicals31 and in the pulpits of such 
congregations since the early 1900s.32 While a number of variations exist, 
premillennialism presents a decidedly dark, apocalyptic, view of the future. As historian 
Emmanuel Sivan writes, it is a “message of messianic redemption following an imminent 
worldwide catastrophe . . . .”33 While interpretations about when and how such a 
catastrophe will occur vary widely, the fact that major evangelical figures such as Billy 
Graham, Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, Hal Lindsey and others have written and preached 
extensively on premillennial teachings is strong evidence of the influence of 
premillennialism in contemporary evangelical culture. As sociologist Susan Harding 
observes “most Bible-believing Protestants in America are premillennialists of one sort or 
another.”34 
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Postmillennialism is the most optimistic of these views. It is predicated upon the 
idea that Christ will return to Earth after the completion of the millennium; hence, the 
name postmillennialism. This can only happen through the work of the Church since 
Christ can only return “at the end of an essentially progressive millennium of human 
rule.”35 In contrast to the premillennialist view, postmillennialism envisioned the 
kingdom of God coming to Earth by degrees, guided by the spirit of God to be sure, but 
ultimately achieved through a human agency. As Jean B. Quandt summarizes: “the 
kingdom of God would be gradually realized in this world; justice, peace and love would 
eventually reign supreme. . . . postmillennialism believed in the gradual redemption of 
the world under the influence of Christ’s spirit rather than his physical presence.”36 The 
optimism and dependency upon human agency espoused in postmillennialism made it 
quite palatable for both religiously-minded socio-political progressives like Charles 
Grandison Finney, Henry Ward Beecher, Washington Gladden and Josiah Strong. It was 
similarly attractive to those such as John Dewey who were comparatively less inclined to 
see religion as a cure for social ills.37 The vision of a global utopia achieved by human 
effort and compassionate good works was and remains appealing to many.  
The optimism and belief in the perfectibility of society via human agency 
elements of postmillennialism remain alive and well today thanks to the emergence of the 
Religious Right as a powerful force in American politics. Evangelicals once distrusted 
political involvement and regarded efforts to improve government and society as largely 
futile since the present world would likely be destroyed in the cataclysmic events before 
Christ’s return anyway. But since the late 1970s, conservative evangelicals have 
demanded treatment as a valuable political constituency via organizations like Jerry 
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Falwell’s Moral Majority. Like nineteenth and early twentieth century progressives, these 
groups care about social issues—particularly ones such as school prayer, abortion, and 
gay rights, which they perceive to pertain to the preservation of “American values” and 
the status of the family.38 Accordingly, contemporary evangelicals are largely 
premillennial in their theology, but have somewhat curiously adopted a postmillennial 
orientation toward political engagement.  
Postmillennialism may also be found in the pre-presidential rhetoric of Ronald 
Reagan. While a number of studies acknowledge Reagan’s use of jeremiads and 
apocalyptic discourse in his pre-political rhetorical career, only one has even suggested a 
postmillennial influence upon Reagan’s rhetoric. In an analysis of Reagan’s 1964 
televised campaign speech for Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater 
entitled “A Time for Choosing,” Kurt Ritter posits that this famous speech employed both 
premillennial and postmillennial elements. Reagan’s speech was apocalyptic, Ritter 
explains, in that Reagan warned his audience that doom threatened to befall the nation if 
it did not change course quickly.39 Ritter argues that Reagan’s framing of expanding 
government power as a lament over America’s threatened liberty, which he defined as an 
impending crisis clothed in the language of good versus evil was heavily influenced by 
apocalyptic elements. Yet, Reagan hardly believed all to be lost. “Even in his darkest 
passages of apocalyptic language,” Ritter notes “Reagan held out hope that Americans 
could alter history, that they could turn back the tide of liberalism.”40 Ritter’s contention 
of postmillennial influence in this speech is evident in passages such as the following: 
You and I have a rendezvous with destiny. We’ll preserve for our children 
this, the last best hope of man on earth, or we’ll sentence them to take the  
last step into a thousand years of darkness. We will keep in mind and remember 
that Barry Goldwater has faith in us. He has faith that you and I have the  
  
    114
ability and the dignity and the right to make our own decisions and determine 
our own destiny.41 
 
However, Ritter’s gives scant attention to the role postmillennialism may have played in 
Reagan’s presidential discourse. This chapter delves more deeply into Reagan’s 
economic jeremiad, demonstrating its postmillennial trajectory,42 and discussing the 
greater efficacy of Reagan’s use of the jeremiad in comparison to Jimmy Carter. 
Ronald Reagan’s Postmillennial Jeremiad 
Unlike Jimmy Carter’s inaugural address, Reagan’s held nothing back in his 
condemnation of the public sin of relying upon big government and how it caused the 
economic problems which, he argued, threatened the very existence of the nation. Days 
before his First inaugural, Reagan and his communication staff headed by chief 
speechwriter Kenneth L. Khachigian evinced both a concern for and understanding of 
how images would contribute to his message. For one thing, Reagan aides let it be known 
to reporters on several occasions that Reagan himself was the rhetorical force behind the 
address. “The real bottom line is that he wrote it out.” reported one aide: “He drafted the 
damn thing.”43 In the post-Watergate era where public distrust of politicians and those 
who helped them craft rhetorical messages still abounded, the image of a “citizen-
politician” (as Reagan often described himself) drafting his own inaugural was politically 
expedient. Widely-distributed photos of Reagan sitting at his desk, surrounded by a flurry 
of papers, while scratching out his own inaugural on a legal pad solidified the “citizen-
politician goes to Washington” image.44 The imagery contributed to the prophetic ethos 
he sought for his first inaugural. As communication scholars James Darsey and Margaret 
D. Zulick each explain in separate works the legitimacy of a prophet’s ethos is often 
expressed in their emergence from the wilderness of isolation and self-denial where 
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suffering allows the prophet to be imbued with God’s message for the people.45 Although 
Reagan certainly did not face the physical privations common to biblical prophets while 
drafting his inaugural, one report noted that he had “secluded himself in his Pacific 
Palisades home” so that he could “work[ed] at a desk amid a home barren of most 
furniture” which had already been moved to the White House.46 
Reagan’s prophetic inaugural message was certainly not for the faint of heart. 
Indeed, his sobering address not only indicated that the nation’s economy was in trouble, 
but suggested that the American economic crisis was a consequence of the great national 
political sin of having allowed the government to expand beyond its appropriate realm. 
As Reagan famously opined near the beginning of the address:   
 In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; government 
 is the problem. From time to time we’ve been tempted to believe that society 
 has become too complex to be managed by self-rule, that government by an  
 elite group is superior to government for, by, and of the people. But if no one  
 among us is capable of governing himself, then who among us has the capacity 
 to govern someone else?47 
 
Despite these warnings, Reagan’s message could have been much stronger, yet probably 
less effective, if he had included a broader and tougher declension far more critical of the 
American public. In the initial draft of the inaugural the line about government as the 
problem was preceded by the assertion that excessive reliance upon the government was 
a byproduct of the desperate years of the Great Depression but that in the ensuing 
decades the government’s reach had “gone too far, threatening to upset that delicate 
balance”48 of the American federal system. The American public was not guilty of any 
actual moral/spiritual transgressions as Jimmy Carter indicated in his July 15, 1979 
energy speech, but of a political sin.  
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The initial draft also featured a startlingly apocalyptic warning about the intrusion 
of government into the lives and privacy of ordinary Americans: “The founders clearly 
understood the perils of power vested so heavily in the state. That peril is even greater in 
modern times. For the era of the complex society, of advanced communications and 
technology, has given to government a sweeping new dimension of power and even 
greater capacity for mischief.”49 This Orwellian description of governmental power did 
not, of course, survive the drafting process. Nevertheless, it illustrates that the deep 
distrust of government Reagan evinced in his pre-presidential rhetoric certainly remained 
with him as he entered the Oval Office. Despite the distrust of government ingrained in 
Reagan’s conservative ideology, the difference between this initial draft and the final 
product indicates a willingness to both sacrifice some of the more radical elements of his 
conservative message in order to project a more optimistic prophetic ethos and narrow 
the focus of his declension by ultimately blaming the government rather than the polis for 
America’s political sin. These early rhetorical choices formulated the foundation of what 
would become the postmillennial trajectory of much of his economic rhetoric.  
The nation’s economic problems were quite significant, Reagan explained, but the 
answers were relatively simple—matters of resolute action rather than deliberation. First, 
based upon the conservative ideological notion that “We are a nation that has a 
government—not the other way around” Reagan pledged to “curb the size and influence 
of the Federal establishment” which, he argued, would restore proper balance to the 
federal system and would maximize individual liberty.50 Reagan seemed to live up to this 
pledge by announcing a federal employee hiring freeze just hours after the inaugural. In 
addition to this tangible policy step Reagan argued, in what may have been a subtle swipe 
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at Carter, that the key to solving these economic problems and renewing the national 
covenant lay in rekindling American optimism: As he explained the country needed to 
“believe in ourselves and . . . in our capacity to perform great deeds, to believe that 
together with God’s help we can and will resolve the problems which now confront us.”51 
President Carter had similarly called Americans to rekindle their faith in 
American promise in his infamous energy speech of July 15, 1979. However, Carter’s 
call for hope also came with a health dose of collective blame combined with calls to 
patriotically sacrifice and conserve energy. Reagan’s call was quite different. He went out 
of his way to explain that no heroic sacrifice would be necessary on the part of average 
Americans, but that their best efforts at reinstituting a generalized public optimism would 
be sufficient to meet the present crisis.  
As Bruce Gronbeck wrote of the speech, “Reagan was grim but not 
despondent.”52 The problems were significant and the nation was under threat, but 
Reagan predicted that things would get better and argued that such hope was a 
fundamental component of the American character. As Reagan stated, “And after all, 
why shouldn’t we believe that? We are Americans.”53 The dominant god and devil terms 
Reagan used in this address bear out its optimistic postmillennial rhetorical trajectory. 
Reagan prized the “individual” American who, when allowed to do so, enabled the nation 
to “prosper[ed] as no other people on Earth.”54 Reagan saw the individual American as an 
heroic figure “going in and out of factory gates,” a noble farmer able to “produce enough 
food to feed all of us and then the world beyond,” as both a producer and consumer 
engaged in the commerce of capitalism, and heroic “individuals and families” who 
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supported the government and society—all of whom were possessed of a “quite, but 
deep” patriotism and “values [which] sustain our national life.”55 
 Reagan’s story also had a villain. “Government,” or rather the tendency of 
government to grow, was far more than the problem; it was a ubiquitous and ominous 
obstacle to economic vitality because it stifled the creativity and prosperity of 
individuals. “It is no coincidence,” Reagan argued “that our present troubles parallel and 
are proportionate to the intervention and intrusion in our lives that result from 
unnecessary and excessive growth of government. . . . we’re too great a nation to limit 
ourselves to small dreams.”56 Reagan’s use of “government” as a devil term allowed his 
jeremiad to target something as the source for the nation’s economic woes without 
pronouncing judgment upon the whole nation (as Carter did in his energy jeremiad) and 
without indicting any one person or group as being responsible for the economic 
stagnation. As Craig Allen Smith observes, much of Reagan’s policy rhetoric was 
characterized “by a lack of domestic adversaries.”57 That is to say that Reagan’s 
economic jeremiad throughout his two terms in office featured a narrow declension, 
which sometimes blamed nobody at all except for a shadowy projection of a nameless, 
faceless adversary—in the case of his inaugural, government. While a few of Reagan’s 
subsequent economic speeches in support of passage of the 1981 ERTA did name a 
particular adversary, his inaugural helped establish his basic practice of using a jeremiad 
which did not blame the general public which was, in Reagan’s view, populated with 
individual heroes. 
Despite the powerful constitutive elements inherent to presidential inaugurals, 
much of Reagan’s policy-making and rhetorical work remained to be done. Accordingly, 
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Reagan spent much of the rest of 1981 addressing the topic of economic recovery via a 
progressively-optimistic postmillennial jeremiad. This campaign began with his first 
major televised address to the nation on February 5, 1981. Of course, like any 
postmillennial message, the upward progression toward eventual perfection must begin in 
the imperiled and imperfect present. Likewise, Reagan began in this somewhat un-
Reagan-like manner by declaring to the nation that it was “in the worst economic mess 
since the Great Depression.”58 Reagan explained that:  
A few days ago I was presented with a report I’d asked for, a comprehensive  
audit, if you will, of our economic condition. You won’t like it. I didn’t like it.  
But we have to face the truth and then go to work to turn things around. And 
make no mistake about it, we can turn them around.59 
 
Archival materials from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library cast some doubt on 
Reagan’s reporting of the timeline for his receipt of the report and the subtle implication 
that he would not have known the report’s content in advance. Weeks before his first 
inaugural, Reagan received a memorandum from former Nixon speechwriter Ray Price. 
Price counseled the president-elect to refrain from announcing the explicit details of a 
“supply-side expansionist or belt-tightening austerity” economic recovery plan in the 
inaugural address.60 Explaining that announcement of Reagan’s already-formulated 
economic program would be premature since “the Inaugural has to unify,” Price offered 
that waiting “a decent interval, and then do[ing] it before a joint session of Congress” 
would enhance the policy’s credibility: 
 specific programmatic recommendations come with greater authority from 
 the Executive Branch than from transition task forces. Anything announced 
 immediately on taking office will be seen as the product of transition task 
 forces; those that come a little later will be seen as the product of the Executive 
 Branch, with its resources and responsibilities.61 
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Although it seems unlikely that Reagan’s choice to wait “a decent interval” was a direct 
result of the advice of the former Nixon speechwriter, Price’s memo coupled with the 
ideological consistency between the economic “audit” and Reagan’s inaugural indicates 
that Reagan carefully chose to initiate his economic recovery jeremiad in a way which 
would maximize his prophetic ethos as he explicated the seriousness of the economic 
crisis and the principle reasons for it.  
 The remainder of the exordium spelled out the nation’s economic problems in 
vivid statistical detail: an $80 billion budget deficit, a 528% increase in the federal 
budget, crippling inflation in 1979 and 1980 at 13.3% and 12.4% respectively, and nearly 
7 million Americans unemployed. Reagan further explained that Americans were saving 
far less of their income than their counterparts in West Germany or Japan, that home 
ownership was becoming far more financially burdensome for average families, and that 
government regulations on the auto industry had added $666 to the price of a new car. 
While each of these statistics illustrated a whole set of complex and often inter-related 
economic problems, Reagan suggested that the ultimate responsibility for each lay at the 
encroaching feet of the increasingly-powerful federal government. “I’m sure you’re 
getting the idea” he wryly reported “that the audit presented to me found government 
policies of the last few decades responsible for our economic troubles.”62 
 At first, Reagan seemed to blame the entire American population in a broad 
Jimmy Carter-style declension when he pointedly announced: “We forgot or just 
overlooked the fact that government—any government—has a built-in tendency to 
grow.”63 However, Reagan’s framing of even this one instance of broad national 
declension was largely self-diffused since “we all had a hand in looking to government 
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for benefits as if government had some source of revenue other than our earnings.”64 
Reagan traced this history of the nation’s fall into the seductive arms of big government 
since the economically-robust post-WWII years noting that although the nation had 
prospered in the form of higher wages and a vastly-improved standard of living, the 
specter of inflation “like radioactivity, was cumulative” and had since gotten “out of 
control.”65 
Reagan argued that the deleterious effects of the federal government’s growth 
were now stifling major components of the national economy like the auto industry and 
American steel production where, because of the excessive but well-meaning regulations 
imposed by the government, American workers were being greatly out-produced. “Now, 
this isn’t because they’re better workers” Reagan was quick to add “But we have to give 
them [American workers] the tools and equipment that workers in the other industrial 
nations have.”66 These deficiencies of the industrial sector were, of course, the result of 
“punitive tax policies” “excessive and unnecessary regulations” and “government 
borrowing” which diminished industrial capital.67 
For Reagan the policy-level solution to the national decline was simple—taxes 
and government spending both had to be cut. The particulars of his strategy were to be 
found in the economic plan he promised to introduce before Congress two weeks later. 
The plan included cuts to a number of government programs which would help the 
government reform its “wasteful ways” and meet its “legitimate responsibilities.”68 Tax 
cuts were the central aspect of Reagan’s plan to renew the national covenant. Cutting the 
tax rate would not only provide individuals with more disposable income and the 
industrial sector with badly-needed capital, it would also check what Reagan perceived to 
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be the ultimate source of all of these problems by constraining and reversing the 
expansion of the federal government. As he put it: “we can lecture our children about 
extravagance until we run out of voice and breath. Or we can cure their extravagance by 
simply reducing their allowance.”69 Apparently the government was behaving like an 
ungrateful and disobedient teenager insofar as its tax and economic policies were 
concerned.  
Remedies in the form of large-scale tax and economic reforms had to be pursued 
immediately. The nation had successfully “stalled the judgment day” but such delay was 
no longer an option—time was simply running out.70 This feint toward the potentially-
apocalyptic consequences of failing to enact his economic reforms was an early prophetic 
warning which helped initiate a rhetorical campaign characterized by increasingly-
optimistic assessments of the nation’s economy. As Ritter and Henry characterize it, 
Reagan was able to “shift the emphasis of his jeremiad” from “a pessimistic assessment 
of how far America had drifted from her original covenant of limited government” to “an 
optimistic and forward-looking prediction of a golden age of prosperity and freedom that 
would come to America as a reward for restoring that covenant.”71 
Reagan ended the February 5th speech in dramatic fashion enacting the type of 
prophetic choice common to biblical and Puritan-era jeremiads: 
We can leave our children with an unrepayable massive debt and a shattered 
economy, or we can leave them liberty in a land where every individual 
has the opportunity to be whatever God intended us to be. All it takes is a  
little common sense and recognition of our own ability. Together we can  
forge a new beginning for America.72 
 
Of course, what Reagan meant by “common sense” and “our own ability” was his own 
economic prescription for America, many components of which were articulated long 
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before he took office. Former Reagan economic adviser Martin Anderson, for instance, 
reported in his 1990 memoir entitled Revolution that Reagan’s plan to halt inflation and 
jumpstart economic growth through a combination of tax cuts and a reduction in federal 
regulations governing business was circulated throughout the campaign as “Policy 
Memorandum No. 1” in August of 1979.73 These notions were not simply a twinkle in 
eye of candidate Reagan, but were settled socio-economic convictions from which 
Reagan and his advisers shaped economic policy upon his election to the presidency. In 
effect, they were articles of faith for Reagan and his administration even before assuming 
office. 
Reagan substantially repeated his message from the February 5th economic 
address to the nation before a joint session of Congress thirteen days later on February 
18, 1981. Despite the grimness of his warnings, the address showed signs of the 
emergence of a more hopeful outlook for the American economy. “There’s nothing 
wrong with our internal strengths” he told the Congress, but “we have failed [the system] 
through a lack of confidence” and through the belief that government tinkering alone 
could right the nation’s economic problems.74 The statement was a telling one as it 
reflected Reagan’s unshakable confidence in the soundness of America’s democratic 
capitalist system which was at the core of his economic jeremiad even at its darkest 
moments.  
The system Reagan envisioned however was rhetorically situated in his poetic 
retelling of the nation’s idyllic past. This aspect of Reagan’s early economic jeremiad 
came through most clearly on March 30, 1981 in a speech to the Building and 
Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO at the Washington, D.C. Hilton. He 
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invoked the name and philosophy of labor leader Samuel Gompers who cautioned that 
socio-political philanthropy must never overcome individual initiative. “We’ve strayed 
far from the path that was charted by this man who believed so much in the freedom and 
dignity of the worker” Reagan opined “We are in today’s economic mess precisely 
because our leaders have forgotten that we built this great Nation on rewarding the work 
ethic instead of punishing it.”75 Reagan accurately perceived the rhetorical value of 
identifying Gompers as a hero of both the American labor movement and a proponent of 
the type of rugged, self-sufficient individualism which Reagan believed to be at the core 
of the American soul. This rhetorical coupling enabled Reagan to argue to the assembled 
AFL-CIO members that “You believe in a work ethic but subsidize a government that 
does not.”76 Again, Reagan only mildly chided the public for putting its faith in 
government with its impersonal “computers . . . organization charts, policies, and 
systems” but quickly concluded that “I think it’s about time that we placed trust in 
ourselves.”77 In short, the nation could “surmount our problems, and . . . accomplish the 
goals that we all seek”78 by changing course and adopting a set of economic reforms 
which would enable the people to tap into their historic strengths and reaffirm the socio-
economic potential of America. 
 Reagan’s speech to the Building and Construction Trades Department of the 
AFL-CIO certainly did not bring to a close his economic jeremiad, but merely the 
opening—and most apocalyptic—phase of it. Reagan’s first inaugural, his address to the 
nation on February 5, 1981, the address to Congress on February 18, 1981, and his 
speech to the AFL-CIO convention all described an inherently good nation that had gone 
astray from its first principles and was suffering the socio-economic consequences of that 
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declension. Yet, the only real villain identified in even this darkest phase of the Reagan 
economic jeremiad was the ubiquitous evil figure of the encroaching federal government. 
After March 30, 1981, Reagan’s economic rhetoric would become increasingly-
optimistic—more and more reflective of the political postmillennialism he seemed to 
favor. A few Reagan biographers have suggested that this growing presidential optimism 
may have been influenced by Reagan’s brush with death that same day after having been 
shot in the chest by John Hinckley Jr. as he left the Hilton.79 While I have no intentions of 
evaluating the degree to which Reagan may have derived a sense of personal mission in 
the wake of this assassination attempt, the remainder of this chapter will suggest that his 
increasing optimism emanated from the fact that Reagan, like any good storyteller, 
understood that the unfolding drama of American renewal had to begin in conflict and 
peril but ultimately progress toward a fulfillment of American potential.  
 Less than one month after the failed assassination attempt, Reagan resumed his 
rhetorical push for economic reform by addressing a joint session of Congress on April 
28, 1981. After receiving a boisterous welcome, Reagan embarked upon a discussion 
about the wonderful qualities of American society. After relating the humorous anecdote 
of a young boy who wrote to him “I hope you get well quick or you might have to make a 
speech in your pajamas,” Reagan provided a gentle fatherly rebuke to those who opined 
that the attempt on his life was evidence of America as a “sick society.”80 
 Well, sick societies don’t produce men like the two who recently returned from 
 outer space. Sick societies don’t produce young men like Secret Service agent 
 Tim McCarthy, who placed his body between mine and the man with the gun 
 simply because he felt that’s what his duty called for him to do. Sick societies 
 don’t produce dedicated police officers like Tom Delahanty or able and  
 devoted public servants like Jim Brady. Sick societies don’t make people like 
 us so proud to be Americans and so very proud of our fellow citizens.81 
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While this aside could be dismissed as nothing more than a leisurely rhetorical detour 
calculated to thank those who had helped save his life and express concern for those who 
were injured in the line of fire, the final sentence of this section revealed a crucial 
component of Reagan’s economic jeremiad. Any society possessed of the inherent virtue 
Reagan described would certainly be willing and able to do the work necessary to get its 
economic house in order and reclaim its endangered individualism and economic vitality 
from the government he believed to be its principle threat.  
 Although American society was not sick, its economy still was in Reagan’s 
estimation. Reagan used his brush with death to draw attention to his economic jeremiad. 
Although his health had been “much improved” he wished he could “say that with regard 
to the health of our economy.”82 Reagan spent a good deal of the uncharacteristically 
brief (only about 15 minutes—short for Reagan) address speaking of the economic 
“sickness” which had afflicted the nation and the “cure” which could be provided by his 
proposed legislation which sought to cut taxes, eliminate certain federal regulations, and 
cut the budget by $140 billion.83 Reagan’s sickness metaphor was important to his 
jeremiad for two reasons. First, as his appearance that evening had enabled him to 
enact,84 recovery was quite possible provided that the proper steps were taken. As in the 
treatment of any sickness, the appropriate steps included a prescribed course of action 
(Reagan’s proposal) and the indication that the treatment had to begin immediately. 
Reagan promised that the appropriate steps were forthcoming as his administration and 
the Republicans in Congress were formulating the legislative response that would 
become the Economic Recovery and Tax Act of 1981. In effect, his message was that 
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although there were some obstacles to overcome, the alternative proposal favored by the 
Democratically-controlled House Budget Committee, relief was on the way.  
 Despite the old political adage that one should never allow the general public to 
see either laws or sausages while they are being made, Reagan allowed the public a 
glimpse into how the economic cure was being formulated. Indicative of his increasingly-
optimistic rhetoric, he noted that his work with Congress had been largely productive and 
that they had “come a long distance in less than 3 months” and that the two parties had 
“communicated in a spirit of candor, openness, and mutual respect.”85 He described few 
actual details of the two proposals under consideration but did name them—one he coldly 
referred to as the “measure offered by the House Budget Committee” and the other he 
proudly heralded as the “bipartisan measure” sponsored by Congressmen Republican Phil 
Gramm from Texas and Democrat Del Latta from Ohio.86 The bipartisan measure would, 
he reported, “achieve all the essential elements of controlling government spending, 
reducing the tax burden, building a national defense second to none, and stimulating 
economic growth and creating millions of new jobs.”87 
The Democratic alternative was, as Reagan insisted, really no alternative at all 
since it did not adequately cut general spending but simultaneously cut far too much ($14 
billion) from the defense budget. In short, this alternative was nothing more than “an 
echo of the past” with its “High taxes and excess spending growth [which] created our 
present economic mess . . . .”88 As such, Reagan suggested that the adoption of the House 
Budget Committee proposal would not cure the disease, but would cause the economy to 
regress in its illness. It seemed to matter little to Reagan that both of these proposals were 
still in their formative stages—or that the House Budge Committee bill would give 
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Reagan about “75 percent”89 of what he sought in the bipartisan measure. He still argued 
emphatically for his economic prescription.   
Reagan’s sickness metaphor was also important to his postmillennial jeremiad in 
that it suggested that the economic cure would ultimately come from the people, not from 
Reagan or any members of Congress. Reagan claimed that the bipartisan proposal under 
consideration was based upon “the message of last November 4th. That message was very 
simple. Our government is too big, and it spends too much.”90 While it is common for 
politicians to claim a ‘mandate’ from an election, contextually speaking, Reagan’s was 
rhetorically-consistent because he argued that it was ultimately the people—the 
“everyday heroes” as he had referred to them in his first inaugural—who were curing the 
nation’s economic maladies themselves. The central components of what would 
eventually become the ERTA largely-reflected Reagan’s long-held conservative 
philosophy. Nevertheless, he continually employed his postmillennial economic jeremiad 
in such a way that the American people, rather than he, were portrayed as the ultimate 
force driving his political decisions.  
Reagan’s penchant for creating rhetorical linkage between his political ideals and 
the public will enabled him to describe the national past in idyllic terms and forecast a 
future time when the American promise would be realized. The conclusion of his April 
28, 1981 speech to Congress featured Reagan’s invocation of the bravery of recently-
returned space shuttle Columbia astronauts John Young and Bob Crippen, and the advice 
of American literary legend Carl Sandburg who wrote “Nothing happens unless first a 
dream.”91 The bravery and optimism of these Americans led Reagan to conclude that 
despite the economic crisis: “we have much greatness before us.”92 Reagan’s next major 
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national address in support of his economic recovery legislation would continue this 
theme and argue that the nation was indeed on the verge of a glorious new era.  
In the months of proposals and counter-proposals between the administration and 
Congress, Reagan eventually abandoned the Gramm-Latta version of reform legislation 
he had heralded in April as the “bipartisan measure” in favor of one sponsored by 
Republican Barber Conable of New York and Democrat Kent Hance of Texas. The new 
version was remarkably similar to its predecessor, except that it arranged for its tax cuts 
to take effect with the beginning of the next fiscal year (October 1, 1981) rather than July 
1, 1981 as proposed by the Gramm-Latta measure.93 The Reagan administration 
employed nothing less than a full-court-press to win the impending congressional vote on 
this crucial component of its economic recovery package in late July of 1981.  
While they used every weapon in the political arsenal to lobby Congress, they 
also understood that Reagan’s talent for direct communication with the public would be 
crucial to their efforts. With this in mind, Reagan addressed the nation from the Oval 
Office on July 27, 1981. He began by assuring American seniors of the soundness of the 
Social Security system rather than talking about the economy. Such reassurances were 
necessary because of the administration’s May 1981 proposal attempting to drastically 
reduce social security benefits in order to trim the federal budget. That proposal was so 
strongly-rebuffed by the Senate in a 96-0 vote that the administration quickly and quietly 
abandoned the effort.94 Public fears over the prospect of similar attempts to cut social 
security had grown enough that summer that it required Reagan to address them with a 
strong denial at the outset of this important economic speech.  
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Turning to the central topic of the evening, Reagan recalled his stark jeremiad 
from February of 1981 and commented that his own message had been “grim and 
disturbing.”95 There would be little of that in this address. Although he reminded the 
national audience that the economy was “still not out of the woods,” he suggested that 
something grand had already been accomplished, additional successful reform was 
imminent—and ultimately they the people were responsible for it. “Your voices have 
been heard” he proclaimed “millions of you, Democrats, Republicans, and Independents, 
from every profession, trade and line of work, and from every part of this land. You sent 
a message that you wanted a new beginning.”96 The “new beginning” of which he spoke 
was both the successful passage of $140 billion in federal budget cuts (the final details of 
which were at that moment being resolve in a conference committee), and the prospective 
passage of the Economic Recovery and Tax Act of 1981 which featured across-the-board 
tax cuts by five percent in 1981, and ten percent in both 1982 and 1983. Strictly speaking, 
Reagan’s definition of the upcoming vote as a “new beginning” was a bit premature since 
the vote on the tax cut components of the bill was shaping up to be a close one—a 
political problem for Reagan that his speech would soon rectify.  
Reagan explained that public response in favor of the proposed budget cuts had 
“reaffirmed the mandate you delivered in the election last November.”97 Reagan 
explained that the battles with Congress had been so hard-fought because those who 
opposed the legislation were merely political insiders whose “way of life depend[ed] on 
maintaining government’s wasteful ways . . .” yet these loud protests were “no match for 
your voices, which were heard loud and clear in these marble halls of government.”98 
This statement illustrated Reagan’s unique rhetorical ability to combine an optimistic 
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outlook defining the American people as the source of all that was virtuous in the 
republic with a narrow, yet acerbic, declension aimed squarely at his political opposition. 
For instance, although he argued that the tax cut legislation before the Congress was a 
bipartisan reflection of the public desire to stop inflation and promote economic growth, 
he berated the Democratic leadership for, at first, calling such a proposal “wildly 
inflationary” then concluding in the face of public opinion that a tax cut one or two years 
in duration “might work.”99 “Now” Reagan added, “it’s July and they find they could 
even go for a third year cut provided there was a trigger arrangement that would allow it 
to go into effect if certain economic goals had been met by 1983.” 
Reagan argued that such dithering was tantamount to “holding the people’s tax 
reduction hostage to future economic events” which would deprive American farmers 
and shopkeepers of “the certainty they must have to begin saving or investing more of 
their money” which was “precisely what we need now to rebuild our economy.”100 The 
declension continued as Reagan accused congressional Democrats of proposing a trigger 
mechanism of deficit reduction which they knew (an interesting admission from Reagan 
given his promise that this measure would ultimately help reduce the deficit) would never 
be met. In short, Reagan charged that the Democrats were proposing a type of Will 
Rogers (who “never met a man he didn’t like”) approach to tax policy: “I’m afraid we 
have some people around here who never met a tax they didn’t hike.”101 
As prescribed by the jeremiad form, Reagan returned to his familiar argument that 
the people, not the federal government, had a right to their money and that the tax 
reductions he proposed would reestablish this seemingly-forgotten provision of the 
national covenant. Accordingly, the public had a clear choice before it:  
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In a few days the Congress will stand at the fork of two roads. One road is  
all too familiar to us. It leads ultimately to higher taxes. It merely brings us 
back to the source of our economic problems, where the government decides 
that it knows better than you what should be done with your earnings and, in  
fact, how you should conduct your life. The other road promises to renew the  
American spirit. It’s a road of hope and opportunity. It places the direction of 
your life back in your hands where it belongs.102 
 
Yet in Reagan’s jeremiad the decision of which road to follow was ultimately up to the 
people rather than Congress. Throughout his first six months in office Reagan’s 
postmillennial economic jeremiad led up to this moment wherein he laid before the 
public a clear choice of which road to follow. His rhetoric suggested that he could only 
prescribe what he believed to be the appropriate path, the choice lay with them. Reagan’s 
political postmillennialism enabled him to include a prediction of future glory in his 
direct appeal for public action on behalf of the ERTA: 
 In these 6 months, we’ve done so much and have come so far. It’s been the  
 power of millions of people like you who have determined that we will make 
 America great again. You have made the difference up to now. You will  
 make the difference again. Let us not stop now.103 
 
The public’s response to Reagan’s appeal was as powerful as it was rapid. Telephone 
calls, telegrams, and letters flooded the Capitol prompting Democratic Speaker of the 
House Thomas “Tip” O’Neill to observe that Reagan’s address “had a devastating effect” 
on his political opposition.104 Forty-eight House Democrats broke ranks and supported 
the administration’s proposal despite the last minute political threats from Speaker 
O’Neill. As political scientist John W. Sloan reported, “What had appeared to be a close 
contest turned out to be a solid majority for the administration . . . .”105 
 It is important to see this public response for what it really was—not just a strong 
public reaction to one speech, but to a well-conceived rhetorical campaign beginning 
with gloomy prophecies in January and culminating in July with what Reagan claimed to 
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be the reclamation of public control of government. The foregoing analysis reveals that 
Reagan’s economic discourse was a jeremiad yet it was far from a traditional jeremiad 
because it did not blame the public and it stressed progressively-optimistic predictions 
about the future. These optimistic features are the byproduct of the political 
postmillennial orientation of Reagan’s discourse. The combination of the jeremiad form 
with these postmillennial themes resulted in an effective political shibboleth which 
enabled Reagan to rally the nation—and Congress by extension—to support the tax 
reduction legislation.  
Ronald Reagan clearly won his rhetorical battle to enact legislation that provided 
the largest tax cut in American history. It eventually accounted for a loss of $750 billion 
from the U.S. Treasury, the creation of numerous tax loopholes for businesses large and 
small, and federal spending cuts of approximately $140 billion in 1982 alone.106 Each of 
these objectives was largely-consistent with the conservative philosophy under which 
Reagan campaigned in 1980. Initially, it looked like Reagan’s success in appealing to the 
public might also result in positive effects for the nation’s economy. The ERTA 
performed largely as expected with regard to significantly slowing the growth of 
inflation. However, as the economy fell into a deep recession lasting from the fall of 1981 
until the fall of 1982 and the total national debt exploded to well beyond $1 trillion 
dollars fueled by the ever-expanding federal budget deficits107 it seemed to some that the 
Reagan administration had duped the public into accepting a highly-suspect economic 
program. Reagan’s budget director David Stockman reinforced this perception when he 
was quoted in the December 1981 Atlantic magazine as saying “none of us really 
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understands what’s going on with all these numbers” in the budget for which Reagan had 
fought so fiercely.108 
Critics of Reagan’s economic policy were given additional ammunition when he 
approved congressionally-initiated tax increases in 1982, 1983 and 1984 which had the 
cumulative effect of recouping approximately one quarter of the lost revenues wrought by 
the ERTA.109 My objective in this chapter is not to make an assessment of the success or 
failure of Reagan’s economic policies, but to explore the degree to which Reagan’s 
postmillennial jeremiad enabled him to promote them. To that end, it is essential to note 
that as Reagan neared the end of his first term a fair amount of contrary evidence 
regarding his economic policies had begun to surface. This historical fact provides an 
opportunity to gauge again the effectiveness of Reagan’s economic jeremiad, particularly 
with regard to its postmillennial themes which tended to offer a glorious vision of the 
future.  That vision dismissed contrary evidence and arguments as nothing more than the 
empty prattle of those seeking to delay the coming of the American millennium.  
As his first term ended and his second began, Ronald Reagan began to assess the 
accomplishments of the economic recovery by returning to his familiar postmillennial 
jeremiad in his second inaugural address. Reagan’s second inaugural has not been treated 
kindly by either academic authors or former Reagan insiders.110 Despite these negative 
judgments of the address, it is significant to this chapter because Reagan concentrated 
more on broadly assessing the economic achievements of his first administration and 
using these achievements to argue enthymematically that the future would therefore be 
equally grand. He began by opining that he had first assumed the presidency at a time of 
“economic stress” when even the nation’s leaders had begun to doubt that America’s 
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brightest days lay ahead.111 While Reagan continually expressed the idea that much work 
remained, the address suggested that an important corner had been turned. Continuing in 
the trajectory of the postmillennial jeremiad he gradually developed during his first term, 
he attributed the positive changes to the people rather than himself. This strategy was 
evidenced by copious uses of “we” throughout the address: “we knew it was time to 
renew our faith,” “We believed then and now . . .,” “We are creating a nation once again 
vibrant, robust and alive,” and “We will not rest until every American enjoys the fullness 
of freedom . . . .” 112 
These successes had occurred, he argued, because the nation had rediscovered the 
freedom-loving, individualistic entrepreneurial spirit that was at its core. The economic 
reforms he had proposed and that the people had so whole-heartedly endorsed through 
their public support of the tax reduction legislation in 1981 reflected the public’s return to 
the national covenant. “At the heart of our efforts” he explained “is one idea vindicated 
by 25 straight months of economic growth: Freedom and incentives unleash the drive and 
entrepreneurial genius that are the core of human progress.”113 Although Reagan’s 
economic success in curtailing the crippling stagflation of the 1970s was already apparent 
by January of 1985, Reagan neglected to mention that the means by which this major 
goal had been attained were not nearly as rhetorically neat or ideologically tidy as his 
description suggested. As Sloan notes, Reagan’s success in fighting off inflation worked 
“partly by design, partly by compromise, partly by muddling through . . . .”114 Reagan’s 
support of “revenue enhancements” in 1982, 1983, and 1984 certainly provide support for 
the notion that Reagan’s original economic reforms most clearly represented in the ERTA 
were certainly not the only factors responsible for the American economic renewal. 
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Additionally, the address seemed to be rhetorically hobbled by what Ritter describes as 
its “uncertainty over whether national redemption had been accomplished.”115 
Although it was certainly not Reagan’s most effective speech, his second 
inaugural continued Reagan’s postmillennial jeremiad by prophesying that his economic 
reforms had once again enabled the nation to have its “economy leading the world to a 
new age of economic expansion, we look to a future rich in possibilities.”116 In short, the 
agents of the coming American millennium were doing the gradual work necessary to 
usher in this golden era of American prosperity.  
 As Reagan’s second term neared its end, the time had come to sum up the 
achievements of his administration. Reagan delivered several major speeches in his final 
months designed to highlight his achievements in areas such as domestic policy and 
foreign affairs. Two of Reagan’s farewells are particularly relevant as assessments of his 
economic recovery policies despite the fact that neither of them were confined to that 
topic alone. Because Reagan’s rhetorical presidency had begun with such heavy emphasis 
upon the nation’s economic perils, it was only appropriate that the economy would be a 
major subject in both the farewell address to the Republican Party at its national 
convention on August 15, 1988 and his farewell address to the nation on January 11, 
1989.  
As would be expected, the assembled delegates to the 1988 Republican National 
Convention in New Orleans, Louisiana, gave the president a rousing welcome on that 
evening. Reagan began the address in a rather self-congratulatory manner by suggesting 
that they all deserved “a little pat on the back” for having restored the Nixon-riddled 
ethos of the Republican Party, but most of all for making “America a proud nation 
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again.”117 Like the skilled narrator he was, Reagan invited the delegates to recall their 
1980 convention in Detroit, Michigan, where “it was our dream that together we could 
rescue America and make a new beginning, to create anew that shining city on a hill.”118 
The shining city was in need of rescue then because of the growth of what Reagan called 
“Trust Me Government,” which had created the “economic chaos” that his reforms had 
since transformed into an era of “economic promise.”119 As always, Reagan gave credit to 
the American people who, in his words, “endured the great challenge of lifting us from 
the depths of national calamity, renewing our mighty economic strength . . .”120 Despite 
the fact that Reagan consistently identified the American people as the real heroes behind 
his political and economic accomplishments, the partisan exigence of this speech created 
some degree of inconsistency. Why pat themselves as Republicans on the back if, as 
Reagan so often claimed, it was the American people who had restored the nation?  
 By far, the most interesting element of Reagan’s postmillennial jeremiad present 
in this speech was his use of a narrow, but sometimes rather harsh, declension to describe 
the Democrats. One certainly expects to hear expostulations of the political opposition 
when listening to such an address. Yet, some of Reagan’s denunciations of the Democrats 
ultimately lose credibility with a universal audience because they appear grounded in his 
own self-interest, and framed in what rhetorical analyst Robert Hariman describes as the 
“realist style.”121 “Successful speakers in the realist style . . .” explains Hariman “keep 
public debate on their own limited terms . . . .”122 At one point, for example, Reagan cited 
increasing factory capacity, new home and car sales and the halting of inflation as 
evidence of the improved economy and then glibly remarked: “You know, I’ve noticed 
they don’t call it Reaganomics anymore.”123 Two interpretive problems existed with 
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Reagan’s interpretation. First, the term Reaganomics was (and is) still routinely applied 
to his economic philosophy. Second, his description implies an absence of economic 
problems as a result of his program—an implication belied by the tremendous budget 
deficit and the need for “revenue enhancements” after his initial tax cuts.  
Other credibility problems emerged from an attack where Reagan blatantly lied. 
While decrying the nation’s soaring budget deficits throughout the 1980s, Reagan was 
content to blame Congress entirely: “But the President doesn’t vote for a budget, and the 
President can’t spend a dime. Only the Congress can do that.”124 In fact, Reagan never 
once submitted a balanced budget to the Congress, yet his use of the postmillennial 
jeremiad enabled him to simply (but convincingly) sweep away such inconvenient 
contrary evidence. 
 These credibility problems aside, Reagan was able to employ his narrow 
declensions in a manner consistent with his political postmillennial themes. The 
following is representative of the strategy: 
 And virtually all this change occurred—and continues to occur—in spite 
 of the resistance of those liberal elites who loudly proclaim that it’s time 
 for a change. They resisted our defense buildup. They resisted our tax 
 cuts. They resisted cutting the fat out of government. And they resisted 
 our appointments of judges committed to the law and Constitution.125 
 
In the context of his jeremiad, Reagan’s anaphora listing all of the things “they resisted” 
paints a vivid picture of a powerful elite on the fringe of the American promise actively 
working to prevent the realization of the American millennium. To Reagan however, the 
promise of America was still alive and well despite the best efforts of these detractors 
who had broken faith with the American vision. Reagan explained his view of American 
promise in this way: 
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I know I’ve said this before, but I believe that God put this land between  
the two great oceans to be found by special people from every corner of  
the world who had that extra love for freedom that prompted them to leave  
their homeland and come to this land to make it a brilliant light beam of  
freedom to the world. It’s our gift to have visions, and I want to share that  
of a young boy who wrote to me shortly after I took office. In his letter he  
said, ‘I love America because you can join Cub Scouts if you want to. You  
have a right to worship as you please. . . . And I also like America because  
we have about 200 flavors of ice cream. ’ Well, truth through the eyes of a  
child: freedom of association, freedom of worship, freedom of hope and  
opportunity, and the pursuit of happiness—in this case, choosing among 200  
flavors of ice cream—that’s America, everyone with his or her vision of the  
American promise.126 
 
The inspiration for the saccharine-sweet vision came from a young boy, whom Reagan 
suggested was representative of the American character. The proofs of the boy’s 
argument (and Reagan’s) about the American promise—Cub Scouts, freedom of religious 
practice, and ice cream—are represented collectively as the embodiment of the American 
ideal. Indeed, immediately after this anecdote Reagan explained that this vision is why 
some “dodged bullets” to get across the Berlin Wall and why others braved death by 
“coming in tiny boats on turbulent oceans.”127 Although he was quite careful not to 
suggest that America has arrived at moral, spiritual, or political perfection, his thesis was 
unmistakable: Americans would continue their work to gradually achieve even greater 
perfection and to defend the progress that had been made under his watch. As Reagan 
said near the end of the address: “Our freedom must be defended over and over again—
and then again.”128 
 Aside from tendering his farewell to the American public, Ronald Reagan’s final 
major televised presidential address on January 11, 1989 also sought to present his 
economic vision in its full glory. In light of Reagan’s gift for storytelling and the hopeful 
writing style of Peggy Noonan who was Reagan’s primary writer for the speech, it is not 
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surprising that this address was—despite its long warning about cultural declension near 
the end—the most economically-optimistic of all his addresses. While careful not to say 
that everything was perfect, Reagan’s metaphor of the long economic and cultural 
journey the nation had completed under his leadership bellied this caution. “It’s been 
quite a long journey this decade” he opined “and we held together through some stormy 
seas. And at the end, together, we are reaching our destination.”129 As Reagan told it, 
“there were two great triumphs” achieved during his administration “One is the economic 
recovery, in which the people of America created—and filled—19 million new jobs. The 
other is the recovery of our morale. America is respected again and looked to for 
leadership.”130 Again, the credit for the recovery ultimately went to the American public. 
Nevertheless, this did not prevent Reagan from both taking some shots at the critics of his 
economic proposals.  
Well, back in 1980, when I was running for President, it was all so different. 
Some pundits said our programs would result in catastrophe. Our views on  
foreign affairs would cause war. Our plans for the economy would cause 
inflation to soar and bring about economic collapse. I even remember one  
highly respected economist saying back in 1982, that ‘The engines of economic 
growth have shut down here, and they’re likely to stay that way for years to 
come.’ Well, he and the other opinion leaders were wrong. The fact is, what  
they called ‘radical’ was really ‘right.’ What they called ‘dangerous’ was just 
‘desperately needed.’131 
 
As rhetorical analysts Amos Kiewe and Davis Houck write of the address, “The eight 
years were described by Reagan in a legend-like manner with the hero overcoming many 
obstacles, . . . Reagan fashioned himself as the hero of his romanticized vision of 
America, he was the hero of the Shining City.”132 
Reagan’s implicit discussion of himself as the hero of America’s renewal appears 
at first glance to violate the dictates of his political postmillennialism which assiduously 
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attributed victory to the people two important considerations unique to his farewell 
address must be acknowledged. First, it must be recalled that presidential farewells as far 
back as George Washington’s famous open letter to the public in 1796 engender a sort of 
intimacy unique to the American presidency. Among other things, presidents must 
express gratitude to the public for what Washington called the “steadfast confidence with 
which it has supported me.”133 This epideictic task can only be accomplished by some 
discussion of the national accomplishments brought about by the nation’s trust in the 
person holding the office. Second, the Reagan-as-hero motif of this address seems largely 
to have been inspired by speechwriter Peggy Noonan who wrote Reagan’s farewell. In a 
memorandum she sent to Reagan during the drafting process Noonan counseled the 
president to remember that the public wanted to say goodbye to him personally through 
this speech because “make no mistake about it, the American people are being ‘left’ by 
the first President they could manage to love since John Kennedy a quarter century ago. 
They love you, Mr. President, but you’re still a mystery man to them in some 
respects.”134 Thus, the intimate character of farewell addresses and the urging of his 
speechwriter nudged Reagan in the direction of appearing to portray himself as a hero 
who got into politics to “protect something precious”135 because it was simply part of 
Reagan’s personal political story.  
Reagan’s political postmillennialism reached its zenith in the farewell address. 
His part of the journey as the nation’s chief executive was over, yet he recognized that 
the nation must and would continue. Acknowledging that challenges would always 
remain on the national horizon, he explained that they could always be met because “as 
long as we remember our first principles and believe in ourselves, the future will always 
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be ours.”136 To poetically drive home this point, Reagan closed the address with one of 
his signature metaphors. Since 1969, Reagan often spoke of America as a “shining city 
upon a hill.”137 For Reagan, the shining city expressed the pinnacle of American 
potential. Throughout his career, he used it to both extol the virtues of America and 
chastise certain people or groups—warning them that only they could prevent the loss of 
the shining city.  
However, in this address Reagan used the metaphor to not only sum up his view 
of the administration’s economic achievements, but to assess his own presidency.  
The past few days when I’ve been at that window upstairs, I’ve  
thought a bit of the ‘shining city upon a hill.’ . . . I’ve spoken of the  
shining city all my political life, but I don’t know if I ever quite  
communicated what I saw when I said it. But in my mind it was a tall,  
proud city built on rocks stronger than oceans, windswept, God-blessed,  
and teeming with people of all kinds living in harmony and peace; a city  
with free ports that hummed with commerce and creativity. And if there had  
to be city walls, the walls had doors and the doors were open to anyone with  
the will and the heart to get here. That’s how I saw it, and see it still. And  
how stands the city on this winter night? More prosperous, more secure, and 
happier than it was 8 years ago. But more than that: After 200 years, two 
centuries, she still stands strong and true on the granite ridge, and her glow  
has held steady no matter what the storm. And she’s still a beacon, still a  
magnet for all who must have freedom, for all the pilgrims from all the lost  
places who are hurtling through the darkness toward home.138 
 
Reagan’s image of a strong city upon a hill with abundant “commerce and creativity” 
certainly featured strong economic overtones. Yet one also detects strong religious 
overtones in the metaphor. For one thing, the phrase “city on a hill” originated not with 
John Winthrop as Reagan always claimed when he used it, but with Christ’s Sermon on 
the Mount found in Matthew 5:14-16. Additionally, the elements of Reagan’s secularized 
postmillennial jeremiad are abundantly clear in the metaphor. Not only was the shining 
city a vision of the realized American utopia, it was ultimately achieved by a noble and 
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dedicated people who had to brave the storms and fight to realize this vision in the face of 
intense opposition.  
As with other instances of Reagan’s postmillennial jeremiad, this address had the 
propensity to overlook relevant contrary facts. As noted earlier, not all of the American 
economic recovery could be interpreted as having resulted from the tax and budget cuts 
imposed by the 1981 ERTA. While this legislation was mostly consistent with Reagan’s 
ideology, Reagan ultimately had to go along with tax raises in 1982, 1983, and 1984 in 
order to prevent the almost certain economic calamity which would have resulted from 
federal budget deficits even larger than the ones of the 1980s. Such details simply had no 
place in Reagan’s story of national renewal.  
The Reagan Economic Jeremiad as Political Shibboleth 
 The analyses offered in this chapter and the preceding one demonstrate that the 
American jeremiad is a multi-faceted, ubiquitous, highly-adaptable, religious rhetorical 
form which can be either a tremendous rhetorical resource or a rhetorical quagmire for 
contemporary presidents. In Reagan’s case, his penchant for highlighting the promise and 
prophecy dimensions of the jeremiad while narrowing the declension so as to target only 
specific people or groups he claimed to be obstructing the nation’s millennial progress 
was generally received with enthusiasm by the general public. Although he faced the 
same peaks and valleys of public opinion common to any American president, Reagan 
finished his term with a public approval rating of sixty-three percent—a mark 
significantly higher than any of the seven presidents who preceded him.139 
A host of factors could certainly be discussed as having contributed to his 
popularity at the end of his presidential tenure; yet Kurt Ritter and David Henry seem to 
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define the essence of Reagan’s rhetorical success when they write that his rhetorical 
mastery was a matter of “his drive for oratorical perfection, his television delivery skills, 
and his ability to express a vision of America that was grounded in American civil 
religion.”140 While Ritter and Henry’s explanation of Reagan’s appeals to civil religion is 
plagued by the conceptual problems with the concept as noted in chapter II, the essence 
of their argument is that Reagan used the available rhetorical resources such as the 
jeremiad form and his own political postmillennialism to create economic rhetoric quite 
attuned to the mythical desires of the masses. Naturally, it is Reagan’s description of 
American vision which is seen most clearly in the economic jeremiads explored in this 
chapter. As the foregoing analysis has demonstrated, Reagan’s economic rhetoric 
rhetorically linked passage of his conservative economic agenda to his idyllic American 
vision in the same way that theological postmillennialists argue that the kingdom of God 
is achievable by humans, by degrees, via the enactment of a social agenda of education 
and intellectual and spiritual enlightenment. As shown throughout this chapter, the 
resemblance is more than incidental. It was Reagan’s adaptation of a religious rhetorical 
form which, throughout American history, had been known largely for its harsh 
condemnation of the community. However, in Reagan’s estimation, the community was 
not to blame for the nation’s troubles. It was, rather, the failure of the previous 
administration to instill confidence in the public, the opposition of Democratic 
congressional leaders to his economic proposals, and the voices of professional 
economists and “liberal elites” who endangered America.  
Given these factors, it is not difficult to see why Reagan’s postmillennial 
economic jeremiad was largely effective as a political shibboleth. Not only did it attribute 
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the success of America’s economic recovery to the people, it also provided a series of 
convenient scapegoats for the public to blame when things went wrong. However, these 
were not the only reasons why Reagan’s postmillennial economic jeremiad was an 
effective shibboleth. Simply stated, Reagan’s jeremiad was an effective shibboleth 
because it not only gave the public the prospect of a hopeful future, it told them that they 
were a special—exceptional—people. And, as Reagan indicated in his first inaugural 
address, all they had to do to recapture that seemingly lost greatness was to simply 
believe in it again. Thus, while the successes and failures of Reagan’s economic policies 
will (and should) continue to be debated by scholars from a wide array of disciplines, 
there can be little doubt that his postmillennial economic jeremiad made them feel good 
about themselves again.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
“KICKING THE VIETNAM SYNDROME”: GEORGE H.W. BUSH,  
 
INCOMPLETE NATIONAL REDEMPTION, AND OPERATION  
 
DESERT STORM 
 
Now I have a special word for those who served in Vietnam. . . . your Nation, when that 
war ended, never appropriately said thanks. Then 20 years later, America was called to 
fight again, and this time we did what was needed to win. We fought quickly; we fought 
with purpose. And when the Desert Storm troops came home, a wondrous thing 
happened. America saluted, unanimously saluted, not just those heroes but our forgotten 
heroes, the men and women who served in Vietnam. The tribute was genuine. It was 
heartfelt, and it came from every corner of this Nation. And so, let me say this: It was 
long overdue. God bless those of you who served in that troubled war. 
George H.W. Bush1 
 
On August 2, 1990, 140,000 troops from the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait at the 
behest of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Later that day President George Herbert 
Walker Bush publicly condemned the invasion as an unconscionable act of “naked 
aggression”2 and initiated an impressive campaign of international diplomacy that would 
eventually culminate five months later when Operation Desert Storm began on January 
16, 1991. Throughout the build up to the war Bush spoke of the conflict in the stark good 
versus evil themes so common in presidential war discourse.3 Bush argued that Hussein’s 
“brutal assault” of his tiny oil-rich neighbor had disrupted the balance of peace 
throughout the world, but that Hussein now stood alone against “a world united.”4 
The evil of Hussein’s reckless land grab was framed with religious language: “the 
world prayed for peace, Saddam prepared for war.”5 From a rhetorical point of view, little 
in Bush’s address to the nation on January 16, 1991 was particularly surprising. Like 
every other president who has addressed the nation in a time of war Bush proclaimed the 
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justness of the cause behind the military endeavor, noted that war was the only remaining 
recourse for the realization of the international community’s peaceful objectives, 
heralded the bravery of America’s armed forces and confidently assured the nation that it 
would “not fail” to achieve victory.6 Bush told the nation that “the battle has been 
joined,”7 but then went out of his way to say that he had not yet ordered ground forces 
into combat. He also included the following caveat.  
I’ve told the American people before that this will not be another Vietnam,  
and I repeat this here tonight. Our troops will have the best possible support  
in the entire world, and they will not be asked to fight with one hand tied  
behind their back. I’m hopeful that this fighting will not go on for long and that 
casualties will be held to an absolute minimum. . . . And let me say this to 
everyone listening or watching tonight: When the troops we’ve sent in finish  
their work, I am determined to bring them home as soon as possible.8 
 
As Bush acknowledged, these pledges were restatements of a theme developed 
throughout the Bush administration’s rhetorical march toward conflict in the Persian 
Gulf. The recurrence of this theme leads us to ask: Why would an American president 
feel compelled to tell the people that the conflict in which they were presently engaged 
would be entirely unlike a previous conflict that had ended nearly twenty years ago? The 
answer to this question, I posit, is that the American public continued to suffer from a 
collective sense of unresolved national guilt stemming from certain socio-political effects 
of its involvement in the Vietnam War. Accordingly, Bush not only needed to convince 
the public that the geopolitical factors which led the nation to war in the Persian Gulf 
were different from those of the Vietnam era; he also needed to enact national redemption 
and purge guilt from the public consciousness over the perceived national sins of the 
Vietnam War. Bush’s strategic development and employment of this theme of national 
redemption as a political shibboleth is the focus of this chapter.  
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 Many rhetorical analysts, historians, and contemporary journalists have observed 
that Bush’s case for war to liberate Kuwait faced significant rhetorical and political 
constraints stemming from the pervasiveness of what many have called the “Vietnam 
syndrome.”9 As such, the observation that Bush had to discursively engage public 
anxieties about the prospect of a Vietnam-style quagmire in the Middle East is nothing 
new. In spite of the excellent extant scholarship about Bush’s Persian Gulf War 
discourse, these studies do not recognize the influence of religious rhetorical form in this 
area of his presidential rhetorical corpus. In this chapter I offer an alternative reading of 
Bush’s war discourse that reveals a largely successful, but ultimately incomplete, effort to 
rhetorically enact national atonement for the social and political sins of the Vietnam era. 
 This scholarly endeavor may appear strange to those familiar with the rhetoric of 
America’s forty-first president for two reasons. First, George H.W. Bush was notoriously 
neglectful of presidential rhetoric as an important means of governance. Indeed, a recent 
book exploring Bush’s rhetorical presidency reads as a veritable catalogue of missed 
opportunities for rhetorical leadership in everything from foreign affairs to education to 
his respective campaigns to win and hold the presidential office.10 Bush’s general 
dismissal of rhetoric as an important element of his presidency caused him to miss many 
of those leadership opportunities available to those who are able to create and maintain a 
compelling rhetorical persona. However, Bush’s inability or unwillingness to fully 
cultivate the resources of the rhetorical presidency hardly means that his rhetoric lacked 
influence at any point in his presidency.  
In four studies quite germane to the present chapter Kathryn Olson, Kathleen 
German, Mary Stuckey, and Carol Winkler each illustrate the effectiveness of Bush’s 
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Persian Gulf War discourse. Olson writes that Bush used a variety of techniques 
including statements of support for the war’s aims from U.S. troops, a fortiori arguments, 
and claims of minimal costs of the war ahead in order to stifle public debate and 
dissent.11 Stuckey and German each trenchantly observe Bush’s strategic use of discourse 
and metaphors from World War II and Vietnam in a manner which presented the Persian 
Gulf War as an analog of the former and a conflict entirely dissimilar from the latter.12 
Similarly, Carol Winkler finds that Bush’s strategy of “denouncing the Iraqi leader as a 
terrorist” enabled him to elevate the Gulf War “from a conventional war scenario 
between two foreign nation-states into an international battle against the scourge of 
terrorism.”13 Taken together, these studies indicate that although Bush was often reluctant 
to use the full rhetorical powers of his office, it would be a mistake to conclude that the 
rhetorical efforts he made in conjunction with the Persian Gulf War and American 
foreign policy always lacked significance or potency.14 
 This analysis of Bush’s use of a religious rhetorical form might appear 
unconventional for a second, more personal, reason. Bush was painfully shy when it 
came to speaking about religion in public. In remarkable contrast to his son, George W. 
Bush (profiled in chapter VII), the elder Bush was simply not given to public discussion 
of what he considered to be private matters like religion. Bush’s awkwardness with this 
topic has not escaped the attention of scholars or biographers.15 One biographer explained 
that Bush was “clearly a man of faith,” but his reticence toward open expression of his 
religion often cost him politically: 
 He was once asked what he thought about as he floated in the ocean for  
those desperate hours after being shot down near Japan. He answered,  
‘Mom and Dad, about our country, about God . . . and about the separation  
of church and state.’ It sounded to some like he was shoving every  
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religious phrase he could remember into a single sentence. It did not wash  
with the Religious Right, particularly when they compared Bush with the  
warm and articulate Pat Robertson or the weepy Baptist governor from  
Little Rock named Bill Clinton.16 
 
Despite his discomfort with the subject of his personal religion and his inability to 
placate his mercurial critics from the Religious Right; Bush’s Persian Gulf War discourse 
offered atonement—a religious rhetorical form central to both Judaism and Christianity—
as a way for America to assuage its collective guilt and do appropriate penance for the 
Vietnam War by checking the aggression of Saddam Hussein in the Middle East. I will 
begin by outlining atonement as a religious rhetorical form emerging out of humanity’s 
mythical desire for redemption. Next, I will discuss the bitter Vietnam-era public 
transgressions to which Bush’s Gulf War discourse served as a rejoinder. I will then 
explore Bush’s rhetorical enactment of atonement in a series of speeches and press 
briefings concerning the Persian Gulf conflict and conclude by pointing out both the 
short-term political effectiveness of Bush’s message and his inability to enact complete 
national redemption. 
Atonement as Religious Rhetorical Form 
 The concept of atonement arises from the collective and personal desire for 
redemption. Religion is nothing if not concerned about redemption. The global salience 
of redemption in religion is manifested in both the individual and collective redemption 
rituals of faiths throughout the world. The expansive thought of Romanian intellectual 
and religious historian Mircea Eliade and the classic explorations of aboriginal totemic 
religions conducted by French sociologist Emile Durkheim are quite revealing on this 
point. In his much-heralded work The Sacred and the Profane Eliade explains that in 
religious communities around the world, whether ancient or modern, there is an 
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“immemorial theme of the second birth.”17 Eliade does not ascribe the importance of 
second birth to the individual alone since it is impossible for a close-knit tribal 
community of the type he is describing to sustain itself apart from the initiatory and 
funerary rites he describes.18 Likewise, Durkheim’s description of the rituals enacted by 
initiates seeking full adult membership within their tribal associations bespeaks this idea 
that the redemption of individuals is, in a very real sense, a perpetual reconstitution and 
redemption of the larger community.19 
 Philosopher and psychologist William James’ The Varieties of Religious 
Experience further illuminates the redemptive elements to be found in religion. James 
explains that, from a psychological point of view, a person’s conflicted or guilty 
psychological persona—elements James refers to as “the divided self” or the “sick 
soul”—can be made well and happy again by achieving a “firmer hold upon religious 
realities.”20 Assuming the validity of James’ observation at the individual level, we may 
surmise that this individualized process of self-reconciliation is observable at the 
collective level when a nation or group comes to believe that it must atone for either its 
religious or socio-political sins. As studies of prophetic discourse have documented, 
religious and political leaders within rhetorically constituted publics from ancient Israel 
to the contemporary United States have argued that national redemption was available if 
only the covenant people would turn from their errant ways and fulfill the obligations of 
their covenant with the Almighty.21 Jeremiadic discourses of this sort are, of course, 
highly concerned with the prospect of communal redemption. Yet the renewal of an 
extant covenant is only one path toward communal redemption. Sometimes the 
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community seeks atonement so that it can destroy its own sense of guilt rather than 
merely escaping the impending judgment often prophesied in jeremiads.  
 David A. Bobbitt’s thoughtful and thorough analysis of Dr. Martin Luther King’s 
I Have a Dream speech provides us an example of such a rhetorical situation. Bobbitt’s 
study reveals that King’s most famous speech swept the nation up into “a redemption 
drama, in which ontological human guilt, and especially white America’s guilt over 
racism, [was] symbolically purged.”22 Bobbitt accurately identifies redemption as a 
discursive and ritualistic commonplace of both Judaism and Christianity. He argues that 
redemption is deeply imbued as a mythical component within the cultural consciousness 
of King’s audience: 
 Thus, in the context of the civil rights movement, one must consider the range of 
 meanings available to a rhetor in a Judeo-Christian culture such as the America  
 of 1963. If racism is immoral (sinful), then there is by the logic of the cultural 
 practice—the “constitutive” practice—a need to make up for (redeem) that sin; 
 and if there is a need for redemption, then there is a need for some process of  
 purification or cleansing of that sin and its accompanying guilt.23 
 
Bobbitt grounds his treatment of King’s redemption drama in Kenneth Burke’s theory of 
dramatism, specifically the redemption drama to which Burke alluded in several of his 
works.24 
In one of his most famous essays, “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle,” Burke 
discusses Hitler’s discursive use of Jews as a scapegoat for Germany’s socio-economic 
problems in Mein Kampf. Burke notes that the eventual Nazi dictator’s employment of “a 
bastardized or caricatured version of religious thought” enabled him to offer the dispirited 
German public of the 1920s and 1930s a rhetorical curative that “hand[ed] over 
[Germany’s] ills to a scapegoat, thereby getting purification by dissociation.”25 As 
Bobbitt observes, guilt-purification-redemption is perhaps the best representation of 
  
    162
Burke’s redemption drama. The drama begins when a group is made to feel guilt or 
shame over one or a series of transgressions or apparent weaknesses. The group next 
pursues a rhetorical program that will symbolically kill its collective guilt or shame.26 
This collective process of killing the scapegoat is what brings the community back into 
happiness and balance now that its guilt and shame have been purged. As such, a rhetor 
who can effectively enact such a redemption drama presents a political shibboleth of 
communal redemption. Burke himself seems to have summed up this drama best in a 
poem included in The Rhetoric of Religion:  
 Here are the steps 
 In the Iron Law of History 
 That welds Order and Sacrifice: 
  
Order leads to Guilt 
 (for who can keep commandments!) 
 Guilt needs Redemption 
 (for who would not be cleansed!) 
 Redemption needs Redeemer 
 (which is to say, a Victim!). 
 
 Order 
 Through Guilt 
 To Victimage 
 (hence: Cult of the Kill) . . . .27 
 A number of authors have produced insightful studies in support of Burke’s idea 
that communal guilt can be expunged via rhetorical means. Larry A. Williamson’s 
analysis of the media coverage of the June 1998 vicious, racially motivated, dragging 
death of an African-American man in rural Texas presents us with an instance of 
redemption rhetorically enacted by a variety of texts generated by a mass public.28 
Williamson reveals that the media coverage of the murder of James Byrd Jr. of Jasper, 
Texas, and subsequent events tended to frame Byrd’s murderers as racist anachronisms 
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from a long-forgotten era of racial oppression in east Texas. “We [white east Texans] 
have found our perfect racist scapegoat,” Williamson explains “chastised him in the most 
graphic and public manner possible, and thereby vicariously purged ourselves of our own 
racist guilt.”29 Although public redemption of this type is not inherently harmful, 
Williamson rightly observes that it “can act to blind us to the subtleties of the [racism] 
problem.”30 
 Other authors have highlighted the presence of redemptive rhetorical elements in 
the co-construction of meaning at American war memorials, in corporate discourse 
designed to regain the trust of the American public, in the telos and praxis of critical 
scholarship, and in religious and political speeches both obscure and historically 
significant.31 As such, redemption is both of interest to scholars of rhetoric and a 
significant component of American rhetorical consciousness. However, I posit that 
atonement (the means of attaining redemption) is more than a feature or effect of certain 
socio-political texts; it is a vibrant religious rhetorical form similar to the other rhetorical 
forms examined in this dissertation with regard to its distinctive discursive pattern, 
intellectual history, and ritualistic response to the mythical needs of mass publics. Joy 
Koesten and Robert C. Rowland provide the clearest and most useful definition of the 
specific features of atonement in their analysis of President Bill Clinton’s use of the 
atonement form in his distinct redemption discourses apologizing for Cold War-era 
nuclear radiation testing on humans, the atrociously-irresponsible studies of the effects of 
syphilis at the Tuskegee Institute, and the Monica Lewinsky matter.32 By articulating the 
central rhetorical features of atonement Koesten and Rowland have uncovered an 
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instrumental rhetorical form used to attain redemption by the discursive destruction of 
personal or communal guilt.33 
 Drawing upon the Unetanneh Tokef prayer from the liturgy of the Jewish high 
holy days, Koesten and Rowland argue that repentance, prayer, and charity are “at the 
core” of atonement (redemptive) discourse.34 Repentance is the fundamental recognition 
of one’s sinfulness or the condition of one’s guilt with regard to a particular religious or 
secular transgression. In Burkean terms, this initial step is indispensable to the 
redemption drama because the community’s guilt must be defined and articulated before 
it can be cast upon the scapegoat and symbolically (rhetorically) killed.  
The communal guilt begins to be assuaged or killed by what Koesten and 
Rowland refer to as prayer—not in the sense of communion with the Almighty—but as 
the dual public assurances that deep self-exploration has occurred which has identified 
the causes of the transgression and that such transgressions will never occur again. 
Koesten and Rowland explain that when establishing this phase it is crucial for political 
rhetors to “offer a thorough examination of the sinful act and reveal a changed attitude or 
policy to prevent future wrongdoing.”35 
The third, and perhaps most important, element of the redemption form is what 
Koesten and Rowland identify as charity. Charity refers to the actions undertaken to 
make restitution to the wronged party(s). Many religious practitioners the world over 
believe that the act of making amends to those whom one has wronged also brings one 
closer to God. Additionally, such efforts also allow the guilty party(s) to purge guilt by 
suffering through penitential works such as paying restitution to a wronged party. 
Alternatively if the time for restitution to the wronged party has passed, the penitent 
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individual or group may make restitution toward someone else in the name of the 
wronged individual(s). Collective penitence can occur in a variety of ways. Political or 
organizational leaders may take rhetorical steps to make amends with the public;36 yet, as 
Robert Ivie reminds us, American political leaders all too often seek national redemption 
through the penitence of war.37 Cultural historian Richard Slotkin also notes that war as a 
purifier of the polis is a commonplace in Western rhetorical history.38 However, George 
H.W. Bush’s Persian Gulf discourse is noteworthy in that it is an instance in American 
history where presidential discourse about one war has been used to atone for the publicly 
remembered sins of another war.   
America’s Public Guilt over Vietnam 
 It is no overstatement to say that the Vietnam War left an indelible scar upon the 
collective American conscience. From its peculiar (and most likely specious) beginning 
with the notorious Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 until the dramatic abandonment of the 
American embassy in Saigon in 1975; the war cost some 58,000 American lives and 
billions of dollars in military resources.39 American casualties were significant, but the 
human costs in Southeast Asia were staggering. More than one million combatants from 
the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Vietcong were killed while civilian deaths in 
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos are estimated to be between one and five million.40 This 
great human tragedy opened deep social and ideological fissures within American 
society—some of which have remained bitter enough to continue affecting American 
politics into the twenty-first century.41 Religious studies Professor Walter Capps probably 
sums up the war’s effects most clearly when he writes that it was “a national trauma, a 
rupture in the nation’s collective consciousness, and a serious and somber challenge to 
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the ways we wish to think about ourselves, our role in the world, and our place in human 
history.”42 The effects of this national trauma are evident on many levels, but have been 
most pronounced in American political rhetoric in both the bitter disagreements about 
how to properly memorialize the war and in the many political discourses which 
struggled to articulate the “lessons” of America’s Vietnam experience.  
 Few (if any) American public monuments have been at the center of as much 
controversy as that which accompanied the opening of the Vietnam Veteran’s Memorial 
in 1982. The design of the V-shaped wall of black granite bearing the names of the 
American military personnel killed in the war, or who eventually died as a result of 
wounds sustained during it, drew bitter criticism from some who believed that its black 
color, partially subterranean orientation, and lack of an American flag or more traditional 
statuary nearby (in the initial design) was indicative of American shame over the war.43 
Some critics likened the structure to a public urinal and even suggested that the 
monument designer Maya Lin’s Asian ancestry was an affront to the memory of 
American veterans. In spite of these criticisms, which nearly killed the project, the 
monument opened in November of 1982 and (thanks to its dialogic components which 
invite the visitors to interpret the war as they wish) has become a site for personal and 
communal healing and the building and rebuilding of collective memory about the war.44 
The controversy over the military and socio-political lessons of Vietnam, 
however, has proven far more difficult to resolve. Robert J. McMahon correctly notes 
that every American president from Gerald Ford to Bill Clinton struggled considerably 
when attempting to draw lessons from Vietnam because of the strongly negative public 
perceptions of it.45 McMahon contends that presidents have often tried to dismiss or 
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transcend the public’s memories of Vietnam instead of offering a “genuine reckoning” or 
any sort of reflective “national self-criticism.”46 While McMahon’s analysis fails to point 
out George Bush’s use of the atonement form in his discursive handling of public 
memory over Vietnam, he is quite correct about the rhetorical constraints placed upon 
American presidents by the public memory of Vietnam. American public memory of 
Vietnam contains four features which make this so.  
First, Vietnam has become synonymous with socio-political division. While the 
war was still yet to reach its height, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. commented in 1967 that, 
aside from wrecking Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” program, the war was producing 
“ugly side effects: inflation; frustration; indignation; protest; panic; angry divisions 
within the national community. . . .”47 Schlesinger’s early assessments of the war’s 
divisiveness were born out as American public support of the war continued its slow, but 
steady, decline. In the late sixties and early seventies demonstrations against the war 
became louder and more bitter than they had ever been before as entire cross-sections of 
American society from the most liberal to the most conservative began to join in the 
protests.48 From this point on, there was little doubt about either the war’s divisiveness or 
its corrosive effects upon American political discourse. Official political action had 
become equally poisonous as evidenced by the Nixon White House in the imbroglio over 
the Pentagon Papers.49 Thus, the general public discourse about Vietnam would take on 
much of the widespread bitterness and division which imbued the public protests and 
political discourse of the era.  
Vietnam also came to symbolize a hopelessly protracted military conflict with 
poorly-defined objectives. While the belief in the uncertainty about the military mission 
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was prevalent throughout the war, this thesis was most clearly articulated by U.S. Army 
Colonel Harry Summers in his book On Strategy. Summers argues that U.S. military 
strategy had been fundamentally flawed due to the policies of containment, gradual 
escalation, and micromanagement by political leadership. By trying to react to and repel 
military incursions from northern Vietnam into the south, as opposed to conducting 
offensive operations designed to destroy the North Vietnamese Army early in the war; 
the U.S. military inadvertently assured an indefinite stalemate. As Summers explains: 
“instead of orienting on North Vietnam—the source of the war—we turned our attention 
to the symptom—the guerrilla war in the south.”50 These fundamental miscalculations 
“resulted in confusion throughout the national security establishment. . .”51 which made 
an unambiguous military victory in Vietnam all but impossible. Right or wrong, 
Summers’ thesis became engrained in the public consciousness about the war giving rise 
to the belief of conservatives and moderates on the political Right such as Ronald Reagan 
and George H.W. Bush respectively that American military and civilian leaders simply 
did not “go all out” to win.  
 A third source of guilt in America’s public memory over Vietnam had to do with 
the bitterness of perceived failure. In the early years of the war Lyndon Johnson 
epitomized the frustrations of many Americans who wondered why the United States 
with all its military and technological might could not easily defeat “this damn little piss-
ant country” in Southeast Asia.52 The conflict in Vietnam simply did not correlate with 
the nation’s experience in WWII with what was widely perceived to be an unambiguous 
victory achieved by hard work and high purpose. Americans were simply unaccustomed 
to failure—especially military failure. Johnson and Nixon both worried that an admission 
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of failure to save South Vietnam from the advance of Communism would erode 
American geopolitical influence. While the rise or decline of something like global 
influence is difficult to gauge, the rhetoric of Presidents Johnson and Nixon clearly 
evinced a concern for America’s global standing as a reason to remain engaged in 
Vietnam.53 However, American public consciousness highlights not so much a loss of 
global prestige, but the bitterness of a failed effort.  
Finally, America’s most persistent public guilt resulted from the perception that it 
had greeted its returning Vietnam veterans with contempt and antipathy rather than with a 
warm welcome and appreciation. Accurate or not, American public consciousness 
records that returning Vietnam veterans were (at best) not thanked for their service and 
(at worst) reviled for it as “murderers” and “baby killers.” Reports of the ubiquitous 
search-and-destroy missions throughout the Vietnamese countryside and the widely-
reported massacre at My Lai seemed to feed public antipathy toward the service of 
American veterans. There is evidence to suggest that press coverage of veterans was 
largely fair and that instances of returning veterans being abused by protestors tended to 
be relatively isolated instances.54 Yet, Vietnam veterans were never warmly welcomed 
home by the nation in general. The same held true for most political leaders who knew 
the political danger of appearing to embrace too closely the increasingly unpopular war. 
As such, the nation was plagued by a sense of national guilt over the perception that it 
had not properly welcomed home its soldiers who had fought bravely in a losing effort. 
While George Bush would respond to each of these four topoi in an effort to assuage the 
nation’s guilt; some of his most passionate responses near the end of the Persian Gulf 
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War would be directed at atoning for the perceived shameful treatment of returning 
Vietnam veterans. 
“Kicking the Vietnam Syndrome”  
From the very outset of his presidency, George H.W. Bush was concerned about 
the lingering socio-political divisiveness he perceived to be one of the chief consequences 
of the Vietnam War. In his inaugural address he decried the type of partisanship that 
made politicians and citizens “untrusting of each other.”55 Although he argued that the 
memory of Vietnam “cleaves us still” he appeared unwavering in his conviction that 
“The final lesson of Vietnam is that no great nation can long afford to be sundered by a 
memory.”56 Bush’s verbs “cleaves” and “sundered” give clear indication of the power he 
believed Vietnam held over the national psyche—and perhaps the power it held over his 
own political worldview. Yet, Bush’s identification of the Vietnam War and all the 
division that went along with it as “a memory” belies this interpretation because his use 
of the term gives the impression that he means that it is “merely a memory.” The clumsy 
binary (memory vs. a great nation) itself should be taken as evidence of McMahon’s 
thesis about the rhetorical difficulties inherent to American presidents when discussing 
Vietnam.57 However, it also provides evidence that Bush believed that collective national 
redemption from the Vietnam experience was an urgent need.58 In spite of this call for 
political healing, Bush did relatively little to explicitly exorcise the national demons left 
over from Vietnam until Iraq invaded Kuwait in August of 1990.59 
Bush’s early statements on the Persian Gulf crisis were grounded in his 
conception of the “new world order” where violent aggression and lawlessness would 
have no legitimate standing. Hussein’s actions were deemed evil primarily because they 
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stood in contrast to the expectations of the new world order.60 Once the international 
coalition had formed, U.S. and other coalition forces had been dispatched to the Persian 
Gulf, and the debate about the prospect of war began in earnest, Bush began to mention 
Vietnam in conjunction with the looming conflict. At first, Bush’s Persian Gulf War 
discourse appeared to demonstrate relatively little interest in actually atoning for 
Vietnam. He merely wished, at first, to demonstrate that the bitter public memories of 
Vietnam would not be relived in the coming struggle.61 
Bush’s first explicit references to Vietnam in relation to the Persian Gulf conflict 
came during a press conference on November 30, 1990: 
In our country, I know that there are fears about another Vietnam. Let me  
assure you, should military action be required, this will not be another  
Vietnam. This will not be a protracted, drawn-out war. The forces arrayed  
are different. The opposition is different. The resupply of Saddam’s military 
would be very different. The countries united against him in the United  
Nations are different. The topography of Kuwait is different. And the  
motivation of our all-volunteer force is superb. I want peace. I want peace, not 
war. But if there must be war, we will not permit our troops to have their  
hands tied behind their backs. And I pledge to you: There will not be any  
murky ending. If one American soldier has to go into battle, that soldier will  
have enough force behind him to win and then get out as soon as possible, as 
soon as the U.N. objectives have been achieved. I will never—ever—agree to  
a halfway effort.62 
 
Bush made explicit reference to Vietnam two other times during the press conference—
each time swearing that history would not repeat itself, that any war in the Persian Gulf 
would not be another Vietnam. At this press conference Bush engaged the perceived 
public transgressions that defined the Vietnam syndrome and incorporated his responses 
to them as an essential component of his war discourse. In the press conference excerpted 
above, Bush specifically vowed that any conflict would be engaged with a maximum 
military and diplomatic effort. No Vietnam-style half measures would be permitted while 
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he was Commander-in-Chief. While his statements at this press conference did not fully 
enact the features of atonement, Bush made an initial foray into the atonement form by 
offering the prayer that the nation’s sin of failing to bring a maximum effort to the war in 
Vietnam would not be repeated. From this point on until victory became apparent 
President Bush often reiterated this pledge.63 
 During the first several days of the conflict Bush continued to distinguish between 
the present conflict and Vietnam. In his speech to the nation as the war began on the night 
of January 16, 1991 Bush reiterated American objectives and pledged that American 
troops would leave as soon as the mission was completed. At a press conference on 
January 17, 1991 he announced that “the operation is going forward with great success,” 
told reporters that he was not concerned about “unwarranted optimism” (apparently there 
was no reason for anything but optimism) and again expressed a desire to keep American 
and civilian casualties at “an absolute minimum.”64 
Seemingly concerned about even a scintilla of the Vietnam-era protest or division, 
Bush used his January 18, 1991 press conference to sweep aside such issues. “This 
country is united,” he insisted and proceeded to offer the following explanation: 
 Yes, there’s some protest, but this country is fundamentally united. And I  
 want that message to go out to every kid that is over there serving this  
 country. I saw in the paper a comment by one who worried—from seeing 
 demonstrations here and there in this country on television—that that  
 expressed the will of the country. So, to those troops over there, let me 
 just take this opportunity to say your country is supporting you—the Congress 
 overwhelmingly endorsed that. Let there be no doubt in the minds of any of 
 you: You have the full and unified support of the United States of America. 
 So, I salute them. They deserve our full support, and they are our finest.65 
 
Bush’s commentary on the war protests and his none-too-subtle implication that war 
protestors were unsupportive of the troops was undoubtedly calculated to stifle dissent in 
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the manner described by Kathryn Olson. Yet, the comment also marked something of a 
discursive turning point in the way Bush addressed the war. While he would continue to 
discuss the differences between Vietnam and the Persian Gulf conflict, much of the rest 
of Bush’s Persian Gulf War discourse would focus upon how America could regain its 
international reputation and its self respect through atoning for its shoddy treatment of 
Vietnam veterans by giving the Gulf War veterans “the love and respect of a grateful 
nation”66 and, of course, by winning the war. 
 In his speech to the Annual Convention of the National Religious Broadcasters on 
January 28, 1991 (nearly two weeks into the air war) Bush not only reiterated the pledge 
that this would not be another Vietnam but opined that, despite the protests, the nation 
was united in the war effort: 
 I know—that some disagree with the course that I’ve taken, and I have no  
 bitterness in my heart about that at all, no anger. I am convinced that we are 
 doing the right thing. And tolerance is a virtue, not a vice. But with the  
 support and prayers of so many, there can be no question in the minds of our 
 soldiers or in the minds of our enemy about what Americans think.67 
 
Notice that the concerns of protestors were again dismissed as not being reflective of 
“what Americans think.” Clearly the Persian Gulf conflict was different from Vietnam in 
that the Commander in Chief loathed even acknowledging the existence of dissenting 
opinions. If complete national unity could not be had by the absence of protest, it would 
be rhetorically imposed by presidential dismissal.  
Yet the dismissal of political opposition was inherently redemptive. It was, 
apparently, necessary to reject the concerns of the protestors in order to obtain unity, 
which would produce strong purpose, which would in turn result in the redemption of the 
nation. As Bush claimed a few moments later in the address: “When this war is over, the 
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United States, its credibility and its reliability restored, will have a key leadership role in 
helping to bring peace to the rest of the Middle East.”68 Thus, one sees the basic structure 
of the atonement form. He pledged that this would not be another Vietnam with regard to 
the political divisions it caused, thereby identifying one of the Vietnam-era sins 
(repentance). He pointed out that the nation would not repeat the type of division it 
suffered during Vietnam because the situation was different, the government and military 
had undertaken the present conflict more carefully, and the nation was fundamentally 
united (prayer). Finally, he opined that the nation’s efforts to expel Saddam Hussein’s 
forces from Kuwait would be penitential (charity) in that they will restore the 
international credibility of the United States and enable it to act as an agent of peace in 
the region. Thus, Bush maintained the repentance, prayer, charity pattern of the 
atonement form. 
 Bush repeated this basic atonement pattern with regard to America’s international 
reputation numerous times in remarks before reporters. The clearest statement of which 
occurred on February 17th: 
 The American people are strongly in support not only of the troops but of  
 these objectives. And, of course, that is a very important point because it is my 
 hope that when this is over we will have kicked the Vietnam syndrome.  And the  
 country’s pulling together, unlike any time—in this kind of situation—any time 
 since World War II. And that’s a good thing for our country. And that sends a  
 strong signal for the future that we’re committed to justice, and we are  
 determined to fulfill our obligations in trying to bring about a more peaceful 
 world order.69 
 
Clearly, dispensing with the Vietnam syndrome involved a rehabilitation of the United 
States’ international reputation. What is equally clear from Bush’s statements, however, 
is that the redemption of America’s international reputation and its own self concept went 
hand in hand. Bush’s talk of “pulling together” and his allusion to a type of national unity 
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unparalleled since World War II bears this out. As such, the Persian Gulf War would both 
restore Kuwaiti sovereignty and redeem America from the Vietnam-era idea that 
portrayed it as a nation in decline. Nevertheless, restoration of the national reputation was 
only one area wherein the nation required redemption. As the war came to an end and 
many of the veterans of Operation Desert Storm began returning home, Bush made clear 
that their sacrifices and the way in which the nation welcomed them home was doing 
much to heal the national soul and redeem it from Vietnam.  
 With victory assured by the 100-hour-success of the ground war Bush felt quite 
comfortable proclaiming that March 1, 1991 was “a proud day for America. And, by 
God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.”70 That same day he 
explained that he was “beginning to feel that the joy that Americans all feel now is 
proper” and that “there is something noble and majestic about patriotism in this country 
now.”71 He was more poetic the following day in a radio address wherein he expressed 
his pride in and thanks to U.S. troops for the way they had conducted the war. Because of 
what they did, Bush opined “Americans today are confident of our country, confident of 
our future, and most of all, confident about you.” He then explicitly claimed that the 
Vietnam syndrome was literally dead and buried: “We promised this would not be 
another Vietnam. And we kept that promise. The specter of Vietnam has been buried 
forever in the desert sands of the Arabian Peninsula.”72 The burial metaphor was hardly 
coincidental in light of Bush’s use of the atonement form. The promise that one’s 
offending behavior will never be repeated—and that tangible steps to assure this have 
been taken—is an element inherent to both prayer and charity. Bush effectively argued 
that America’s success in the Arabian Peninsula cancelled the sins of the Vietnam era.  
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Up to this point in Bush’s discourse much of the Vietnam specter had been 
defined by the domestic political divisions of the Vietnam era and the loss of American 
reputation abroad. Yet, for the next several months as the troops came home from the 
Persian Gulf, Bush added a new dimension to that dead specter—he claimed that the 
United States was now prepared to properly thank its Vietnam veterans. Speaking to a 
group of American veterans Bush had this to say on March 4, 1991: 
I made a comment right here at this podium the other day about shedding the  
divisions that incurred from the Vietnam war. And I want to repeat and say  
especially to the Vietnam veterans that are here—and I just had the pleasure 
of meeting some in the hall—its long overdue. It is long overdue that we  
kicked the Vietnam syndrome, because many veterans from that conflict came 
back and did not receive the proper acclaim that they deserve—that this  
nation was divided and we weren’t as grateful as we should be. So somehow,  
when these troops come home, I hope that message goes out to those that  
served this country in the Vietnam war that we appreciate their service as well.73  
 
Here Bush’s use of the atonement form was something of a reversal of the typical 
redemptive pattern Burke describes as the cult of the kill. Instead of chastising a 
scapegoat as representative of the community’s sins, Bush herein lauds U.S. forces 
involved in the Persian Gulf as representative of America’s best and said that their 
victory was also the victory of the Vietnam veterans. The homecoming enjoyed by 
veterans of the Gulf War was also a belated warm welcome home for America’s Vietnam 
veterans. This passage is a clear example of the charity component of the atonement form 
identified by Koesten and Rowland. Bush had identified a series of national 
transgressions of the Vietnam era—not the least of which was the way it treated its 
returning veterans—and then proceeded to rhetorically enact public restitution for these 
wrongs.  
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 Bush elaborated upon this theme at a moving ceremony for returning Gulf War 
veterans in Sumter, South Carolina on March 17, 1991. Bush asserted that he 
performance of America’s Gulf War veterans had given rise to a new spirit of American 
patriotism which had helped the nation “give proper recognition to the Vietnam veterans. 
Their time has come.”74 Not only had their time come, but the results of the war 
symbolized a new liberation and redemption for the nation: “You know, you all not only 
helped liberate Kuwait, you helped this country liberate itself from old ghosts and doubts. 
And when you left it was still fashionable to question America’s decency . . . courage . . . 
and resolve. No one, no one in the whole world doubts us anymore.”75 
Bush’s allusion to the doubts and ghosts from the Vietnam era punctuated the 
point that the war had changed things—the United States had indeed redeemed its present 
and past selves through victory and violence. “Our successes,” Bush told the 
commencement audience at the University of Michigan two months later, “have banished 
the Vietnam-era phantoms of doubt and distrust.”76 Yet it would have been rhetorically 
undesirable for Bush to have claimed that the resurgence in American patriotism he 
lauded was the product of a military victory alone. It is quite common for leaders political 
or religious to suggest that a military victory is a sign of divine favor, but such claims 
would surely have been seen as presumptuous to contemporary ears. But, by cloaking this 
claim in the atonement form, Bush made the more palatable claim that America’s 
involvement in the Persian Gulf War was also a way to rectify its prior wrongs. His use 
of the atonement form throughout his Persian Gulf War discourse suggested that 
America’s proud self confidence had returned because the country had finally found 
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redemption from the divisions and losses of confidence and prestige resulting from the 
Vietnam War.  
An Incomplete Redemption 
 Viewing Bush’s Persian Gulf War discourse as a set of political texts influenced 
by the religious rhetorical form of atonement provides a satisfying and nuanced way of 
explaining the public appeal of Bush’s messages to the nation during the war. Despite his 
penchants for dry delivery, questionable syntax, and his own self-acknowledged 
difficulty articulating a national vision, presidential scholar George C. Edwards III 
reports that Bush’s public approval soared to an un-heard-of height of eighty-nine percent 
near the denouement of the war.77 While one can hardly attribute Bush’s stratospheric 
public approval rating to the effectiveness of his rhetoric alone, it seems unwise to ignore 
his rhetoric or to attribute his high ratings to little more than a “rally event” or public 
admiration of his talent for behind-the-scenes diplomacy.78 
Accordingly, one should view Bush’s enactment of national atonement as 
something which, despite his lack of rhetorical talent, allowed the nation to become 
caught up in a compelling rhetorical vision of a nation—once thought to be in decline—
but now seen to be on the rise once again. In short, Bush’s atonement helped turn the 
national consciousness away from the public transgressions of Vietnam and resurrected a 
sense of unqualified pride in and respect for the U.S. military that had been diminished 
since the Vietnam War. Historian Steve A. Yetiv argues that although Bush was unable to 
win a second term in office, “he did leave behind an America proud of its armed forces. . 
. . helped some Americans heal lingering wounds from the Vietnam debacle, elevated the 
reputation of the U.S. armed forces at home, and restored pride in American efficiency 
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and ingenuity.”79 The thousands of pieces of personal correspondence which flooded the 
White House during the war were indicative of these feelings of renewed pride in the 
military. One Anglican priest was so taken by Bush’s claim of renewed national pride 
that he included the following request in his letter to the president: 
 This may not be a very “priestly” request, but I would consider it to be a very  
 personal favor to me . . . and old Anglican Priest down here in Houston,  
 Texas . . . . Please, if you can, pass along to the proper military personel [sic]  
 who re-load our aircraft with armed missiles . . . to inscribe (for me) an  
 appropriate message on one of them . . . perhaps: “UP YOUR’S Saddam”  
would do very nicely . . . . and make it “from Father Bill.”80 [ellipses in  
original]  
 
Bush’s use of the atonement form and the symbolic killing of national guilt it enacted 
also temporarily reinvigorated his presidency. Bush’s broken “read my lips: no new 
taxes” campaign pledge and harsh budget battles with the Congress in 1990 had placed 
his public popularity in peril. The atonement form that Bush employed in the context of a 
militaristic rhetorical situation, led many Americans to see Bush as a strong leader of a 
resurgent nation. In this way, Bush’s rhetoric of atonement was a remarkable short-term 
political success—and one of the relatively few rhetorical successes of his presidency.   
Despite Bush’s claim that the nation’s military victory had permanently destroyed 
the Vietnam syndrome, several of Bush’s policy and rhetorical decisions in the aftermath 
of the Persian Gulf War suggested otherwise. Most notably, Bush’s failure to provide 
military support to Kurdish and Shiite rebels trying to topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq was 
evidence that—at least in terms of American foreign policy discourse—the epitaph for 
the Vietnam syndrome may have been written prematurely.  
During the war Bush encouraged the Iraqi military and civilian groups to “take 
matters into their own hands”81 by forcing Hussein out of power. As American forces 
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began to leave Iraq in March of 1991, Kurdish guerillas in northern Iraq and Shiite 
insurgents in the south attempted to do just that. After many initial successes on both 
fronts, the rebels were brutally crushed by units of Hussein’s elite Republican Guards 
who had been kept out of much of the fighting with U.S. and coalition forces. What 
resulted was a military and humanitarian crisis—the scope of which was just becoming 
clear by mid-April of 1991 as Kurdish refugees by the thousands began streaming into 
southern Turkey.82 When some critics of the Bush administration advised strong military 
action be taken to protect the rebels or at least attempt to destroy elements of the Iraqi 
Republican Guard, Bush’s reply revealed the depth to which fears of another Vietnam 
continued to hold sway in American foreign policy discourse.  
While the Bush administration lent its support to United Nations efforts to 
establish “no-fly-zones” in the north and south of Iraq to protect the rebels, Bush was 
resolved that no further military action would be taken: “I am not going to involve any 
American troops in a civil war in Iraq. They are not going to be going in there to do what 
some of my severest critics early on now seem to want me to do. I want these kids to 
come home.”83 When questioned by reporters about the inconsistency of his calls for an 
Iraqi revolt while refusing to offer military support Bush, although defensive, could say 
little to clearly absolve his administration’s potential complicity in the humanitarian crisis 
that was unfolding. 
And you’re asking me if I foresaw the size of the Kurdish refugee problem?  
The answer is: No, I did not. But do I think that the United States should bear 
guilt because of suggesting that the Iraqi people take matters into their own 
hands, with the implication being given by some that the United States would 
be there to support them militarily? That was not true. We never implied that. 
Do I think the answer is now for Saddam Hussein to be kicked out? Absolutely.  
. . . I don’t concede encouraging an exodus. I did suggest—and its well  
documented—what I thought would be good is if the Iraqi people would take 
  
    181
matters into their own hands and kick Saddam Hussein out. I still feel that way, 
and I still hope they do.84 
 
Bush’s reticence to aggressively deploy U.S. military forces to protect the rebels or 
topple Hussein was reflective of the fact that his own rhetoric had constrained the 
flexibility of his policy making. Although he had suggested that a rebellion against 
Hussein was in fact a viable means to “instantly stop the bloodshed” and allow Iraq and 
Iraqis to have “a new lease on life,”85 Bush could not commit U.S. troops to a relief effort 
since such an action could have led the nation into “another Vietnam” of protracted 
conflict without clear objectives. Indeed, Bush’s words at this press conference might 
remind one of the tragic fates which befell many of the citizens of Saigon after the 
American military’s hasty withdrawal ahead of the Communist advance into the city in 
1975. This perception of the United States abandoning the Iraqi Kurds and Shiites to their 
abysmal fates illustrated that America’s redemption from Vietnam was incomplete in 
terms of foreign policy rhetoric and decision making.  
 Bush’s discourse throughout the 1992 presidential campaign also indicated that 
the lingering effects of the Vietnam syndrome were still very much a part of American 
politics. For someone who claimed that the specter of Vietnam had been buried in the 
Arabian Peninsula, Bush was certainly not above reanimating Vietnam and the kinds of 
political divisions it entailed in order to score points on the campaign trail. At one 
campaign rally in St. Louis, Missouri Bush chided the Democratic-controlled Congress 
for its deliberations prior to the war accusing them of “spen[ding] much of the fall 
parading experts up there to the Congress saying, ‘Well, they’re going to have another 
Vietnam. We must avoid it.’”86 He also celebrated American victory in the Persian Gulf 
as a victory over all of the “protestors” and “talking heads” who callously suggested that 
  
    182
he “was uncaring about body bag counts.”87 Of course, Bush can hardly be blamed for 
discussing the fact that, on balance, the Persian Gulf War turned out better for the United 
States than many of the experts or his political opponents believed it would. Yet, his 
comments indicate that he was perfectly willing to capitalize on the divisiveness of 
Vietnam and the Persian Gulf conflicts in his attempt to be reelected as president. Bush’s 
own rhetorical choices reflected the incomplete character of America’s redemption from 
Vietnam.  
Bush was also more than willing to reconstitute the political divisions of the 
Vietnam era when discussing the questionable military draft record of his opponent in the 
1992 presidential election—Bill Clinton. Trailing in the polls near the end of the contest, 
Bush began to mention the inconsistencies of Clinton’s statements about the release of 
his draft records and his activities during the war.  
 I have differed with Governor Clinton on the war and on his own service.  
My position is clear. And some people differed with me on the Vietnam War.  
But I’ll tell you the thing I do not understand. I simply do not understand a  
person whose peers are dying in Vietnam, some of whom are held in Hanoi 
prisons, going to England to organize demonstrations against the United  
States. We cannot have that. What will he tell a young man or a young woman 
as Commander in Chief if they said ‘Oh, no, we want to go off and organize 
demonstrations’?88 
 
Fair or not, Bush’s criticism of Clinton’s draft record and activities while a Rhodes 
Scholar at Oxford University reveals the depth to which Vietnam remained a rhetorical 
quagmire of American political discourse despite Bush’s claim that it had been destroyed 
by the Persian Gulf War.  
 This chapter presents an alternative analysis of George Bush’s speeches on the 
Persian Gulf War and considers them in light of what they really were—a mixture of 
successes and failures. Bush did indeed enact national atonement for Vietnam. In this 
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respect, the atonement form proved to be a successful political shibboleth in the short 
term. Nevertheless, Bush was ultimately unable to deal with the lingering public guilt 
about the Vietnam War in a manner that would prevent it from re-emerging as a major 
fissure in American society and politics. Ultimately, Bush’s own use of the atonement 
form ended harming his own presidency by limiting the range of foreign policy choices 
he was able to make in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. As evidenced by partisan 
charges and counter-charges about the service records of both John Kerry and George W. 
Bush in the 2004 campaign, the ghosts and doubts that plagued America over the war in 
Vietnam have continued into the twenty-first century. Moreover, this chapter reveals that 
political shibboleths are, indeed, complicated things. The use of the atonement form as a 
political shibboleth in this instance is both comforting and troubling. While it is desirable 
that societies seek to rectify the wrongs of the past, it is disturbing that war can be 
employed as the primary means by which the redemption occurs. Is there no non-violent 
alternative which would have allowed for a rhetorical atonement of America’s collective 
guilt left over from the Vietnam War? Perhaps the time has come to consider Robert 
Ivie’s idea about the “peace-building potential” of rituals?89 Based upon the foregoing 
analysis, I would suggest that one way to begin exploring this potential is to examine how 
such rhetorical rituals and forms (like atonement) are presently used for war so that their 
rhetorical potency can be adapted toward more peaceful causes.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
WILLIAM J. CLINTON’S “NEW COVENANT”: A PROPHECY OF  
 
NATIONAL DELIVERANCE 
 
And so today we pledge an end to the era of deadlock and drift, and a new season of 
American renewal has begun. 
Bill Clinton1 
 
 As he announced his presidential candidacy on October 3, 1991, Arkansas 
Governor William Jefferson Clinton boldly asserted that “a new kind of leadership, 
leadership committed to change” was needed to “turn this country around and get it 
moving again.”2 While such statements are legion in the announcement speeches of 
presidential candidates, Clinton provided his audience with more than the usual rhetorical 
fare in the form of an eloquent religious expression of the type of leadership he was 
proposing. In what was certainly a swipe at President George H.W. Bush, Clinton 
conceded that much progress had been made on the foreign policy front resulting in “the 
death of Communism abroad,” but argued that the domestic policy priorities of the 
current administration had resulted in “the loss of the American Dream at home.”3 His 
prescription for America entailed not just a new administration with new policy 
objectives, but a complete renewal of the national socio-political culture reflected in the 
establishment of a new contract between the people and their government. Early in the 
address, Clinton opined that: “a new covenant” was needed “to rebuild America. . . . 
Government’s responsibility is to create more opportunity. The people’s responsibility is 
to make the most of it.”4 While Clinton did not elaborate on the specific responsibilities 
of the people as a result of the new covenant, the metaphor became a vital component in 
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hundreds of his stump speeches and in his major policy addresses throughout the 
campaign.5 
As a former law professor and six-term Governor of Arkansas, Clinton was 
certainly familiar with the concept of a binding agreement between two parties. Yet, he 
elected to refer to the new political compact he proposed as a covenant rather than a 
contract. Contracts and covenants are similar in that they each set forth before the parties 
a series of binding expectations and responsibilities. Both kinds of agreements also 
typically provide some indication of the consequences that will result if one or both of the 
parties fail to abide by the terms. Nevertheless, there are a number of differences between 
the two types of agreements. Aside from the specifically religious origin of the term, a 
covenant suggests a warm relational intimacy between the parties who enter into one—
hence the use of the term in marriage ceremonies and religious rites. When two parties 
enter into a covenant, the connotative meaning of the term suggests that they will give all 
of themselves to the agreement out of deep respect (or love) for the other party. Contracts 
connote no such intimacy. The two parties simply sign on the dotted line.  
Clinton’s announcement speech would have sounded very differently if he had 
not used the covenant metaphor. He could not offer the nation a “new contract” because 
of the rhetorical coldness of the term. Nor could he offer a “New Deal” for that 
compelling metaphor was taken by a previous Democrat—President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. As such Clinton called for a new covenant.  He not only used the metaphor 
while a presidential candidate in 1992 he returned to it as a political shibboleth at an 
important and politically challenging moment in his presidency—the 1995 State of the 
Union Address.  
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Although the new covenant may have been one of Clinton’s favorite metaphors, 
he did not always use it. After taking the oath of office on January 20, 1993, for instance, 
Clinton inaugurated his presidency by appealing to the theme of national renewal. He 
accurately suggested that the idea of renewal was older than America itself, yet deeply-
ingrained in the public consciousness of modern Americans. After proclaiming the 
inaugural a celebration of “the mystery of American renewal,” he further solemnized and 
contextualized the occasion by combining the renewal motif with an agricultural 
metaphor adapted to the cold January day: “by the words we speak and the faces we show 
the world, we force the spring, a spring reborn in the world’s oldest democracy that 
brings forth the vision and courage to reinvent America.”6 Although Clinton’s first 
inaugural largely conformed to the traditional functions of the genre recognized by 
rhetorical scholars Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, it was far more 
than a mere “rehearsal of communal values drawn from the past,” or a simple renewal of 
“the covenant between the president and the people. . . .”7 Clinton’s inaugural proclaimed 
the coming of a new and brighter era in America. As he put it, “we pledge an end to the 
era of deadlock and drift, and a new season of American renewal has begun.”8 Clinton’s 
use of the renewal motif in his first inaugural was noteworthy for its eloquence, ubiquity 
(the words “renew” or “renewal” appeared eight times in the address), and centrality to 
his larger message of national renewal throughout his presidential campaign and beyond. 
In short, whether the central metaphor was agricultural or covenantal, the theme of 
national renewal remained.  
A number of rhetorical analysts have evaluated Clinton’s rhetorical presidency in 
light of the prophetic discourse he employed on the campaign trail,9 in his inaugural 
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address,10 and as he articulated the growing threats from domestic and foreign terrorism 
at the close of the twentieth century.11 These studies are informative and accurately 
acknowledge that Clinton’s rhetorical corpus was informed to a large extent by the 
prophetic discourse found in the sacred texts of Judaism and Christianity. However, as 
George A. Kennedy and W. Eugene March amply demonstrate, prophetic discourse is not 
confined solely to the jeremiad with its basic covenant-blame/accusation structure.12 
Although the jeremiad may be one the dominant rhetorical motifs of Hebrew prophecy, 
the prophets of ancient Israel also foretold of times when the covenant people would be 
rescued and delivered from their perils by the power of the Almighty.  
I argue that Clinton’s 1991 campaign discourse, his first inaugural, and his pivotal 
1995 State of the Union Address are best understood as prophecies of deliverance. These 
selections from Clinton’s presidential rhetorical corpus merit analysis because all were 
delivered in times of political transition during which there was uncertainty about the 
nation’s future. Accordingly, Clinton’s use of this religious rhetorical form was designed 
to provide a measure of comfort by dovetailing with an appeal to the extant public 
mythology of American exceptionalism—the notion that America has had and still holds 
a special status and destiny among the nations of the Earth. In the 1991 campaign, 
Clinton presented himself as a political savior who would deliver the nation from its 
uncertain economic times. In his first inaugural address, Clinton argued that political 
deliverance had come—not through himself—but because of the work of the American 
people. In the 1995 State of the Union Address, with his own administration confronting 
uncertainty, Clinton sought to parlay the deliverance form into a new set of 
understandings between the exceptional American public and the government—the new 
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covenant. While other American presidents have used American exceptionalist rhetoric, 
Clinton’s use of it is different. For Clinton, America was exceptional for what it could 
become rather than what it had been (Ronald Reagan’s view). As I will show throughout 
this analysis, Clinton’s deliverance form rhetorically constituted an American community 
reborn, renewed, and reinvigorated by his leadership. Thus, his deliverance form 
constituted a political shibboleth of national renewal.  
 This chapter offers two noteworthy findings. First, in contrast to other presidents 
who have emphasized renewal, Clinton rhetorically situated American renewal as an 
element of the future rather than an idealized past. As we will see, this choice was a 
logical one in light of the rhetorical form in which his message was cast. Second, in 
contrast to the findings of other studies,13 this study argues that Clinton’s campaign 
rhetoric was cast not in the form of a jeremiad, but in the prophetic form that George A. 
Kennedy and W. Eugene March have called a “prophecy of salvation”—which I shall call 
a prophecy of deliverance.14 I will proceed by describing the features of the prophecy of 
deliverance as a religious rhetorical form and accounting for Bill Clinton’s personal 
familiarity with it. Next, I will analyze the candidacy announcement and nomination 
acceptance address from Clinton’s 1992 campaign, his first inaugural address, and the 
1995 State of the Union noting especially how Clinton wedded this rhetorical form to the 
mythology of American exceptionalism. This analysis will allow me to demonstrate how 
deliverance prophecies are distinct from American political jeremiads. As a result, this 
chapter will highlight and clarify a distinct religious rhetorical form that has heretofore 
been little noted nor well understood in the scholarship on American political rhetoric.  
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 Since the conclusion of his presidency, a number of rhetorical scholars have made 
significant contributions to our understanding of Clinton’s rhetorical prowess as a 
political campaign rhetor15 and his less-than-inspiring performance as a rhetorical 
Commander-in-Chief.16 As previously acknowledged, the observation that President Bill 
Clinton frequently called upon the rhetorical resources of religion is hardly new. John M. 
Murphy, for instance, demonstrates that Clinton rhetorically constructed much of his 
presidential authority to engage the issue of Civil Rights by incorporating or 
“interanimating” the “historical and cultural echoes” of the African American church.17 
Throughout the essay Murphy rightly notes Clinton’s command of scripture and the 
concepts of prophetic authority and apostleship by his appropriation of “King’s voice in a 
form of prosopopoeia.”18 Elsewhere, Murphy writes of Clinton’s new covenant rhetoric 
likening it to a journey toward the future and Clinton as a president who “sought to 
prepare the American people for the trip.”19 While the comparison is both interesting and 
appropriate, Murphy’s analysis here is confined only to Clinton’s use of the new 
covenant metaphor in his nomination acceptance address.  
Shawn and Trevor Parry-Giles’ fascinating study of Clinton’s August 28, 1998 
speech commemorating the March on Washington likewise notes that Clinton combined 
the public memories inherent to the occasion with the discourse of forgiveness in an 
attempt to address the Monica Lewinsky scandal in a more effective manner than he had 
two weeks earlier in his televised speech on August 17, 1998.20 Clinton’s employment of 
the discourse of forgiveness has been explored more fully in a pair of studies by Ronald 
Lee and Matthew H. Barton and Joy Koesten and Robert Rowland. Both accurately 
acknowledge Clinton’s struggle to enact proper repentance in his remarks on August 17, 
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August 28, and September 11 of 1998. Both of these studies are important touchstones 
for the present analysis. Lee and Barton note that although he struggled mightily with the 
confession form, Clinton finally met “the generic demands of religious confession” in his 
third address on September 11, 1998.21 Koesten and Rowland explore the concept of 
religious rhetorical form as they reveal that Clinton was able to use the atonement form 
as a rhetorical resource in response to public revelations of the Lewinsky scandal. 
Koesten and Rowland further reveal that Clinton used the atonement form when asking 
forgiveness for his personal sins and on a public level as a president seeking forgiveness 
for wrongs perpetrated in his nation’s history.22 
Deliverance Prophecy as a Religious Rhetorical Form 
 Like the jeremiad, prophecies of deliverance and salvation trace their roots to 
ancient Jewish prophecy. Contrary to some descriptions of the jeremiad, biblical 
prophecy was not always judgmental and foreboding in tone. In fact, March explained 
that an entire subgenre of biblical prophetic literature was designed as a “prediction of 
salvation”—a promise from God to rescue the chosen nation from its time of peril.23 
Several excellent examples of this form exist, including Jeremiah 30: 3-11: 
‘For behold, days are coming,’ says the LORD, ‘when I will restore the  
fortunes of my people, Israel and Judah, says the LORD, and I will bring  
them back to the land which I gave to their fathers, and they shall take  
possession of it.’ These are the words which the LORD spoke concerning  
Israel and Judah: ‘Thus says the LORD: We have heard a cry of panic, of  
terror, and no peace. Ask now, and see, can a man bear a child? Why then do  
I see every man with his hands on his loins like a woman in labor? Why has  
every face turned pale? Alas! that day is so great there is none like it; it is a  
time of distress for Jacob; yet he shall be saved out of it. ‘And it shall come to 
pass in that day,’ says the LORD of hosts, ‘that I will break the yoke from off  
their neck, and I will burst their bonds, and strangers shall no more make  
servants of them. But they shall serve the LORD their God and David their  
king, whom I will raise up for them. ‘Then fear not, O Jacob my servant, says  
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the LORD, nor be dismayed, O Israel; for lo, I will save you from afar, and your 
offspring from the land of their captivity. Jacob shall return and have quiet and 
ease, and none shall make him afraid. For I am with you to save you, says the 
LORD.24 
 
Whether the book of Jeremiah was the product of one solitary prophet or, as some 
scholars argue, the result of several author/redactors, it is startling to find such a 
reassuring passage in a work which, on balance, appears to foretell the destruction of 
Judah (the southern kingdom of Israel) as a sovereign kingdom and the fall of Jerusalem. 
Oxford University biblical scholar Rex Mason notes that the books of Haggai, Zechariah, 
and Malachi may be interpreted as “prophets of restoration” whose relatively optimistic 
outlooks foretold that, in the end, the Almighty would restore and save his chosen people 
“proved a seed-bed for the faith of those [both Jewish and Christian] who followed 
them.”25 Other biblical scholars such as Ronald E. Clements of King’s College and 
Walter Brueggemann of Columbia Theological Seminary have acknowledged similar 
themes of restoration and deliverance embedded within the texts of major Hebraic 
prophets such as Isaiah and Jeremiah. Clements claims that Deutero-Isaiah26 is 
characterized by several defining ideas including: “Yahweh has not abandoned his 
people; . . . the salvation of Israel is assured through the Davidic dynasty.”27 
Brueggemann concurs with Clements’ analysis of Second Isaiah. He explains that Second 
Isaiah was something quite distinctive in the annals of prophetic discourse:  
This great poet of the exile understood that speech which rearranges the  
pieces and which echoes the management mentality of its contemporaries 
is not worth the bother. Second Isaiah presumably lived through and knew 
about the pathos of Lamentations and the rage of Job. Nevertheless, he  
goes beyond the pathos and rage to speeches of hope and doxology.28 
 
Although he and other biblical scholars discern “indispensable precursors” of this 
message in other prophetic books; Brueggemann considers Deutero-Isaiah’s message of 
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the Almighty’s promise to deliver Israel’s from its present woes to be “a genuine 
novum.”29 This bold claim appears well founded when considered in conjunction with 
what may be regarded as the exordium of Deutero-Isaiah in Isaiah 40: 1-5: 
Comfort, comfort my people, says your God. Speak tenderly to  
Jerusalem, and cry to her that her warfare is ended, that her iniquity is  
pardoned, that she has received from the LORD's hand double for all her  
sins. A voice cries: "In the wilderness prepare the way of the LORD, 
make straight in the desert a highway for our God. Every valley shall be  
lifted up, and every mountain and hill be made low; the uneven ground  
shall become level, and the rough places a plain. And the glory of the  
LORD shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together, for the mouth  
of the LORD has spoken.30 
 
At this point it must be acknowledged that the theme of deliverance is many centuries 
older than the pre-exilic and exilic prophets who employed it. As far as Hebrew culture 
and religion are concerned, the deliverance theme undoubtedly harkens back to Israel’s 
exodus from Egypt circa 1550 B.C.E. Although it is unnecessary to recount that well 
known ancient story here, a recollection of the importance of the exodus narrative as a 
central feature in both Jewish religious practice and as a religious rhetorical form in its 
own right enables one to appreciate the ancient heritage and rhetorical import of the 
deliverance form.31 
 In spite of the similarity that both are addressed to a covenant people, the 
jeremiad and the deliverance rhetorical form are quite distinct. Most obviously, the 
deliverance form foretells the coming deliverance of a people rather than chastising them 
for their sinful behavior as the jeremiad typically does. This teleological distinction has 
important rhetorical implications. Where rhetors using the jeremiad rebuke and chastise, 
those employing the deliverance form endeavor to reassure the covenant community.  
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Based upon the works of these biblical scholars, and the biblical examples of 
deliverance prophecy cited herein, we may conclude that deliverance prophecies 
constitute a religious rhetorical form comprised of three distinct elements: a description 
of the current national peril, the promise of deliverance, and specific visions of renewal. 
The prophet using this form begins by describing the nation’s troubled state. As in the 
previously noted case of Jeremiah 30: 3-11, Israel’s oppression was so dire that even the 
strong men of the community clutched their nervous stomachs out of fear and dread. The 
depth of suffering evident here serves to intensify the glorious deliverance that will 
subsequently take place. In the second phase, the prophet promises God’s deliverance 
from the current peril as vividly illustrated by Jeremiah’s reference to breaking the yoke 
that bound the nation in slavery and oppression. Finally, the prophet paints a vivid picture 
of the forthcoming deliverance by citing specific future occurrences that illustrate the 
renewal and restoration of the nation. In Jeremiah the text proclaims that “no longer will 
foreigners enslave them” and “Jacob will again have peace and security”. In Isaiah the 
audience is reassured that “Every valley shall be lifted up, and every mountain and hill 
made low; the uneven ground shall become level, and the rough places a plain.” In short, 
the form was intended as a hopeful promise of future deliverance and renewal for the 
nation. While the nation’s deliverance is still implicitly contingent upon proper 
observance of the covenant (as in the jeremiad), the deliverance form assumes that such 
observance has already occurred and that deliverance is therefore forthcoming.  
March reminds us that some such prophecies in the biblical era were considered 
to be theologically suspect since they were delivered to kings in order to curry favor with 
the monarch; nevertheless, the variety of circumstances under which prophecies of 
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deliverance occurred and their occurrence throughout scripture gives indication of a clear 
prophetic subgenre.32 This prophetic subgenre eventually grew to become a religious 
rhetorical form in contemporary and historical American rhetoric—one uniquely suited to 
the propagation of a public mythology of American exceptionalism.  
Deliverance and American Exceptionalism 
Surviving evidence suggests that colonial American clergy were equally adept at 
using both prophecies of deliverance and jeremiads—sometimes even in the same 
sermon. The Reverend Samuel Dunbar’s election sermon, “The Presence of God with His 
People,” delivered during the French and Indian War provides an example of the 
deliverance prophecy as used in the late colonial period. Dunbar equated God’s 
deliverance of ancient Israel with that of England from the Spanish Armada in the 
sixteenth century and what he considered to be God’s protection of the New England 
colonies during the war. The connection between colonial America and ancient Israel was 
far more than metaphorical as Dunbar explained: 
[God] delivers them, in their lowest and most desperate circumstances. 
When they are surrounded with difficulties and dangers, and reduced 
to the greatest streights: when they have neither wisdom to contrive, nor 
power to effect, any way of escape, but, as to any visible means, all hope 
of being saved is gone; now is God’s times to work: Now will I arise, saith 
the Lord, and set them in safety. Providence wonderfully steps in, and opens 
a door of hope and help to them. So it did for Israel in delivering them from 
Egyptian bondage: then God went forth for the salvation of his people: yea, 
he rode upon his horses and chariots of salvation, made speed to help and 
save them. Miraculous appearances and operations of providence, for the  
deliverance of God’s oppressed, endangered people, may not now be  
expected; yet God has very strange and unthought ways, to accomplish 
deliverance for them: as we see, in the deliverance of God’s people, from  
their Babylonish captivity, and also in the days of Esther.33 
 
Although Dunbar’s assertions of deliverance were mingled with exhortations “not 
to forfeit [God’s protection] by any sinful departure from God,”34 the rhetorical thrust of 
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the sermon was a proclamation and celebration of God’s deliverance. Despite the perilous 
dangers surrounding New England, Dunbar asserted that their previous and continued 
deliverance was a result of the providential favor they enjoyed by virtue of their 
covenantal relationship with the Almighty as his people.  
The deliverance form is equally apparent in the Reverend Samuel Haven’s 
sermon “Joy and Salvation by Christ; His Arm Displayed in the Protestant Cause.” 
Haven’s sermon was a history of sorts. He described the early colonial wars with the 
Indians as Satan’s attempt to thwart the purpose of the divine colonial errand. The errand 
was rescued however by “the puisiant Jehovah” whose “holy arm . . . was made bare in 
the eyes of all these Indian nations; and the infant church of Christ in America saw the 
salvation of God.”35 The threat once posed to those Haven assumed to be God’s people 
by the Native Americans was soon eclipsed by the French who had “long endeavoured 
both by artifice and arms to drive us from this good land which the Lord God gave unto 
our fathers.”36 In accordance with the deliverance form, Haven included specific 
examples of God’s favor having been visited upon the New England colonies as the war 
neared its denouement. The Lord had given his people “the vast riches and strength of the 
Havannah, and the Spanish navy there . . . inriching us with millions in the compass of 
one year. . . .”37 
In socio-political terms, the application of the biblical notion of a chosen people 
to the American colonies was a quintessential expression of American exceptionalism. 
While Dunbar and Haven’s identification of nascent America as a type of biblical Israel 
may have been bad theology, they were very much in tune with the thoughts of their 
forbearers and contemporaries. The notion of American exceptionalism has been an 
  
    203
integral part of American culture since colonial times. America’s first Puritan colonists 
believed that their very presence in and success on the continent was the result of divine 
providence. These beliefs were instilled and reinforced by prominent civil and religious 
leaders such as the Reverend John Cotton and Massachusetts Governor John Winthrop. 
In a sermon entitled “God’s Promise to His Plantations” delivered to the Winthrop party 
prior to their departure from England in 1630, Reverend Cotton proclaimed that the group 
was helping to found a New Israel—a land filled with covenant people chosen by God for 
special religious and secular purposes.38 This idea has remained steadfast in the American 
consciousness and has been used as a component of the rhetorical justifications for 
rhetorical and historical events such as the American Revolution, westward expansion 
under the guise of “manifest destiny” and even foreign military intervention.39 To put it 
simply, American political and religious leaders have long used various rhetorical 
expressions from Judaism and Christianity to indicate that America was a special place 
and that they were a special people. The deliverance prophecy, wherein the rhetor 
promises that God’s chosen people will be delivered from whatever their present 
afflictions may be, is one religious rhetorical form particularly suited to the rhetorical 
enactment of such a vision. 
The identification of the deliverance form by biblical scholars combined with its 
use by Haven, Dunbar, and others throughout American history reveals the presence of a 
legitimate counterpart to the jeremiad as a religious rhetorical form emanating from 
biblical prophecy. This observation is not intended to diminish the jeremiad form or its 
importance in American political rhetoric; rather, I mean to observe that the jeremiad is 
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not the sole form of religious rhetoric to have inspired American political discourse past 
or present.  
Bill Clinton’s Prophecy of American Deliverance 
Despite never having earned the trust of conservative evangelical Protestant 
voters, Bill Clinton was, in many ways, one of them. As a child Clinton40 evinced a 
strong interest in matters of religion. The origin of Clinton’s interest in religion while 
growing up in Hot Springs, Arkansas is something of a mystery since neither his 
alcoholic and abusive stepfather Roger Clinton nor his mother Virginia Kelley, were 
particularly religious.41 After a two-year stint in a local Catholic school, an eleven-year-
old Clinton took it upon himself to get up early nearly every Sunday morning, put on his 
best suit, and walk with Bible in hand to the Park Place Baptist Church where, according 
to one report, he was “often waiting at the church before the minister arrived to open the 
doors.”42 Clinton’s interest in religion was apparently more than a peripheral pre-
pubescent fad. Like most evangelicals, he claimed to have undergone a public religious 
conversion. Clinton described the encounter is his autobiography My Life:  
 In 1955, I had absorbed enough of my church’s teaching to know that I was 
 a sinner and to want Jesus to save me. So I ran down the aisle at the end of  
 Sunday service, professed my faith in Christ, and asked to be baptized. The  
 Reverend Fitzgerald came to the house to talk to Mother and me. Baptists 
 require an informed profession of faith for baptism; they want people to  
 know what they are doing, as opposed to the Methodists’ infant-sprinkling 
 ritual that took Hillary and her brothers out of hell’s way.43 
 
Apparently Clinton’s involvement with his faith went deep enough that he not only made 
a public profession of it but developed a kind of partisanship about his Baptist heritage. 
  Clinton’s interest in religion also led him to an encounter with the Reverend Billy 
Graham which played an important role in his thinking about religious and socio-political 
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matters. This encounter occurred prior to a 1958 Billy Graham crusade in Little Rock, 
Arkansas where the beloved southern evangelist had threatened to cancel his crusade 
rather than give in to pressure from some local groups to make it a segregated event. “I 
loved Billy Graham for doing that,” Clinton recalled “For months after that I regularly 
sent part of my small allowance to support his ministry.44 Although Clinton’s church 
attendance and adherence to certain Baptist dogmas (such as abstinence from alcohol) 
became more moderated during his years of study at Georgetown and Oxford; he never 
renounced his Christian faith and always considered himself a person of faith. After 
embarking upon his political career, the Clintons joined the Immanuel Baptist Church in 
Little Rock. During his years as Governor of Arkansas Clinton submitted himself to the 
mentorship of Immanuel’s pastor the Reverend Dr. W.O. Vaught who “helped him think 
his way through a number of thorny moral/political issues, including capital punishment 
and abortion.”45 
 The central point here is that Clinton’s interest in religion, regular attendance of 
religious services throughout junior high and high school, and his exploration of the 
application of religious teachings to his political positions indicates a relatively deep level 
of familiarity with scripture. As such, there can be little doubt about Clinton’s knowledge 
of the Bible’s prophetic discourses—those promising punishment as the consequence of 
sin as well as those which foretold the deliverance of the faithful. The best evidence of 
Clinton’s familiarity with prophetic deliverance forms (other than the new covenant 
metaphor) may be seen in his use of Isaiah 58: 12 in both his second inaugural address 
and the 1997 State of the Union message. The passage assures the chosen people that 
“your ancient ruins shall be rebuilt; you shall raise up the foundations of many 
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generations; you shall be called the repairer of the breach, the restorer of streets to dwell 
in.”46 Clinton admired the verse so much that he placed his hand upon it as he took the 
oath of office at his second presidential inauguration.47 Clinton’s use of one of the 
deliverance form’s signature biblical passages in these prominent texts from his rhetorical 
corpus must be seen as evidence of his fluency with the language of biblical deliverance 
prophecy. His use of the deliverance form during the 1992 campaign is most apparent in 
his 1991 candidacy announcement speech, his 1992 nomination acceptance address, and 
his 1993 inaugural address.  
American Deliverance in the 1992 Campaign  
From the very start of his candidacy, Bill Clinton proclaimed that he wanted to 
bring change to America and its political landscape. Like a deliverance prophet of old, 
Clinton began his announcement speech by describing what he believed to be the perilous 
condition of the nation: “I refuse to be part of a generation that celebrates the death of 
Communism abroad with the loss of the American Dream at home. I refuse to be part of a 
generation that fails to compete in the global economy and so condemns hard-working 
Americans to a life of struggle without reward or security.”48 Clinton’s use of antithesis 
depicted the stark contrast between America’s soaring foreign policy achievements of the 
late 1980s and early 90s with the era’s less-than-stellar economic performance. This 
disparity clarified the national decline out of which Clinton promised to bring the nation.  
These prophecy-style injunctions must be read as both convenient charges to level 
against the Bush administration and indications that the nation (because of the wayward 
priorities of its leadership) was in danger of losing its very soul. This aspect of the 
prophetic plot advanced as Clinton opined that his recent travels led him to the 
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conclusion that “everything we believe in, everything we’ve fought for, is threatened by 
an administration that refuses to take care of our own, has turned its back on the middle 
class, and is afraid to change while the world is changing.”49 Clinton’s use of “we” in the 
description indicates that although he was indeed castigating the Bush administration, he 
elected to frame the problems confronting the nation as new challenges produced by the 
conditions of a changing world. In the end, all that could really be said of the Bush 
administration was that it simply failed to change with and adapt to the times. Even when 
he seems to lay the blame for national problems at the feet of President Bush, Clinton 
could ultimately do little more than describe the problems as events or present conditions 
rather than full-throated denunciations or declensions from a national covenant.  
As indicative of the deliverance prophecy form, Clinton adduced some of the 
specific problems confronting the beleaguered nation: 
Middle class people are spending more hours on the job, spending less time 
with their children, bringing home a smaller paycheck to pay more for health  
care and housing and education. Our streets are meaner, our families 
are broken, our health care is the costliest in the world and we get less for it. 
The country is headed in the wrong direction fast, . . . and all we get out of 
Washington is status quo paralysis. No vision, no action, just neglect, 
selfishness, and division.50 
 
While such accusations against the incumbent administration are common in campaign 
speeches,51 Clinton was less concerned with blaming the Bush administration than with 
generating the image of an American community in decline and in need of his leadership. 
As Clinton himself noted, mere “Bush-bashing” would not help in “confronting the real 
problems of real people and pointing the way to a better future.”52 
 Clinton continued using the deliverance form by announcing to the assembled 
audience and thousands watching via satellite (a relatively new occurrence in the early 
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1990s),53 that his candidacy would be a “fight for the forgotten middle class.”54 But how 
could his presidential campaign dedicated to restoring the endangered American dream in 
the name of the forgotten middle class best express this lofty aim with a manageable 
metaphor? Clinton himself supplied the answer: “We need a new covenant to rebuild 
America. It’s just common sense. Government’s responsibility is to create more 
opportunity. The people’s responsibility is to make the most of it.”55 In contemporary 
political terms, Clinton used the new covenant metaphor to portray himself as a new, 
centrist, Democrat—one who insisted that the government do more to foster socio-
economic opportunity while placing heavy emphasis upon “personal responsibility.” In 
terms of his announcement speech and subsequent campaign, the metaphor became a 
handy sobriquet for the national deliverance he promised to provide. In his announcement 
speech, Clinton pledged “opportunity for all” and then went on to create a laundry list of 
objectives including education reform, affordable health care, new anti-crime legislation, 
welfare reform, and a fairer tax system.56 As in the deliverance form, each of these 
pledges were representations of the American deliverance which would result from 
Clinton’s election to the presidency. This function is confirmed by the oft-repeated 
phrase which preceded many of them “In a Clinton Administration. . . .”57 
 The deliverance form appeared frequently in Clinton’s stump speeches during the 
1992 campaign. Yet, his most prominent employment of the form before a national 
audience occurred during his nomination acceptance speech at the Democratic National 
Convention in New York City on July 16, 1992. In what was his most important address 
of the campaign up to that time, he began by noting that his acceptance of the party’s 
nomination was “in the name of all those who do the work and pay the taxes, raise the 
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kids, and play by the rules, in the name of the hardworking Americans who make up the 
forgotten middle class . . .”58 Aside from maintaining fidelity to the message of his 
announcement speech, Clinton’s invocation of the middle class here comported with the 
imagery of a beleaguered middle class in need of deliverance.  
In contrast to the biblical deliverance prophets who presented themselves as 
merely vessels whose speech conveyed the Almighty’s divine truth,59 Clinton presented 
himself in the nomination acceptance speech as a kind of political savior who would 
correct the nation’s many socio-economic ills. I am not suggesting that Clinton suffered 
from any sort of Messiah complex, but that the combination of religious rhetorical form 
and political praxes on this particular occasion called for a measure of self-exultation. 
This is apparent in Clinton’s assertion that he was “a product of that [forgotten] middle 
class.” He recalled never having known his biological father who had died in a car 
accident prior to his birth and enduring long absences from his mother as a toddler “while 
she went back to Louisiana to study nursing” in order to “support me and give me a better 
life.”60 
Portraying himself a product of the middle class was, of course, politically 
expedient and was a persistent feature of Clinton’s campaign and presidential rhetoric. As 
one of Clinton’s presidential speechwriters would later observe, Clinton “saw himself as 
the mediator between the voters and the elites.”61 This interpretation is confirmed by the 
political virtues Clinton claimed he possessed as a result of the hard times of his 
childhood and the love of his mother. “That’s why” he said “I’ll fight to create high-
paying jobs so that parents can afford to raise their children today.”62 In this way, Clinton 
assumes much of what Margaret Zulick calls the “prophetic ethos.”63 Here, Clinton was 
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not just a herald of deliverance, he was also speaking as one who, through self 
determination and the supportive influences of others such as his mother, grandparents, 
and a favorite professor at Georgetown, had made it to the highest echelons of political 
influence. Such self-exaltation would have been unthinkable for a genuine Old Testament 
prophet, but as Kenneth Burke reminds us it is the form of a message rather than the 
content which “is the creation of an appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate 
satisfying of that appetite.”64 In other words, it is the form of the message which conveys 
much of the rhetorical substance. Clinton’s near-Messianic Horatio-Alger-like self 
description is less important, from a rhetorical perspective, than the substance of the 
message produced by his choice of rhetorical form—the deliverance that would renew the 
American community was on its way.  
 Like the deliverance prophets of old who provided glimpses of what deliverance 
of the covenant people would look like, Clinton did not stop with merely promising 
deliverance. Clinton’s articulation of the new covenant in his acceptance speech was both 
far more poetic and expansive than his candidacy announcement had been. According to 
Clinton, the new covenant was indeed something new. It was “a solemn agreement 
between the people and their government based not simply on what each of us can take 
but what all of us must give to our Nation.”65 A cynical reader might evaluate this phrase 
as little more than a reworking of Kennedy’s immortal “ask not what your country can do 
for you. . . .” Yet Clinton defined the idea as the natural outgrowth of America’s bold 
vision for the future. As he reminded the delegates and the nation quoting from Proverbs 
29: 18 “Where there is no vision, the people perish.”  
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Clinton’s vision of deliverance promised innovative progress and new 
responsibilities between the people and the government in areas such as the economy, 
education, community service, healthcare, and tax reform. In the economic sector, for 
instance, Clinton invited his audience to envision an America:  
that says to entrepreneurs and businesspeople: We will give you more  
incentives and more opportunity than ever before to develop the skills of  
your workers and to create American jobs and American wealth in the new  
global economy. But you must do your part, you must be responsible.  
American companies must act like American companies again, exporting  
products, not jobs.66 
 
In the realm of education Clinton offered this vision:  
An America in which the doors of colleges are thrown open once again to  
the sons and daughters of stenographers and steelworkers. We will say:  
Everybody can borrow money to go to college. But you must do your part. 
You must pay it back, from your paychecks or, better yet, by going back  
home and serving your communities.67 
 
And Clinton had a particularly hopeful twinkle in his eye as he articulated what his new 
covenant would mean with regard to youth community service programs: 
 Just think of it. Think of it. Millions of energetic young men and women  
 serving their country by policing the streets or teaching the children or  
 caring for the sick. Or working with the elderly and people with disabilities. 
 Or helping your people to say off drugs and out of gangs, giving us all 
 a sense of new hope and limitless possibilities.68 
 
Each one of these wide-ranging, poetic refrains was followed by the phrase: “That’s what 
this New Covenant is all about.”69 
Like most nomination acceptance speeches, Clinton’s was short on details as to 
how all this would be accomplished, yet his vision was specific enough to afford the 
voters an image of a restored and renewed American community. Clinton’s vision was 
particularly compelling in light of America’s problems and the general economic 
pessimism that pervaded the nation as the 1992 campaign neared its end.70 Although 
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Clinton’s campaign balked at articulating a specific economic policy, his rhetoric of 
restoration allowed him to position himself as the candidate who would restore economic 
prosperity as part of his larger agenda of renewal. Additionally, Clinton’s new covenant 
enabled him to present himself as a political moderate—neither a tax-and-spend, big 
government liberal nor a cold, austere, tax-and-budget-cutting conservative. In short, 
Clinton used the deliverance form and its new covenant metaphor to present himself as 
the only candidate who represented what Americans really wanted their country to be.  
Some of Clinton’s most prosaic rhetoric appeared near the end of the speech as he 
spoke to the perception that the country needed to be delivered from a problem more 
consequential than any of the policy issues he had addressed up to that point—the 
division of the American community itself. As Clinton explained: 
Tonight every one of you knows deep in your heart that we are too  
divided. It is time to heal America. And so we must say to every  
American: Look beyond the stereotypes that blind us. We need each 
other—all of us—we need each other. We don’t have a person to waste, 
and yet for too long politicians have told the most of us that are doing 
all right that what’s really wrong with America is the rest of us—them. 
Them, the minorities. Them, the liberals. Them, the poor. Them, the 
homeless. Them, the people with disabilities. Them, the gays. We’ve  
gotten to where we’ve nearly them’ed ourselves to death. . . . But this is  
America. There is no them. There is only us. One nation, under God,  
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. That is our Pledge of Allegiance,  
and that’s what the New Covenant is all about.71 
 
Despite the banality of his inclusion of the Pledge of Allegiance in these final lines, 
Clinton endeavored to offer America something new. More to the point, he held himself 
and his candidacy out as perhaps the last best hope to escape the kind of division which 
he portrayed as threatening the very existence of the American community.  
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American Deliverance in Clinton’s Presidential Rhetoric 
On January 20, 1993 President Clinton used his first inaugural address to 
proclaim that deliverance had come. True to the deliverance form which had been so 
much a part of his campaign, he began by presenting the idea that the nation was in deep 
peril. Although the nation’s strength was considerable, it had been “weakened by 
business failures, stagnant wages, increasing inequality, and deep divisions among our 
own people.”72 The problem, explained Clinton, was not that the government had 
neglected its covenant with the citizenry; it had merely failed to adapt to the tenor of the 
times by “mak[ing] change our friend and not our enemy.”73 His metaphor of “forcing the 
spring” illustrated this theme by painting a picture of a nation about to move from 
difficult to more prosperous and hopeful times.74 Nevertheless, Clinton remained quite 
explicit about the problems the nation still faced: 
But when most people are working harder for less; when others cannot 
work at all; when the cost of health care devastates families and threatens 
to bankrupt our enterprises . . . when the fear of crime robs law abiding 
citizens of their freedom; and when millions of poor children cannot even 
imagine the lives we are calling them to lead, we have not made change 
our friend.75 
 
Clinton avoided assigning specific blame for the nation’s problems, and seemed to 
mollify any idea of collective blame when he claimed that there was “nothing wrong with 
American that cannot be cured by what is right with America.”76 Clinton moved quickly 
from a discussion of the current perils to his triumphant promise of national deliverance: 
“And so today we pledge an end to the era of deadlock and drift, and a new season of 
American renewal has begun.”77 
The deliverance prophecy in Clinton’s inaugural address was far humbler than the 
version of it he used during the campaign. His campaign rhetoric seemed to suggest that 
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he was a Messiah-like figure. His inaugural shifted the locus of action from himself to the 
public. He made clear that it was “The American people [who] have summoned the 
change we celebrate today. . . . you, my fellow Americans, have forced the spring.”78 He 
quickly added that forcing the spring entailed doing “the work the season demands.”79 
This change in focus is subtle, yet quite significant. The rhetorical exigencies of the 
campaign trail demand that a candidate exalt him or herself above their opponents. In 
Clinton’s case, his use of the deliverance form meant that he would have to appear as a 
political savior. However, such exaltation would have been inappropriate in an inaugural 
with its emphasis upon high ceremony and nonpartisan, healing civic ritual. As such, the 
deliverance prophecy of Clinton’s first inaugural required a new hero for this occasion—
the American people. Clinton claimed that, ultimately, it was the American people who 
would bring about the long-awaited national renewal. Thus, the fulfillment of the 
deliverance prophecy was the work of everyone—an important realization for a people 
who already believe themselves to be exceptional.  
Consistent with the deliverance form, Clinton closed the speech by providing 
specific visions of what American renewal would look like in areas such as government 
reform, economic renewal, and America’s standing as a world leader. Finally, he 
eloquently invited the audience to participate in its own renewal: “From this joyful 
mountaintop of celebration we hear a call to service in the valley. . . . And now, each in 
our own way and with God’s help, we must answer the call.”80 
 Interestingly, Clinton refrained from using the new covenant metaphor in his first 
inaugural. Speechwriter Michael Waldman reports that Clinton removed large portions 
from previous drafts of the inaugural which had discussed the new covenant and 
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enumerated the people’s obligations to fulfill the covenant.81 Apparently Clinton chose to 
emphasize how the government would reform its ways of dealing with the public rather 
than highlighting the responsibilities of individual citizens toward the government.  
 After his election, President Clinton seemed to put his version of the deliverance 
form into moth balls for the next two years.82 Despite some notable successes such as 
securing passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Clinton 
administration struggled mightily during its first two years to enact its political agenda. 
From the badly-mishandled controversy over Clinton’s proposed policy on homosexuals 
serving in the U.S. armed forces to his failed attempt to reform healthcare, the Clinton 
administration seemed to produce more political and rhetorical blunders than successes. 
Many explanations have been offered for the political and rhetorical reverses of the early 
years of the Clinton presidency. Some alleged that Clinton was an ineffective manager 
who often tried to work on too many initiatives at once.83 Others argued that his failure to 
effectively ingratiate himself with the White House press corps and other media outlets 
made them more eager to highlight his foibles.84 Still others claimed that Clinton’s desire 
to avoid confrontation and tendency to over-analyze complicated policy matters caused 
him to waffle on key issues.85 
One explanation for Clinton’s tribulations relates to his use of the new covenant 
metaphor. Denise Bostdorff convincingly argues that Clinton’s campaign rhetoric which 
called for a new covenant approach to presidential leadership helped him win the 
election, but plagued him with problems once in office. “The rhetoric that had helped him 
win the White House,” she explains “now boxed him in politically. Through his 
transcendent campaign appeals, Clinton had raised expectations, now difficult to fulfill, 
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that change would come quickly.”86 Whether or not this rhetorical quandary was a 
primary cause of Clinton’s difficult first two years as president, Clinton found himself 
imperiled and in need of political deliverance when his Democratic Party lost control of 
Congress in 1994 after having held it for the last forty years.  
 As the date for the 1995 State of the Union message approached, the Clinton 
White House knew that their rhetorical missteps and the Democratic Party’s defeat in the 
1994 election had created a public perception that the administration was flailing. 
Accordingly, the White House stepped up its campaign to highlight its early 
accomplishments. While reporting on one such event during the daily press briefing on 
January 19, 1995 Press Secretary Mike McCurry was grilled by reporters who wondered: 
“The obvious question is, why is this necessary? If this President has done so much why 
do people not realize it?”87 “It seemed” recalls speechwriter Michael Waldman “that 
Clinton had hit rock bottom. The promise of his presidency seemed ashes.”88 
Clinton’s immediate audience for the 1995 State of the Union address was full of 
fresh faces, many of whom were hostile to his agenda. In acknowledgment, Clinton 
began by noting that the results of both the 1992 and 1994 elections confirmed the 
nation’s desire for fundamental political change. After spending several minutes recalling 
how political change had been a bulwark and defining feature of the nation’s history from 
the days of the founders through the New Deal, Clinton called attention to the nation’s 
present peril.  
 But the rising tide is not lifting all boats. While our nation is enjoying peace  
and prosperity, too many of our people are still working harder and harder for 
less and less. . . . Our civil life is suffering in America today. Citizens are  
working together less and shouting at each other more. The common bonds of 
community which have been the great strength of our country from its very 
beginning are badly frayed. . . . Our Government, once a champion of national 
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purpose, is now seen by many as simply a captive of narrow interests, putting 
more burdens on our citizens rather than equipping them to get ahead. The  
 values that used to hold us all together seem to be coming apart.89 
 
The present state of affairs dictated that “a new social compact” was necessary “to meet 
the challenges of this time.”90 This new compact would engage the public with “a new set 
of understandings, not just with Government but, even more important, with one another 
as Americans.”91 
Clearly Clinton’s rhetoric posited that America was in need of deliverance. Yet, 
the exigencies of this particular address required some adaptation of the deliverance 
form. Rather than implicitly promising that deliverance would arrive with his election as 
articulated in his campaign rhetoric, the fact that Clinton was already president meant that 
both the promise and visions of deliverance phases of the rhetorical form needed to be 
conflated as one. In short, Clinton argued that the deliverance of America was to begin 
then and there. To highlight this transformation, Clinton devoted considerable attention to 
the idea that a major corner was being turned with regard to the way that government and 
citizens interacted.  
The New Covenant approach to governing is as different from the old  
bureaucratic way as the computer is from the manual typewriter. The old 
way of governing around here protected organized interests. We should  
look out for the interests of ordinary people. The old way divided us by  
interest, constituency, or class. The New Covenant way should unite us 
behind a common vision of what’s best for our country. The old way  
dispensed services through large, top-down, inflexible bureaucracies. The 
New Covenant way should shift these resources and decision making from 
bureaucrats to citizens, injecting choice and competition and individual  
responsibility into national policy. The old way of governing around here 
actually seemed to reward failure. The New Covenant way should have 
built-in incentives to reward success. The old way was centralized here in 
Washington. The New Covenant way must take hold in the communities 
all across America. And we should help them to do that.92 
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Of course, Clinton failed to mention that, as the sitting president, he certainly bore some 
responsibility for the “old way” things were done in Washington. Nevertheless he rather 
eloquently articulated his hope for the beginning of something new.  
Did this address produce the new covenant era in national policy-making that it 
heralded? Yes and no. While the Clinton administration’s public mishandling of gays in 
the military and universal healthcare left him open to the hackneyed old charges of being 
a big government liberal, his 1995 State of the Union message, with its unmistakable 
rhetorical signatures of political centrism, made such claims from Republicans seem 
increasingly outmoded. Indeed, Clinton would deliver the coupe de grace to such charges 
one year later when he famously proclaimed in his 1996 State of the Union Address that 
“The era of big government is over.”93 This move to the political center undoubtedly 
aided Clinton as he worked and fought with Republicans over the issue of welfare 
reform. Clinton’s more centrist approach informed his rhetoric on this issue by enabling 
him to tap into what Martin Carcasson calls the “anti-welfare culture.”94 In this sense, 
Clinton’s use of the deliverance form provided a kind of political deliverance for himself. 
Indeed, Clinton speechwriter Michael Waldman defined the 1995 State of the Union 
message as a “comeback” after which “Clinton began to build a new kind of presidency. 
It was a presidency that depended far more than ever before on the bully pulpit, on his 
speeches and statements, and on actions he could take on his own.”95 Clinton’s fortunes 
were also aided by strong indicators that the American economy was growing rapidly.  
As Bostdorff observes of his use of the new covenant in his campaign rhetoric, 
the metaphor set a lofty standard quite attainable for Clinton the orator but not for Clinton 
the rhetorical president and policy maker. Clinton did not (because he could not) deliver 
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on his promise to radically change the way things were done in Washington and the 
relationship between government and citizenry in the fashion he had described. 
America’s deliverance from socio-political peril was inhibited by intense battles over the 
federal budget, the resulting shutdowns of the federal government on two different 
occasions, the ever-present pall of scandal which seemed to hang over the administration, 
and the extra-marital affair with a certain White House intern which ultimately led to the 
Republican’s unsuccessful effort to remove Clinton from office via impeachment. 
Despite these unfortunate incidents, Clinton’s public approval during the aftermath of the 
Lewinsky scandal and subsequent impeachment actually grew to sixty-seven percent and 
remained near that level throughout the remainder of his presidency—giving him one of 
the highest public approval ratings during a president’s final month in office since Ronald 
Reagan.96 
While space does not permit a full analysis of Clinton’s use of the deliverance 
form through the remainder of his presidency, it must be noted that he continued to 
employ elements of this religious rhetorical form in high-profile addresses such as his 
second inaugural, wherein he again promised to help end the bitter partisanship that 
plagued the government, and his 1997 State of the Union Address where he cited Isaiah 
58:12 and admonished Congress to aid him in being a “repairer of the breach.”97 I do not 
posit that Clinton’s high approval rating was the result of his use of the deliverance form 
throughout his presidency, yet there can be little doubt that its message of perpetual 
American renewal in the face of numerous extant challenges did no harm to his public 
standing since it lent itself so readily to the extant public mythology of American 
exceptionalism. 
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Deliverance, Not a Jeremiad 
In both its abstract rhetorical form and its concrete manifestation in Clinton’s 
rhetoric, the deliverance prophecy differs from the jeremiad in several important ways. 
First, the deliverance form is largely devoid of the explicit warnings and condemnations 
toward a rhetorically constituted public found in jeremiadic prophecy. While some mild 
criticism may still take place in this prophetic form, ultimate blame for the nation’s 
problems rests with outsiders rather than members of the chosen nation. As the Reverend 
Dunbar explained in his war sermon “The Presence of God with His People,” “The 
smiles of God upon them [the chosen nation], make every thing flourishing—God’s 
presence makes their land healthful, their fields fruitful, their merchandize gainful, and 
their armies successful . . .”98 Such absence of outright condemnation does not mean that 
no covenantal obligations exist. Rather, this rhetorical form assumes that the people have 
and are adhering to the covenant and divine deliverance is coming as a result. This 
distinction further highlights that the jeremiad and deliverance prophecy are two different 
religious rhetorical forms for two different kinds of occasions. Second, the deliverance 
form, like the halfway covenant of the late Puritan era, sought inclusion and assurance99 
as opposed to the jeremiad’s message that the audience must mend its ways or face God’s 
judgment. The general absence of condemnation in favor of a more conciliatory tone of 
the deliverance form illustrates that Clinton’s discourse was prophetic, but it was not a 
jeremiad.  
While several excellent scholars have argued that Clinton’s pre-presidential and 
presidential appeals were jeremiads or “jeremiadic” in nature,100 the rhetoric I have 
examined here simply does not fit the well-established “promise, declension, prophecy” 
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pattern of the jeremiad form.101 The studies that characterize Clinton’s rhetoric as a 
jeremiad generally misinterpret Clinton’s description’s of national peril to be instances of 
jeremiadic declension—the act of the people falling away from the covenant because of 
their sins. This interpretation is problematic in light of the fact that Clinton usually went 
to great pains to avoid specifically criticizing anyone. Even at his most partisan during 
the 1992 campaign, Clinton could do little but fault the Bush administration for failing to 
keep up with changing times. While Clinton’s inaugural and campaign rhetoric decried 
the “drift” and “deadlock” of the political establishment in Washington, D.C., these 
statements were simply demonstrations of the peril from which Clinton promised to 
deliver the nation. Clinton assigned no particular sin or violation of the national covenant 
to George Bush. Likewise, Clinton held the American public particularly blameless since 
they were hard at work paying their taxes, raising their kids, and playing by the rules as 
he intoned in his nomination acceptance address.  
Perhaps the clearest evidence of distinction between the jeremiad form and 
Clinton’s rhetoric which I have profiled here is the fact that Clinton’s primary 
metaphorical expression of the form was as a new covenant—not an old one. Jeremiads 
are built upon the notion that the chosen people is in danger of judgment for breaking, or 
threatening to break, their sacred covenant with the Almighty. One sees something quite 
different from this in Clinton’s rhetoric. Indeed, the lengths to which Clinton went to 
declare that the new covenant was nothing less than a revolutionary change in the 
relationship between the government and its citizens reveals that he spoke as a prophet 
promising deliverance for the afflicted rather than one promising divine judgment and 
punishment for the covenant breakers. 
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Years after its conclusion, the presidency of William Jefferson Clinton remains 
something of a mystery. He was perhaps one of the most intelligent, articulate, and 
charismatic individuals to ever hold the office. Yet these very strengths occasionally 
contributed to the problems of his administration. He may also have been one of the most 
openly religious presidents in recent memory, yet much of his presidential legacy has 
been needlessly tarnished by scandal because of his own lack of personal discipline. 
Mysterious though some aspects of his presidency may remain, this chapter has 
endeavored to help clarify an important element of Clinton’s rhetorical presidential 
legacy. Like predecessors Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush, 
Clinton employed a religious rhetorical form as a political shibboleth throughout his 
campaign for the presidency and during his presidency itself. Clinton’s use of rhetorical 
form is perhaps most noteworthy not for what it says about Clinton, but for what it says 
about American socio-political culture. Despite the pluralistic nature of our society and 
democratic principles, the salience of Clinton’s deliverance rhetoric indicates that 
Americans are indeed a people who, believe in our own exceptionalism and are willing to 
overlook the sins of, and even reward, those who remind us of our potential for progress 
and renewal in times of hardship. As such, the deliverance form stands as yet another 
distinct religious rhetorical form that is still quite alive within American socio-political 
culture, and therefore remains a potentially potent shibboleth in the contemporary 
American presidency. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 ENACTING TRANSFORMATION: GEORGE W. BUSH AND THE  
 
PAULINE CONVERSION NARRATIVE* 
 
 
You know, I had a drinking problem. Right now I should be in a bar in Texas, not the 
Oval Office. There is only one reason that I am in the Oval Office and not in a bar. I 
found faith. I found God. I am here because of the power of prayer. 
George W. Bush1 
 
 In the summer of 1985 George W. Bush took one of the most personally 
significant and later widely reported walks of his life at Walker’s Point near 
Kennebunkport, Maine. The thirty-nine-year-old had suffered a string of business failures 
in Texas, was known as the “black sheep” of his auspicious family, and was beset by a 
less-than-flattering reputation as an occasionally irresponsible drinker. In short, Bush 
seemed like anything but presidential material. The eldest son of the Vice President cut a 
far-less-imposing figure than either his powerful father or his walking companion that 
day—the Reverend Billy Graham. Graham had joined the Bush family at their vacation 
home that weekend at the behest of the elder George Bush. Whether the invitation was 
prompted by a desire to have a private family audience with perhaps the world’s greatest 
living evangelist or simply an opportunity to catch up with an old friend; Graham’s 
conversation with the family soon turned into a question and answer session covering a 
host of spiritual topics.  
_____________ 
*Portions reprinted from “Enacting Transformation: George W. Bush and the Pauline Conversion Narrative 
in A Charge to Keep,” by David C. Bailey, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 11, 215-241, Copyright [2008] by 
Michigan State University. 
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Although George W. Bush maintains to this day that he remembers little of what 
Graham said during this encounter, it apparently stirred a spiritual curiosity within him. 
As they talked privately on the beach the next day, Graham reportedly asked Bush, “Are 
you right with God?” to which he responded, “No, but I want to be.”2 While no complete 
record of their encounter remains, Bush would later define it as a spiritual turning point in 
his life. In his 1999 autobiography A Charge to Keep Bush explained that Graham had 
“planted a mustard seed in my soul, a seed that grew over the next year. . . . It was the 
beginning of a new walk where I would recommit my heart to Jesus Christ.”3 
 Although Bush’s encounter with Graham was personally significant, it also 
echoed a previous experience with another religious figure—one far less renowned than 
Graham. In April of 1984, evangelist Arthur Blessitt came to Bush’s hometown of 
Midland, Texas to hold a six-day revival called “Decision ’84.” Since 1969, Blessitt had 
become known as a sincere but somewhat eccentric evangelical figure. One of the 
trademarks of Blessitt’s evangelistic crusades was his habit of carrying a twelve-foot 
wooden cross from meeting to meeting.4 Blessitt’s Midland crusade drew thousands to 
the city’s Chaparral Center, including several prominent businessmen from Midland’s 
struggling oil industry. One of these, Jim Sale, had been instrumental in arranging for 
Blessitt to come to Midland. He was also a personal acquaintance of George W. Bush.  
During the crusade, Bush telephoned Sale to ask if a private meeting between the 
pair and Blessitt could be arranged. Blessitt quickly agreed. Bush, Sale, and Blessitt met 
together on Tuesday, April 3, 1984 at a restaurant in Midland’s Holiday Inn. Bush got to 
the point almost immediately telling Blessitt that “I want to talk to you about how to 
know Jesus Christ and how to follow Him.”5 Bush’s directness impressed Blessitt who 
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recalled that it was unusual for someone interested in spiritual conversion to bring up the 
subject themselves. Bush’s query provoked the following exchange: 
 Blessitt: “What is your relationship with Jesus?” 
 Bush: “I’m not sure.” 
Blessitt: “Let me ask you this question. If you died this moment do you have the 
assurance you would go to heaven?” 
Bush: “No.” 
Blessitt: “Then let me explain to you how you can have that assurance and know 
for sure that you are saved.” 
Bush: “I’d like that.”6 
 
After several minutes of presenting the Christian gospel with copious biblical references 
from the New Testament (mostly from Paul’s epistle to the Romans), Blessitt led Bush in 
what is known in evangelical circles as the “sinner’s prayer” of repentance and salvation.  
 Dear God, I believe in You, and I need You in my life. Have mercy on me a 
 sinner. Lord Jesus, as best as I know how, I want to follow You. Cleanse me  
 from my sins, and come into my life as my Savior and Lord. I believe You 
 lived without sin, died on the cross for my sins, and arose again on the third 
 day and have now ascended unto the Father. I love you, Lord; take control of 
 my life. . . . I accept the Lord Jesus Christ as my Savior and desire to be a true 
 believer in and follower of Jesus. Thank You, God, for hearing my prayer. In  
 Jesus’ name I pray.7 
 
While such prayers are nowhere formally codified as a sacrament of the Christian faith, 
evangelicals see them as tantamount to a life-changing spiritual rebirth which marks the 
beginning of a new existence for the convert. Arthur Blessitt certainly thought this was so 
in Bush’s case. That night he recorded in his journal: “A good and powerful day. Led 
Vice President Bush’s son to Jesus today. George Bush Jr.! This is great! Glory to God.”8 
Unlike his subsequent walk with Graham, Bush’s conversion encounter with 
Arthur Blessitt was far-less-publicized in the ensuing years. Indeed, Graham was 
prominently featured in A Charge to Keep while Blessitt was not mentioned at all. In and 
of itself such an observation may seem insignificant. Yet when examined within a larger 
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rhetorical framework, the omission of the Blessitt narrative, the amplification of 
Graham’s role in Bush’s spiritual life, and the emphasis upon the results of his personal 
transformation all indicate that the telling of Bush’s personal conversion story was 
marked by a series of strategic rhetorical choices to frame it within the parameters of a 
compelling religious rhetorical form—the Pauline conversion narrative.  
 This chapter is neither an exploration of the spiritual life of George W. Bush nor a 
partisan polemic about the sincerity of his Christian faith. Rather, it is concerned with 
how the 2000 Bush campaign simultaneously highlighted certain elements of Bush’s 
conversion narrative while minimizing others such that Bush’s conversion account 
conformed more closely to the Pauline conversion narrative. Naturally, this claim leads 
one to ask: Why would a presidential candidate (and his campaign) seek and desire 
narrative conformity to the conversion account of a first century Jew who eventually 
became one of Christianity’s most influential figures? As this analysis will demonstrate, 
the answer to this question lies with the notion that rhetorical forms—recognizable 
recurring patterns of discourse—are an essential tool for presidential candidates who seek 
what Aristotle called “the available means of persuasion.”9 Such a claim should not be 
interpreted as a positive or negative judgment of the sincerity of Bush’s faith—but 
merely a call to explore the suasory components of his personal conversion story in the 
2000 campaign.  
In the case of George W. Bush, I argue that his adaptation of the Pauline 
conversion narrative to tell his own conversion story provided the Bush campaign with a 
compelling explanation for his admitted indiscretions with alcohol, and even more 
importantly served as narrative evidence of a divine commission upon his life which 
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would (according to his campaign rhetoric) ultimately culminate in his election to the 
presidency. Bush’s use and adaptation of his narrative to the Pauline form is most clearly 
seen in a sermon he preached to the congregation of the Second Baptist Church in 
Houston, Texas in March of 1999 entitled Faith Can Change Lives and was even more 
fully developed in his campaign autobiography A Charge to Keep. Bush’s personal 
salvation narrative derived its suasory value from its recasting in the form of the Pauline 
conversion narrative—a widely-recognized religious rhetorical form used by 
contemporary and historical rhetors to relate life-changing transformations. In this sense, 
the Pauline form is a shibboleth of personal transformation. 
 To conduct this analysis it is necessary to begin by discussing the cultural 
prevalence and features of the Pauline conversion narrative as a common religious 
rhetorical form. Next, I will discuss how the Bush campaign refined the candidate’s 
conversion narrative such that it more closely resembled the Pauline conversion form. 
Carefully exploring this adaptation to the form will show how Bush’s reconstructed 
Pauline-style narrative proved more useful than the narrative of his own actual 
conversion experience in explaining Bush’s former fondness for alcohol and especially in 
publicly commissioning him to assume the presidential office. Finally, the rhetorical and 
political implications of the Bush campaign’s use of this form will be examined.  
Cultural Prevalence and Features of the Pauline Conversion Narrative 
 In his classic work The Varieties of Religious Experience, psychologist and 
philosopher William James writes that conversion is a “process, gradual or sudden,” 
whereby an internally-conflicted self “becomes unified and consciously right superior 
and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities.”10 James’ 
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description of the divided self is a poignant one. One self is described as an id-like figure 
seeking only its own pleasure while its counterpart is of stouter moral fiber. Each self is 
determined to master the other: the lower self desires to run amok while the higher self 
seeks to suppress the baser impulses of its counterpart which (in conversion) it eventually 
does by taking a “firmer hold upon religious realities.” Such descriptions resonate 
throughout human experience from religion to psychology. Indeed, such notions of 
personal conversion are neither new nor exclusive to evangelical Christianity. In their 
respective studies of conversion and conversion narratives Arthur D. Nock and Gerald 
Peters each note that the concept of conversion dates back to the secular philosophical 
schools of ancient Greece wherein students were admonished to abandon the lower orders 
of existence (base passions for political power, self-promotion and the like) in favor of 
higher orders of consciousness (enlightenment and self-discipline via philosophy).11 
In The Republic, Plato himself argued that the ultimate goal of education was a 
“turning around of the soul.”12 While he could not have precisely envisioned such future 
developments, Plato’s notion of soul transformation and his definition of rhetoric as “a 
way of directing the soul by means of speech”13 prefigured the evangelistic endeavors of 
Christian preachers such as the Apostle Paul and Augustine of Hippo. Although rarely 
evangelistic in orientation, ancient religions such as the Egyptian cult of Osiris and many 
of the so called “primitive” tribal religions studied by Emile Durkheim contained 
elements of personal rebirth and renewal via ritualized practices.14 Indeed, as Durkheim 
illustrates, such conversions were as much communal as individual since one could not 
even be considered a full adult member of the society in question without having had 
such an experience.15 
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 Although conversion was an important idea in the ancient, pre-Christian world, its 
most prolific influence occurred after it was recast in the Pauline form by subsequent 
generations of Christian rhetors. As Peter A. Dorsey explains, “Augustine and other early 
Christians found a scriptural model for conversion in the life and writings of St. Paul, 
who regarded the receiving of the Spirit of the risen Lord as a central event in the life of a 
Christian.”16 Because of these rhetors, the Pauline conversion form exists today as a 
commonly recurring pattern of religious discourse which has permeated everything from 
the autobiography and novels of Western literature,17 to American frontier literature and 
mythology,18 to the rhetoric of racial reconciliation in the American south.19 In order to 
appreciate the cultural prevalence of this durable form, one must distinguish the phases of 
the narrative form, the situational factors implicit within the form, and the rhetor’s 
description of the effects of his or her conversion. It is equally important to recall at the 
outset that such conversion narratives are not the actual conversions themselves, but the 
rhetor’s post-hoc account of the event. 
The New Testament book of Acts contains three accounts of the Apostle Paul’s 
conversion to Christianity, all of which share a common narrative structure. Saul of 
Tarsus was a devout Jew and staunch enemy of the first century Christian church. Eager 
to quash what he saw as a dangerous upstart sect of Judaism, Saul went from city to city 
arresting any Christians he could find. On his way to Damascus, the writer of Acts tells 
us, he encountered a bright light and heard the voice of Jesus asking: “Saul, why do you 
persecute me?” (Acts 9:4). All of three accounts agree that he was struck blind and was 
led into Damascus where he eventually regained his sight and ultimately, after several 
years of wandering and meditation,20 took on a new life mission. After this encounter he 
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began to refer to himself as “Paul” (the name he used as a Roman citizen prior to his 
conversion) and became a Christian missionary to the gentiles. Religious studies scholar 
Gerald Peters argues that the name change to “Paul” was significant and represented “not 
only the rebirth of a historical figure but the incarnation of a more permanent, public self. 
. . .”21 Whether his name change was a milestone of newly found faith or simply a useful 
tool for carrying his gospel message across the Roman world of the first century, Paul’s 
dramatic conversion account eventually became “embedded in Christian consciousness”22 
as what Kenneth Burke would call a “representative anecdote” of Christian conversions.23 
As Paul’s story was told and retold it was also reconfigured to meet the rhetorical 
needs of the Christian converts who used it to frame their own conversion stories and 
often those of their audiences. In such rhetorical situations the conversion narrative is 
often referred to as a “testimony” or spiritual autobiography. The most notable change 
from the testimonial form of the Pauline narrative and the actual Pauline account in Acts 
is that the protagonist is no longer a member in good standing of an older, more 
established religious tradition as Paul had been prior to his conversion. As the narrative 
unfolded across the centuries and became the archetypical conversion story, the 
protagonist became a vile sinner whose life was in desperate need of redemption. Along 
with the privileged place it has enjoyed in Christian tradition down through the centuries, 
the Pauline form of a sinful or religiously apathetic (according to James) soul being 
confronted by divine conviction of sin and reforming his or her life accordingly, has 
become a standard form in Christian and secular rhetoric. The imprint of this form is 
evident in the way its transgression, transformation, commissioning narrative unfolds.  
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Although not identical,24 the conversion narratives of Christian luminaries St. 
Augustine of Hippo and Protestant reformer Martin Luther bear the imprint of the Pauline 
form and illustrate the various phases of the narrative. The Pauline conversion narrative 
was certainly a familiar story to Augustine whose spiritual father, Ambrose of Milan, 
encouraged him to study assiduously the life and teachings of the first century apostle. In 
Confessions Augustine writes of the guilt-ridden angst he felt just prior to his conversion 
experience in a Milan garden in 386 C.E.: “You, Lord, put pressure on me in my hidden 
depths with a severe mercy wielding the double whip of fear and shame.”25 Even the most 
cursory reading of Confessions reveals Augustine’s profound sense of both guilt and 
shame over his perceived sins—which he took great pains to describe in detail from his 
earliest childhood on through his adult life—even after his conversion.  
Ernest Bormann describes this first phase as the “protagonist’s awareness of not 
living as the gospel requires”26 while William James similarly defines it as the potential 
convert’s newly-found awareness of “the present incompleteness or wrongness, the ‘sin’ 
which he is eager to escape from.”27 Establishment of this phase is essential to maintain 
fidelity to the Pauline account of open hostility toward God. The speaker says, in effect, 
that he or she was utterly lost in sin and rebellion—an object of pity and wretched 
depravity. Such features are obvious in the account of seventeenth century Puritan 
minister Thomas Shepard who painstakingly described his fondness for “lewd 
company…lust & pride & gaming & bowling & drinking” prior to his salvation 
experience.28 Such Augustinian-style confession was apparently required to illustrate the 
degree and depth of the transformation which had occurred.  
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Recent evidence suggests that contemporary political figures who use the Pauline 
form tend to mollify the transgression phase. For instance David McLennan writes that 
the conversion narrative of former Nixon aid and Watergate conspirator Charles Colson 
softened the description of his transgressions a bit by using the language of apologia. 
McLennan finds that Colson’s “disease” metaphor to describe his sins enabled him, to 
some degree, to avoid “accepting personal responsibility for the problems of the Nixon 
administration . . . .”29 While Colson did publicly confess his wrongdoings in his 1976 
autobiography Born Again, McLennan’s finding is important to keep in mind since it 
suggests that the transgression phases of contemporary political Pauline conversion 
accounts often seek to deflect at least some guilt away from the protagonist. Once the 
rhetor has established his or her sinfulness, the narrative reflects God’s transformative 
revelation to the rhetor via the transformation phase. 
As is true of other narratives styled after the Pauline form, Augustine’s deep guilt 
and shame in the transgression phase contrasts starkly against the glorious exultation of 
his transformation: 
Suddenly it had become sweet to me to be without the sweets of folly. What 
I once feared to lose was now a delight to dismiss. You turned them out and 
entered their place, pleasanter than any pleasure but not to flesh and blood,  
brighter than all light yet more inward than any secret recess . . . Already my 
mind was free of ‘the biting cares’ of place-seeking, of desire for gain, of 
wallowing in self-indulgence, of scratching the itch of lust. And I was now  
talking with you, Lord my God, my radiance, my wealth, and my salvation.30 
 
The transformation phase is the heart of the Pauline conversion narrative. In the 
transformation phase, the rhetor revels in his or her changed condition. Bormann explains 
the typical content of this phase of the narrative: “A man’s life divided in twain: the first 
part was rife with worldliness and sin: the second showed forth the beauty of a changed 
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life.”31 William James—whose The Varieties of Religious Experience was informed by 
the two hundred personal conversion narratives he collected for the project—describes 
the transformation and its ultimate results as: 
 an altogether new level of spiritual vitality, a relatively heroic level, in which 
 impossible things have become possible, and new energies and endurances are 
 shown. The personality is changed, the man is born anew, whether or not his  
 psychological idiosyncrasies are what give the particular shape to his meta- 
 -morphosis. ‘Sanctification’ is the technical name of this result. . . .32 
 
This second phase of the Pauline form flows quite naturally into the third—the 
transformed convert now speaks of what they perceive as a commission to serve by doing 
God’s work. As if to mark the profound change, the protagonist describes the significant 
changes which occurred in his or her life after conversion. For Augustine and Luther the 
commissioning phase involved leaving their chosen professions as a professor of rhetoric 
and an aspiring lawyer respectively. For Paul, one component of this change involved 
seeing non-Jews as the focus of his missionary efforts on behalf of his new found faith. 
The third account in Acts records that Jesus commissioned Paul, “to open their [Gentile] 
eyes and turn them from darkness to light” (Acts 26:18). At its core, the commissioning 
phase involves the protagonist’s description of purpose and renewed mission that he or 
she has accepted as a result of the conversion experience.  
In some variations, this phase of the narrative either shifts the focus of the 
narrative in such a way as to encourage the hearers to proselytize others33 or lists the 
personal and spiritual benefits received post-conversion.34 While these variations are 
worthy of study, they appear somewhat peripheral to the central idea of this phase in the 
original Pauline story—Paul’s conversion experience was cited as evidence of a divine 
commission which had been placed upon his life. Religious studies scholar Charles W. 
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Hedrick has argued that two of the three Pauline conversion accounts in the book of Acts 
(Acts 22: 4-21 & 26:12-18) can be properly identified as “call/commissioning narratives” 
because of their emphasis upon how Paul’s conversion was a divine appointment for his 
future evangelical endeavors.35 As such, the convert’s new commission completes the 
process of conversion and enables him or her to stand before an audience (often of fellow 
believers) as a transformed individual on a divine mission. 
While perhaps less poetic, Martin Luther’s account of conversion is strikingly 
similar to the Pauline and Augustinian versions. Luther is said to have converted in 1505 
C.E. after being caught in a fearsome thunderstorm on his way to Erfurt. In fear and 
despair he cried out to St. Anna, “I will become a monk.”36 Perhaps because this 
conversion was one to monastic asceticism rather than what Luther would later perceive 
as ‘true religion,’ or because of his miserable sojourn in monastic life during the 
subsequent years, Luther’s account does not report the same liberation and exultation 
immediately upon his conversion as did Augustine. Nevertheless, Luther writes of his 
famous “tower experience” which occurred years later (circa 1519) while studying the 
book of Romans as a preacher and professor of theology at the University of Wittenberg. 
Luther’s struggle with the Pauline text convinced him that salvation was ultimately the 
product of divine grace rather than human effort—that one simply had to accept God’s 
provision for salvation. For Luther, this realization was an experience wherein the 
message of the Christian gospel crystallized into a meaningful, life-changing encounter: 
“I felt myself straightway born afresh and to have entered through open gates into 
paradise itself.”37 Like Augustine before him, Luther believed that his new found 
revelation had empowered and commissioned him with a sense of higher purpose. 
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Perhaps it is not coincidental that Luther began his program of systematically 
deconstructing Catholic hierarchy and theology after this experience.  
Aside from the transgression, transformation, and commissioning phases that are 
typical of the narrative, the Pauline, Augustinian, and Lutherian accounts all illustrate the 
presence of several situational factors typically described by the rhetor as he or she 
recounts the conversion experience. First, such conversions often stem from a deep 
existential crisis of the soul. Paul (according to Luke’s account in Acts) was confronted 
by Christ himself with the sinfulness of what he later described in Galatians as his 
“persecution” of the Christian church—a realization which caused him to proclaim 
himself “the worst of sinners.”38 Augustine was confronted by the futility of pursuing 
human pleasures and worldly success—objectives toward which his entire life to that 
point had been oriented. Luther’s existential crisis (according to his account of the “tower 
experience”) came from his recognition of the futility of achieving salvation by human 
means—it was God who saved rather than man.39 Although fear and shame (what 
Augustine called God’s “severe mercy”) usually accompany conversion experiences, 
conversions (religious or secular) always come at a moment of crisis which forces the 
protagonist to make an important choice. The subject is brought to a moment of personal 
spiritual decision wherein fear of judgment, shame over past sins, or some similar 
psychological motivation emanating from what James calls the “divided self” crystallizes 
the need for a profound change.  
Bormann’s analysis of the sermons before and after the Great Awakening in 
North America demonstrates that expressions of fear, shame and personal crisis were 
practically ubiquitous in conversion accounts from groups as theologically diverse as the 
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Calvinistic Puritans to the more evangelically-minded Baptist and Methodist 
congregations.40 For instance, seventeenth century minister Thomas Shepard recalled his 
moment of crisis after finding himself lying in a cornfield hungover from the previous 
evening’s carousing. Shepard reported that God “troubled my soul for this and other my 
sins, which then I had cause and leisure to think of. Now when I was worst, He began to 
be best unto me, and made me resolve to set upon a course of daily meditation about the 
evil of my sin . . . .”41 It appears that, in its traditional form, a crisis was required to 
initiate the conversion experience and add dramatic richness to the narrative.  
A second important situational factor associated with the telling of the Pauline 
conversion narrative is the suddenness of the experience. Patricia Caldwell relates the 
account of Puritan woman Elizabeth White who, although ostensibly religious, reported 
having a genuine conversion encounter while attending a sermon in 1657 wherein the 
Lord “broke my false confidence, and swept away my refuge of lies.”42 White’s account 
is reflective of the sudden conviction which converts often describe in the initial 
transgression phase of the narrative. The theme of suddenness is also displayed in the 
conversion narrative of Charles Colson who vividly recounted the initial stirrings of the 
conversion impulse in his own life as a friend read a passage from C.S. Lewis’s Mere 
Christianity. Colson reported the moment in his 1976 autobiography tellingly entitled 
Born Again: “I could feel a flush coming into my face. . . . Suddenly I felt naked and 
unclean, my bravado and defenses gone. I was exposed, unprotected, for Lewis’s words 
were describing me. . . .”43 However, it is important to realize that religious or secular 
conversions—as lived by the convert—are not always marked by the suddenness 
suggested in narratives such as White’s and Colson’s.44 When retold; however, they often 
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morph into a Pauline form wherein the convert, like Paul, describes the moment of 
conversion as “seeing the light” or a type of “Damascus road experience.” What may be 
lived in slow motion—complete with moments of rejection of the divine call and willful 
procrastination—is narrativized with emphasis upon suddenness.  
A third situational factor often present in conversion accounts of the Pauline type 
is the recollection of the specific time and place at which the transformation occurred. 
The initial Pauline accounts in Acts specifically situate his conversion narrative on the 
Damascus road. A lowly cornfield is the site of Thomas Shepard’s conversion while 
Charles Colson’s initial conversion experience took place in his car and was dramatically 
reinforced later in his prison cell. While one could make the case that such humble scenes 
may reinforce the notion that the protagonist has “hit rock bottom,” it seems more 
plausible to suggest that the specificity with reference to time and place serves to lend 
credibility to the story.  
The phases (transgression, transformation, commissioning) and the situational 
factors (existential crisis, suddenness, specific time and place) of the Pauline conversion 
narrative coalesce into a compelling story of personal transformation at the deepest level. 
Such stories serve an important communal function in a Durkheimian sense because 
persons who tell such stories are typically seen as fellow believers and are accepted into 
the community of faith. As rhetorical scholar Brian R. McGee notes, “The convert is 
immediately received by fellow Christians as a new person now separated from her or his 
past transgressions.”45 Thus, a convert who tells his or her story literally enacts his or her 
spiritual transformation before the audience. In modern American religious life where 
forty-six percent of the population claims to have been “born again,”46 the Pauline 
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conversion form is perhaps the most unmistakable religious shibboleth in existence. As 
such, we must determine whether this form can perform a similar function in modern 
American politics.  
        While the communication literature includes many studies of religious language 
in political discourse, far fewer studies focus upon conversion narratives in such 
discourse. Peter M. Kellett demonstrates that various approaches to communication 
theory may be a useful way of studying the interpersonal components of conversion 
phenomena.47 Yet, Kellett provides no extended examples to clarify the critical utility of 
these theoretical models. Sociologist Richard Harvey Brown explains that “logics of 
discovery” as related in classic works of science from luminaries such as Descartes, 
Copernicus, and Rheticus are related in the form of conversion narratives.48 Based upon 
the frequency with which such narratives occur in science, Brown proposes that 
conversion narratives be considered “as a literary/scientific genre.”49 
 While they do not specify the conversion form used as Pauline, Charles Griffin 
and David B. McLennan both study the conversion form used by Charles Colson in Born 
Again—suggesting that such a form does play a prominent role in contemporary political 
rhetoric. Brian R. McGee’s study of Louisiana politician and former Ku Klux Klansmen 
David Duke’s 1991 gubernatorial campaign rhetoric also reveals that the conversion form 
can (and does) influence political messages. Griffin finds that the conversion form 
“contributes directly” to Colson’s Born Again’s “function as discourse.”50 Specifically, 
Griffin’s study reveals how rhetors using conversion narratives “can use the agency of 
narrative form to construct coherent and plausible myths of self around the self-insights 
they have obtained through conversion.”51 Although Griffin offers a plausible explanation 
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of the suasory value that the conversion narrative added to Colson’s message, he does 
little to explain why or how the conversion form adds to the appeal of Colson’s account. 
McLennan’s account is much firmer in this regard, pointing out that conversion was a 
standard (and often compelling) rhetorical motif in post-Watergate and post-Vietnam 
America. However, even McLennan’s study would have benefited from a more direct 
application to presidential rhetoric if it was to help us understand the full influence of the 
form in American political rhetoric. In this sense, this exploration of George W. Bush’s 
conversion narrative as in the 2000 presidential campaign seeks to extend upon the 
findings of Griffin and McLennan by both further specifying the suasory nature of 
Pauline conversion narratives as typically used in situations where a political rhetor seeks 
to convey a sense of personal transformation. The present chapter also reveals the form’s 
rhetorical utility in the context of presidential campaign discourse.  
 Likewise, McGee’s study of David Duke’s use of conversion form presents useful 
findings which call for further exploration. While McGee convincingly demonstrates that 
Duke used the conversion form to considerably shore up his damaged ethos, one wonders 
how McGee’s finding might be confirmed or challenged by exploration of a politician 
whose ethos did not require such radical reconstruction. Thus, each of these useful 
studies suggest that religious rhetorical form certainly influences the content of a 
message. Yet, additional clarification of the specific type of form is required along with 
further analysis of how and why such religious rhetorical forms may contribute to the 
persuasiveness of a presidential candidate’s message.  
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Conforming Bush’s Conversion Narrative to the Pauline Form 
 If Mario Cuomo was correct that political candidates campaign in poetry but 
govern in prose, then the 2000 presidential candidacy of George W. Bush suggests that 
presidential candidates try to synchronize their poetic campaign narratives with those 
alive in the public consciousness even if they do not match exactly. From the start of his 
presidential run, Bush wanted the public to know that he intended his presidency to be 
defined by a “higher purpose.” Bush laid the rhetorical groundwork of this “higher 
purpose” in two noteworthy texts—his sermon to the Second Baptist Church in Houston, 
Texas on March 6, 1999 and his campaign autobiography entitled A Charge to Keep—the 
lion’s share of which was ghostwritten by his long-time confidant, speechwriter, and 
communications director Karen Hughes. Although Bush did not officially announce his 
candidacy until June of that year, Bush and his team had been considering the possibility 
at least since his reelection as Texas Governor in 1998.  
Bush biographer Stephen Mansfield relates the now famous story of Bush’s 
reaction to the Texas gubernatorial inaugural sermon of Pastor Mark Craig. Craig’s 
sermon related the biblical story of Moses’ call from God to lead Israel out of Egypt; 
however, the application of the text was as political as spiritual with Craig proclaiming 
that modern America (presumably because of Clinton’s Lewinsky scandal) was “starved 
for leaders who have ethical and moral courage.”52 Mansfield writes that Bush began to 
believe that Pastor Craig’s message had been meant for him: “He felt a ‘call,’ a sense that 
God was directing him to run for president.”53 This interpretation was seemingly 
confirmed by Bush’s mother—Barbara Pierce Bush—who after the service announced to 
her oldest son with her characteristic bluntness that Reverend Craig “was talking to 
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you.”54 Not long after his second gubernatorial inauguration Bush began meeting with 
evangelical Christian pastors and leaders confessing to them that “I feel like God wants 
me to run for president.”55 
 Whether the impetus for Bush’s presidential aspirations were personal or divine, 
his widely-reported “misadventures” and fondness for alcohol up until his fortieth 
birthday presented a problem. He had even admitted publicly that this behavior had a 
negative impact upon his marriage and family. How could Bush claim that he sought the 
White House because of a divine calling to restore integrity to the office when certain 
elements of his past suggested that he himself may have had lapses in his own integrity? 
An answer to this rhetorical and political problem was to be found in the Pauline 
conversion narrative—a rhetorical staple of Christianity and a form designed specifically 
to highlight the personal and spiritual transformation of one who had encountered God.  
 As he positioned himself to run for president, Bush began meeting with 
evangelical leaders such as Dr. Richard Land of the Southern Baptist Convention, Bishop 
T.D. Jakes pastor of The Potter’s House in Dallas, Texas, Dr. Tony Evans pastor of Oak 
Cliff Bible Fellowship Church in Dallas, and evangelist and Christian talk show host 
James Robison who, in many ways, proved to be Bush’s most important entree into these 
religious circles. Although Bush struck Robison as a “party boy” when the two first met 
during George H.W. Bush’s reelection campaign in 1992, the two had forged a friendship 
as a result of a meeting they had in Austin in1998.56 At this meeting Bush was 
surprisingly candid with the evangelist: “I had a drinking problem. I won’t say I was an 
alcoholic, but it affected my relationships, even with my kids. It could have destroyed 
me. But I’ve given my life to Christ.”57 While expressing his personal reluctance to run 
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for president, Bush told Robison that “I feed God wants me to do this, and I must do it.”58 
At the close of this meeting Robison pledged to introduce Bush to other high profile 
Christian leaders and even arranged a series of prayer meetings for him in the governor’s 
mansion in Austin.59 Having used allusions to his conversion story to gain access to the 
highest circles of evangelical Protestant leaders, George W. Bush would soon go public 
with the shibboleth. 
 Though he attended church as a boy with his family at Midland’s First 
Presbyterian Church and later at St. Martin’s Episcopal Church in Houston (where he 
served as an altar boy for a time), Bush could never point to a single “transforming 
moment” of “instantaneous spiritual awakening” prior to the ones which occurred in his 
late thirties.60 Bush later said that faith always seemed to be there in the sense of 
“stirrings of a faith that would be years in the shaping.”61 Even in his late thirties when 
these “stirrings” apparently began to mature into a higher spiritual sensibility, Bush’s 
spiritual growth appears to have come in fits and starts. As biographer Paul Kengor 
explains Bush’s actual conversion “was no Saul-like conversion . . .” at all.62 In 1984 
Bush prayed the “sinner’s prayer” with evangelist Arthur Blessitt. A year later he took 
the famous walk on the beach with Billy Graham. A year after that Bush made the 
decision to give up drinking. Thus, while the years 1984-1986 were certainly pivotal in 
his spiritual life, his actual personal experience could scarcely be said to have conformed 
to the Pauline form. Yet, one gets the impression from Bush’s sermon to Houston’s 
Second Baptist Church and from his campaign biography A Charge to Keep that his 
conversion was much more sudden and his transformation less gradual than it had 
actually been—important facets of the Pauline conversion narrative.  
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 On March 6, 1999, George W. Bush delivered a sermon entitled “Faith Can 
Change Lives” before the congregation of the Second Baptist Church in Houston, Texas. 
While it is hardly unusual for sitting governors or other elected officials to speak at 
religious gatherings, Bush seemed to be casting a vision that went well beyond the 
borders of Texas. Much of the speech was devoted to expounding Bush’s philosophy of 
“compassionate conservatism,” Bush began the sermon (as he had in his conversation 
with James Robison in 1998) with an extremely personal statement: 
 You and I are here because we believe that faith changes lives. . . . I know  
 firsthand because faith changed mine. I grew up in the church, but I didn’t 
 always walk the walk. There came a point in my life when I felt empty. And 
 so, by chance, or maybe it wasn’t chance, I got to spend a weekend with the 
 great Billy Graham, and as a result of our conversations and his inspiration, I 
 searched my heart and recommitted my life to Jesus Christ. My relationship  
with God through Christ has given me meaning and direction.63 
 
Within this short paragraph, one finds each phase of the Pauline conversion narrative 
(transgression, transformation, commissioning) and each of the situational factors 
typically described within such narratives (existential crisis, suddenness, specific time 
and place).  
 As is typical in the Pauline conversion narrative, the protagonist begins with an 
acknowledgement of his or her transgressions prior to conversion. Although Bush did not 
list his prior sins, he acknowledged that he “didn’t always walk the walk.” This was an 
important and necessary admission to make since there had already been much 
speculation in mainstream media outlets about Bush’s alleged unseemly behavior in 
earlier years. These rumors included one fictional story about nude table dancing at a 
country club party and a few true accounts about minor road sign stealing peccadilloes 
while a student at Yale.64 Although evidence of Bush’s 1976 citation from driving under 
  
    250
the influence of alcohol would not come to light for another year and a half, news stories 
speculated about potential alcoholism and marijuana and cocaine use during his years at 
Yale and into his thirties.65 While no credible evidence to support such charges had 
emerged by March of 1999, it was clear to the Bush campaign that a preemptive response 
was needed to solidify Bush’s image before news of his 1976 DUI or any other damaging 
information could come out. The Pauline conversion narrative would enable Bush to 
claim that any transgressions from his life before conversion could simply be relegated to 
the time that he was not yet “walking the walk.”  
 As Christians often say “sin has consequences,” and one of the consequences of 
not “walking the walk” was that Bush “felt empty.” This allusion to the existential crisis 
of the soul which is a staple of conversion narratives seems quite benign when considered 
against the existential crisis of a figure such as Augustine. Yet, the statement conformed 
to the Pauline form and demonstrated to his evangelical audience that Bush had been 
brought to the point of spiritual crisis necessary for the transformation to occur.  
 Bush next related the transformation component of the Pauline conversion 
narrative. As the core of the Pauline form, the transformation phase relates the moment 
when the transformation occurred. In Bush’s case, the transformation occurred at a 
specific place and time and with a specific person taking on the role of Bush’s spiritual 
mentor—no less than “the great Billy Graham.” As William James notes, these details 
infuse the narrative with credibility.66 Bush’s reference to his conversion having taken 
place over the course of a weekend with Graham also conveys a sense of suddenness 
about the experience because of how this particular weekend with this particular figure 
had such a profound influence upon his life.  
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Bush added further legitimacy to his conversion by citing Graham as his spiritual 
mentor in both this sermon and in A Charge to Keep. While Bush’s description of 
Graham’s role in his conversion will be explored in more detail in a few pages, for now it 
is important to note that although Arthur Blessitt prayed with Bush a year before his 
encounter with Graham, it is Graham who is identified as having been responsible for his 
conversion. Bush’s personal testimony on this Sunday morning also included the 
commissioning phase of the Pauline conversion narrative—his assertion that faith 
provided his life with “meaning and direction.” While Bush dealt with commissioning 
more peripherally than he would later in A Charge to Keep, it is obvious that he wanted 
the audience of Christian brothers and sisters to whom he was speaking to become 
convinced that he was one of them. Thus, Bush’s use of the Pauline conversion narrative 
was designed to produce what Kenneth Burke would call a sense of “identification and 
consubstantiality” via the use of rhetorical form.67 Moreover, one notices that Bush’s 
actual experience of religious conversion has been narrativized—certain aspects of his 
experience amplified while others have been omitted or altered—so that it would better 
fit the parameters of the Pauline form. While this assertion may be obvious from this 
analysis of Bush’s sermon to Houston’s Second Baptist Church, Bush’s narrativization or 
transformation of his narrative into the Pauline form will become even more obvious 
through an analysis of his 1999 campaign autobiography A Charge to Keep.  
The release of a campaign autobiography is hardly an unprecedented move in 
American politics. In fact nearly every major presidential candidate from both parties had 
published a new book at the outset of the 2000 campaign. Yet, Bush’s autobiography had 
a distinctively religious tone and substance due to its reliance upon the Pauline 
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conversion rhetorical form. The book’s title itself A Charge to Keep was taken from 
evangelist Charles Wesley’s 1762 hymn “A Charge to Keep I Have.” A favorite in 
Methodist congregations, Bush had professed during his first term as Governor of Texas 
that he too admired the hymn and was “particularly impressed” with its second verse: “To 
serve the present age, my calling to fulfill; O may it all my powers engage to do my 
Master’s will.”68 He was so impressed by the message that he had a painting of the same 
title by Texas artist W.H.D. Koerner hung prominently in his Austin office and later in 
the Oval Office. The painting features a road-weary horseman riding up a steep rocky 
trail. It became a richly-symbolic talisman for the Bush administration during his 
governorship and presidency. Shortly after the painting was first loaned to him in 1995, 
Bush sent a memorandum to his staff inviting them to look at the painting and ponder its 
significance in light of the public trust that comes with high office. At the end of the 
memorandum Bush added that: “This is us. What adds complete life to the painting for 
me is the message of Charles Wesley that we serve One greater than ourselves.”69 In and 
of itself, the message of proving faithful to a public trust may not even seem patently 
religious, yet when examined alongside of Bush’s conversion story as told in A Charge to 
Keep, it is clear that such messages represent the commissioning phase of the Pauline 
conversion narrative. Indeed, the central idea of A Charge to Keep was that George W. 
Bush viewed public office as a charge or calling—one which he stood ready to undertake.  
 Bush’s A Charge to Keep was reflective of the Pauline conversion form in its 
employment of the phases of the narrative (transgression, transformation, 
commissioning), the situational factors which often accompany it (existential crisis, 
suddenness, specific time and place), and the transformative results of the experience. 
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When A Charge to Keep was released in November of 1999 the 2000 presidential 
campaign was already well underway and Bush was considered by most to be the 
Republican frontrunner despite the fact that the primary season would not get underway 
until January. In light of this, we may consider the autobiography to be the clearest 
expression of Bush’s religious message in the 2000 presidential campaign.  
 Considering A Charge to Keep as a political text inspired by a religious rhetorical 
form, one sees that Bush’s use of the Pauline conversion form was modified to befit his 
status as Republican frontrunner—a change since his March 1999 sermon in Houston. As 
such, Bush’s Pauline conversion narrative as used in A Charge to Keep focused primarily 
upon the transformation and commissioning phases rather than the transgression phase. 
Far from seeing confession of his pre-conversion sins as a part of God’s “severe mercy” 
in the Augustinian fashion, Bush discussed his transgressions in a rather evasive, 
Clintonesque manner. Bush began his story by acknowledging that he “drank too much 
and woke up with a hangover” during a fortieth birthday celebration weekend with 
friends in Colorado Springs.70 By choosing to engage the subject of his drinking 
synechdochally through the lens of one incident—in effect making it the representative 
anecdote of his entire experience with alcohol—Bush enabled himself to engage all of his 
experiences with drinking by engaging just one. It was while jogging with this apparently 
nasty hangover that Bush decided to give up drinking.  
Framing his decision to stop drinking in this way had the effect of minimizing any 
moral accountability that stemmed from his failures in this area. Here Bush briefly 
digressed to make the point that his friends “laugh about the image of me as a party 
animal, an image they think is vastly overblown.”71 After deftly dodging much of the 
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responsibility for any past sins by minimizing them and discussing only one incident, 
Bush was ultimately forced to confront them—though be it in a rather oblique fashion. 
He admitted (as he had in previous interviews) that “when I was young and irresponsible, 
I sometimes behaved young and irresponsibly” and that during his years as a young oil 
executive in Midland “There were a few big parties.”72 He hastened to add that “I 
engaged in some of the excesses of youth of my time, things I wouldn’t have wanted my 
mother to know then but that she would probably laugh about now that I’ve survived 
them.”73 
 Bush spent the next several paragraphs justifying his aversion to publicly 
confessing specifics misdeeds from his past: 
 Many reporters who ask me about this do not approve of my reluctance to 
 itemize misbehavior. They worship at the altar of public confession, demanding 
 that candidates tell all. They want to conduct a public strip search . . . . I think  
 they forget that children are watching, including my own. I believe parents who 
 choose to recount their misadventures run a great risk that their children will 
 imitate them. . . . I don’t want my own daughters or any other young people to 
 imitate anything foolish I once did or use me as an excuse for misbehavior. I  
 believe leaders have a responsibility to send a clear message to our children. . . . 
 Make smart and healthy choices.74 
 
If one stopped reading A Charge to Keep at this point, one would be left with the 
impression that Bush simply sought to be an accomplished politician and skillfully 
conceal his indiscretions and that no actual conversion had taken place.  
Aside from being premature, this type of dismissal of the Pauline conversion form 
would ignore three important facets of religious rhetorical form. First, as in his sermon to 
Second Baptist in Houston, Bush’s rhetorical aim was to convey a sense of religious 
transformation—which is, after all, the ultimate goal of the Pauline conversion narrative. 
As McLennan suggests in his analysis of the conversion narrative of Charles Colson in 
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Born Again, the presence of apologia strategy in some elements of conversion rhetoric 
does not abrogate the fact that the conversion form was still used.75 This adaptation by 
Colson and Bush suggests that contemporary transgression phases are considerably 
lighter than their historical counterparts. Second, while the transgression phase is 
truncated in Bush’s case, he told his story in conformity to every other facet of the 
Pauline conversion form. Finally, a rhetor’s adaptation of a rhetorical form should not be 
interpreted as an abandonment of it. In their examination of Bill Clinton’s use of 
confessional rhetoric in a series of three speeches responding to the Monica Lewinsky 
scandal, Ronald Lee and Matthew H. Barton found that Clinton’s first two forays into the 
confession genre were, at best, incomplete. Nevertheless Clinton’s rhetoric continued to 
be influenced by the form and he finally met the requirements of rhetoric of contrition in 
the third address: 
 Each successive speech embraced more fully the generic demands of  
religious confession. The president moved from characterizing his  
transgressions as mistakes to calling them sins; he moved from angrily  
blaming others for his troubles to asking forgiveness for his pride; and  
he moved from the liberal language of rights to the moral language of  
virtue.76 
 
Thus, we must recognize that Bush’s adaptation of the Pauline form to reflect his own 
squeamishness about naming the specific sins for which he was sorry hardly represents a 
lack of influence on the part of the Pauline conversion narrative. 
 Transformation is both the rhetorical heart and the ultimate goal of the Pauline 
conversion narrative. While Bush tiptoed around his transgressions in A Charge to Keep, 
he plunged headlong into the rhetoric of transformation. After discussing the benefits 
yielded by his decision to quit drinking Bush explained that “the seeds of my decision 
had been planted the year before, by the Reverend Billy Graham.”77 In order to fully 
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appreciate Bush’s narrative of this encounter, it is necessary to quote his recollection at 
some length: 
 He [Graham] visited my family for a summer weekend in Maine. I saw him 
 preach at the small summer church, St. Ann’s by the Sea. . . . One evening 
 my dad asked Billy to answer questions from a big group of family gathered 
 for the weekend. He sat by the fire and talked. And what he said sparked a  
 change in my heart. I don’t remember the exact words. It was more the  
 power of his example. The Lord was so clearly reflected in his gentle and  
 loving demeanor. The next day we walked and talked at Walker’s Point, and 
 I knew I was in the presence of a great man. He was like a magnet; I felt  
drawn to seek something different. He didn’t lecture or admonish; he shared 
warmth and concern. Billy Graham didn’t make you feel guilty; he made you  
feel loved. Over the course of that weekend, Reverend Graham planted a  
mustard seed in my soul, a seed that grew over the next year. He led me to the 
path and I began walking.78 
 
This account contains two important rhetorical acts which are crucial to the use of 
the Pauline conversion narrative in Bush’s campaign discourse. First, we see evidence of 
all three of the important situational factors (existential crisis, suddenness, specific time 
and place) found within Pauline conversion narratives. Though mildly muted by his 
aversion to discussing specific transgressions, Bush’s description still provides evidence 
of existential crisis—not in dramatic Pauline or Augustinian terms, but in the more 
urbane language of a twentieth century seeker. Graham made Bush feel loved by God—
an experience which—as previously noted—can be a powerful and life changing 
experience in itself. Thus, Bush’s existential crisis was motivated more by love rather 
than simple fear and shame as illustrated by the conversions of Luther and sixteenth 
century English reformer Thomas Bilney whose existential crises were motivated 
(according to their accounts) by realizations of God’s love.79 As a result of this revelation 
Bush reports that a change was “sparked” within his heart. In this passage Bush’s 
transformation was narrated as a sudden awakening which happened during the weekend 
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with Graham, thus establishing fidelity to the suddenness and time and place situational 
factors of the Pauline conversion narrative.  
In his campaign biography Bush amplified Billy Graham’s role in his conversion. 
Indeed, Bush speaks of Graham with the sort of reverence and respect due from a student 
to his spiritual father. Bush’s “mustard seed” metaphor bespeaks of Jesus’ well known 
parable of the mustard seed.80 In this parable Jesus explained to his followers that 
although miniscule in size, the mustard seed can eventually produce trees of great size. In 
A Charge to Keep, Graham was portrayed as a servant of God who faithfully planted the 
seed of faith in Bush’s life—a seed which (according to the narrative) eventually grew to 
greater maturity. The striking thing about this description of Graham is not that Bush 
gave much credit to Graham for his conversion; it is that he gave Graham all the credit by 
failing to mention his encounter with evangelist Arthur Blessitt the year before. Bush’s 
omission of Blessitt is quite curious. It seems highly unlikely that Bush would have 
simply forgotten Blessitt. Indeed, as Blessitt reports on his personal website, he and then 
candidate Bush exchanged warm pleasantries and remembrances of their 1984 visit 
together at a fundraiser in June of 1999—just months before the release of A Charge to 
Keep.81 While his encounter with Blessitt may have been just one event in a series of 
events which led to Bush’s ultimate conversion (as is often the case in actual 
conversions), it still seems odd that Bush would have omitted it given his willingness to 
discuss other steps in his spiritual growth such as being an altar boy, teaching Sunday 
school, attending community Bible study after his conversion and the like.82 As such, the 
most plausible explanation for the omission is that it was intentional. 
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 Why would Bush choose to omit his encounter with Blessitt from a book which so 
specifically refers to his spiritual development and subsequent conversion? The omission 
appears to have been motivated by two factors. First, in the Pauline account, the convert 
typically has only one moment of spiritual awakening. While in actual practice a new 
convert may have had several moments of important spiritual realization, the Pauline-
style story is (almost without exception) told as one defining moment of spiritual 
transformation at one place and time. The inclusion of the Blessitt account would have 
simply been too great a deviation from the Pauline pattern and would therefore have 
made the rest of Bush’s conversion story less believable. Additionally, Bush (or his 
ghostwriter Karen Hughes)83 may have feared that telling the whole story might have 
reflected poorly on Bush’s devotion to his newfound faith in light of his personal 
behavior. Although Bush fully admits to drinking for almost a full year after his 1985 
conversion with Graham, the evidence of profound personal change brought about by 
such a conversion would have carried far less persuasive power had Bush admitted to 
having had two conversion experiences and continuing to drink for two years after the 
first.  
A second reason Bush likely chose to omit the Blessitt account is that Billy 
Graham—who has been widely recognized as one of the world’s most respected religious 
figures and has consistently appeared on top ten lists of the most admired people in 
America84—simply exudes more credibility than Arthur Blessitt. Although widely 
regarded as a sincere Christian evangelist, Blessitt’s celebrity lacks the almost universal 
appeal of Graham’s. While serving as a street evangelist off the Sunset Strip in the 1970s, 
Blessitt’s style of presenting the gospel to the “down and out” drew both critics and 
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admirers. Besides his penchant for carrying a twelve-foot wooden cross through the 
streets of Los Angeles, Blessitt also operated a Christian nightclub called “His Place” and 
would occasional attempt to relate to his audiences by peppering his sermons with 
allusions from the drug culture. He once told an audience that Jesus was an “eternal trip” 
and explained that if a person wants to be truly happy: "Man, you don't have to drop 
downers; all you have to do is drop a little Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John."85 Given the 
choice of claiming Billy Graham or Arthur Blessitt as a spiritual mentor, it is small 
wonder that Bush chose to amplify Graham’s role in his conversion account. Although 
noteworthy in itself, this selectivity militates toward the larger conclusion that Bush’s 
conversion narrative was the refined according to a series of strategic rhetorical choices. 
In A Charge to Keep Bush continued his discussion of the transformation  
wrought by his conversion. Bush defined the weekend with Graham as an event of central 
importance in his spiritual life: “But that weekend my faith took on new meaning. It was 
the beginning of a new walk where I would recommit my heart to Jesus Christ.”86 Thus, 
Bush narrativized the encounter as the true beginning of his spiritual life. While the 
development of his faith had its twists and turns, the Pauline conversion narrative 
provided Bush a way to smooth the contours of his own narrative resulting in one more 
rhetorically palatable and compelling to the general public. However, a conversion is 
only as good as the changes it brings in the life of the new convert. Accordingly, we must 
now examine how Bush employed the commissioning phase of the Pauline conversion 
narrative in A Charge to Keep.  
 Like the transformation phase, the commissioning phase—wherein the rhetor 
details the benefits of conversion and discusses his or her new sense of purpose—was 
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crucial to Bush’s conversion narrative as related in A Charge to Keep. Bush explained 
that he was “humbled to learn that God sent His Son to die for a sinner like me” and 
remarked that because of the experience he “could understand the life-changing powers 
of faith.”87 The most obvious change in Bush’s life was his abandonment of alcohol. 
Although this decision came nearly a year after his Walker’s Point conversion with Billy 
Graham, Bush conflated the two as if they had occurred simultaneously. Although 
deliverance from the desire to drink was clearly a benefit derived from his conversion, 
the third step of Bush’s conversion experience (like its Pauline archetype) reflected a 
special commissioning—God had appointed Bush to fulfill a special purpose.  
Of course, no political candidate could specifically say in a major speech, 
interview, or autobiography that they believed God had appointed them to become 
president. Yet, when one reads Bush’s accounts of the effects of his conversion in A 
Charge to Keep, they read as qualifications on a resume. Bush asserted that although 
politics could be a “fickle business” his faith enabled him to soar above it: 
 Yet I build my life on a foundation that will not shift. My faith frees me.  
Frees me to put the problem of the moment in proper perspective. Frees me  
to make decisions that others might not like. Frees me to do the right thing  
even though it may not poll well.88 
 
Clearly, Bush argued that his faith provided him with a special skill set including 
stability, good decision making, and the courage to make decisions regardless of their 
popularity. He likewise presented these political virtues as both necessary and desirable 
for American presidents. Even more importantly, one sees that, since God was the 
initiator of Bush’s conversion, it naturally follows that the divine being is also the source 
of the benefits of Bush’s conversion. Thus, Bush implied quite strongly that, as he told 
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James Robison and other Evangelical leaders in 1998 and 1999, “God wants me to be 
president.” 
Bush’s Pauline Conversion Narrative as Political Shibboleth 
It is significant that such a private personal expression of one’s spiritual journey 
should be juxtaposed with political virtues and mentioned in such an obviously political 
context. Such a coupling might appear curious were it not for the fact that Bush’s efforts 
to conform his conversion narrative to the Pauline form can only be explained by an 
effort to use this religious form to appeal to voters. While some could interpret this 
finding as the cynical judgment of one who does not really know the president, it may be 
helpful to turn to David Kuo—a former administration insider who served as Special 
Assistant to the President from 2001-2003. Kuo, who was the second highest 
administration official in the White House’s Office of Faith-Based Initiatives, offers this 
assessment of Bush’s use of his conversion narrative throughout his presidency: 
 When Christians like me share the stories of how we came to believe in Jesus 
 and what his presence means in our daily lives, it is called a testimony. It is 
 deeply personal, deeply intimate, and shared with fellow Christians as well as 
 with those we hope are open to accepting Jesus. Bush tweaked its purpose—he 
 was using it to encourage Christians to accept him.89 
 
As Kuo suggests, this religious rhetorical form gave Bush the rhetorical tools necessary 
to appeal to a vast swath of his electoral base.  
On Election Day in 2000, Bush carried the evangelical Christian vote in stunning 
fashion to the tune of sixty-eight percent.90 Just as Bush’s now famous reference to 
“Christ” as his favorite political philosopher in the Iowa Republican primary debate in 
December of 1999 generated copious applause, it appears that evangelical Christians 
across the nation erupted in approval and acceptance of Bush’s transformation as enacted 
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by his use of the Pauline conversion narrative. Evangelicals appeared, in a Burkean sense 
of “identification and consubstantiality,” to have become convinced that Bush was one of 
their own. This degree of consubstantiality has remained quite durable in light of the fact 
that Bush increased his dominant command of the evangelical vote by ten percentage 
points capturing seventy-eight percent of it in the 2004 campaign.91 
 Perhaps the best evidence of the degree to which Bush’s Pauline conversion 
shibboleth was accepted can be seen in a moment the Bush campaign would rather have 
forgotten. On November 2, 2000 news finally broke about Bush’s 1976 DUI arrest in 
Kennebunkport, Maine. Bush aides feared that this revelation would damage the 
credibility they had worked so hard to build up with evangelical Christians. The Bush 
campaign did not respond to the revelation by fully employing the Pauline conversion 
narrative. Rather, they chose to allude briefly to the Pauline-like story which had been a 
prominent rhetorical feature of the campaign since March of 1999. This may have 
seemed like a peculiar strategy. Why not cast the DUI revelation in full Pauline detail? 
Having already largely secured the support of evangelical Christians, Bush needed to 
respond to the allegations in a manner that would hold their support without repelling any 
non-evangelical voters. Moreover, Bush had to carefully avoid the impression of being 
“too religious” just days before the election. Had he responded to the allegations with his 
fully developed Pauline conversion narrative, he would surely have compromised his 
standing as a candidate able to unite the diverse religious and non-religious constituencies 
of the Republican Party and the American electorate.  
 The campaign’s first response came as a statement from Bush himself 
campaigning in West Allis, Wisconsin that evening. He admitted that the story was 
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“accurate” and that he was “not proud of that.”92 Echoing the largely understated 
transgression language of A Charge to Keep, Bush grudgingly acknowledged that “I have 
oftentimes said that years ago I made some mistakes. I occasionally drank too much and I 
did on that night.”93 As in A Charge to Keep, the transgression phase proved more muted 
than Bush’s discussion of his transformation and subsequent commissioning which 
accompanied it. Alluding to his, by this time, well known conversion story Bush offered 
that he “learned [his] lesson” and that giving up drinking in 1986 was “the right decision 
for me to make. . . .”94 While he did not explicitly mention his commissioning at the press 
conference in West Allis, Bush had said just days before at a rally in San Jose, California 
that he had given up drinking years before: “And it wasn’t because of a government 
program, by the way—in my particular case, because I had a higher call.”95 Of course, 
Bush failed to mention that he had waited until a decade after his DUI arrest before he 
felt the higher call to stop drinking.  
In the following days, supporters of George W. Bush were able to make rhetorical  
use of the transformative orientation of the Pauline conversion narrative. Florida 
Governor Jeb Bush, among others, defended his brother saying, “Twenty-four years ago, 
my brother was a different person. . . . he wasn’t ready to be president” he went on to 
proclaim that Bush had “transformed himself” in the ensuing years.96 Such explanations 
coupled with public recollection of Bush’s religious conversion constituted an expedient 
bit of preemptive rhetorical image restoration mounted with the aid of the transformation 
and commissioning phases of the Pauline conversion narrative. Despite a theory that 
Bush’s chief political strategist Karl Rove formulated—that the DUI revelation had kept 
many evangelical voters away from the polls in 2000—the revelation appears to have had 
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relatively little discernible effect upon Bush’s appeal to religious voters on Election 
Day.97 In short, the Bush campaign had used the Pauline conversion narrative to prepare 
the rhetorical ground so well for such a potentially damaging revelation that its impact 
upon the campaign was negligible at best. Bush’s sermon to Houston’s Second Baptist 
Church and A Charge to Keep established a compelling story of redemption and 
transformation so effectively that Bush was able to make use of it throughout the 2000 
campaign and well into his presidency.  
 While much more analysis of the rhetoric of the Bush administration remains, this 
chapter has contributed to our understanding of how religious rhetoric is used by 
presidents and presidential candidates. Specifically, the case of George W. Bush’s use of 
the Pauline conversion narrative suggests that religious rhetorical form is useful—so 
useful in fact that Bush reconfigured his own personal conversion narrative to fit the 
parameters of the form. Bush’s efforts to do this suggest an important role which 
religious rhetorical forms may play in American political discourse.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 From Plato, to Rousseau, to the contemporary efforts of Robert Bellah and 
Roderick Hart; scholars have long sought to better understand the discursive relationship 
between religion and politics. This dissertation is certainly not the final word on the 
subject. Nevertheless, it does offer an alternative approach to understanding this dynamic 
nexus that is very much a part of American political culture. This chapter outlines the 
major findings of the dissertation, discusses the normative considerations inherent to this 
topic, briefly notes the limitations of the dissertation, and cautiously considers the future 
political and scholarly prospects of religious rhetorical forms and their employment as 
political shibboleths. 
Major Findings 
How do contemporary American presidents employ the rhetorical resources of 
religion? While they certainly employ religious discourse in many ways, this 
investigation of the last five American presidents suggests that religious rhetorical form is 
one of these methods of using religious language in the political realm. As illustrated by 
chapter II and the various case studies explored, contemporary scholarship is yet to 
recognize the variety of ways in which presidents use such religious rhetorical forms. 
Moreover, this dissertation has shown that contemporary presidential discourse does 
indeed include religious rhetorical patterns which can aid presidents by helping them 
identify with the public. These religious rhetorical forms act as shibboleths which derive 
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their rhetorical value from the fact that they address the mythical needs of the American 
populace via discursive patterns with a rich cultural and intellectual history.  
Religious rhetoric in American presidential discourse is thus a far more complex 
phenomenon than simply the use of a “God strategy” or religious code words heard and 
understood only by religious segments of the electorate—a phenomenon sometimes 
referred to as “dog whistle politics.”1 Although some specific nuances of religious 
discourse are undoubtedly understandable only to certain groups, religious rhetorical 
forms are full of meanings for complex and variegated national audiences. This finding 
about the potentially broad appeal of religious forms suggests that religious rhetorical 
form is a more salient feature of American political rhetoric than previous scholarship has 
recognized. The existence of religious discursive patterns operating within political 
rhetoric (other than the jeremiad) is in itself a significant contribution to the existing 
scholarship. This dissertation supports earlier findings that religious rhetoric is a 
significant element of American presidential rhetoric; but it has also uncovered a variety 
of ways in which religion is ritualistically inserted into our political discourse by way of 
rhetorical forms.  
 The most important conclusion that can be drawn from this examination of 
religious rhetorical forms used by those who have occupied the modern White House is 
perhaps also the most obvious. Religious rhetorical forms such as the ones profiled in this 
dissertation are (for good or ill) a vibrant aspect of contemporary American presidential 
rhetoric. This claim arises from a careful reading of the many presidential texts explored 
within this dissertation. While it is perhaps not surprising that religious form presents 
itself in campaign discourse as a way for candidates to appeal to voters, it is quite 
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noteworthy that religious rhetorical forms find their way into an array of additional 
discourses of contemporary presidents—discourses on the economy, the national budget, 
the state of the relationship between the people and their government, and war. The 
diverse array of rhetorical sites at which religious rhetorical forms are used tells us that 
such forms are potentially useful tools of the rhetorical presidency; however, the more 
intriguing finding is why this is so. This dissertation suggests that religious discursive 
patterns have significant potential for inter-textuality. Literary critics Northrop Frye and 
Jay Macpherson observe the inter-textuality of religious mythologies from ancient East 
Asia and Mesopotamia which found their way into the narrative structures of the Bible 
thereby exercising profound influence upon the form and content of Judaism and 
Christianity.2 Frye also found that religious mythical structures were quite useful things 
for political leaders seeking the loyalty and consent of the populations over which they 
ruled:  
 Thus the Christian myth of providence, after a battle, is often invoked by the 
 winning side in a way which makes its truth of secondary importance. The  
 storm that wrecked the Spanish Armada was a providential event to the  
 English, but a natural event to the Spaniards. Elizabeth I issued a medal  
 quoting the Psalms, ‘God breathed with his winds, and they were scattered;’ 
 Philip of Spain said to the survivors: ‘I sent you forth to fight with men, not 
 with the elements.3 
 
Strictly speaking, the proclamation of God’s providence in the Psalm and the battle with 
the Spanish Armada in the English Channel had absolutely nothing to do with each other 
historically or hermeneutically. Yet, religious language and imagery are so rhetorically 
malleable as to minimize the necessary inferential leap—such is the power of the inter-
textuality of religious form. As Barry Brummett notes, “That is the role of homology: not 
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to unite what is already the same, but to link disparate orders of experience by way of the 
same form.”4 
The importance of these discursive patterns is also apparent in the way that 
presidents will sometimes go to great lengths in order to conform more closely to the 
rhetorical form. As revealed in chapter VII, for example, George W. Bush highlighted 
some aspects of his conversion story and minimized others in order to conform more 
closely to the Pauline conversion narrative in several important rhetorical moments 
during his 2000 presidential campaign—particularly in his campaign biography A Charge 
to Keep.  
Although political shibboleths can be tuned or targeted to a particular religious 
political constituency, this dissertation has demonstrated that a political shibboleth is 
often much more. The mythological nature of the rhetorical forms employed suggests 
that, for instance, when George W. Bush spoke of giving up drinking because of “a 
higher call”5 evangelical Christians certainly understood the familiar religious 
implication. Yet, the notion of deep personal transformation—which comprises the 
mythological core of the Pauline conversion narrative form—is sufficiently well 
understood by non-religious audiences such that the primary message of transformation 
inherent to the form is not lost upon a general audience.  
The same can be said for the renewal theme which comprised the mythical core 
Bill Clinton’s use of the deliverance form. Both the prospect of collective national 
forgiveness and reinvigoration from a shameful chapter in national history as was found 
in George H. W. Bush’s atonement form; and the hope of national restoration evident in 
the postmillennial jeremiad of Ronald Reagan offered similar comfort to the rhetorically 
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constituted mass public of the American populace. Even the condemnatory mythological 
core of Jimmy Carter’s moralistic jeremiad was, to the detriment of his presidency, 
recognizable to the mass American public. In his jeremiad the public heard the echoes of 
a scolding prophet—and they did not appreciate the message.  
These examples suggest that religious rhetorical forms do indeed speak to the 
mythically needs of rhetorically constituted publics as proposed in chapter II. If 
convinced that its national status has declined, what national public would not 
collectively long for the type of national restoration promised by Ronald Reagan? If 
many within the country accept the premise that we are living in dark times of peril and 
distress, what nation would not want to hold firmly to a political leader who promises the 
renewal of a great nation and a deliverance from the national peril as Bill Clinton did 
throughout his 1992 campaign speeches and in his 1995 State of the Union Address? Of 
course, the American public hardly subscribes to such visions in a wholesale manner. 
Yet, it is intriguing to notice that each of the religious forms explored within this 
dissertation contains not just a religious pattern of discourse with a long history, but a 
basic principle (such as transformation, atonement, renewal) that, on its own, nearly any 
American would accept. As suggested by my use of the term shibboleth, these forms 
foster a type of Burkean identification, but at the collective rather than the purely 
individual level. Presidents who use these or other similar religious rhetorical forms have 
the potential to be seen as being consubstantial, or ‘one of us’—the heart of identification 
in the manner Burke conceptualizes it—with the larger American public. My claim is not 
that the American public is inherently religious at its core, but that these patterns contain 
sufficient cultural familiarity and mythological depth as to help presidents identify with 
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and satisfy the public’s need for myths of transformation, atonement, renewal, and the 
like. Given this finding, future explorations of the American public sphere should 
examine the way that the need for collective myths may influence the rhetorical and 
political choices made by the electorate and those who covet their support.  
At the theoretical level, this dissertation demonstrates the validity of religious 
rhetorical form as a way of understanding the relationship between religious and political 
discourse in contemporary presidential rhetoric. I do not claim that either Robert Bellah’s 
notion of civil religion or Roderick Hart’s contract of civic piety lack conceptual validity. 
On the contrary, both have been helpful perspectives on the dynamic rhetorical 
intersection of religion and politics. Nevertheless, both of these perspectives seem 
wanting in the face of how religion has been used in the contemporary presidency—at 
least for the eight presidential campaigns and the five presidents of the United States 
between 1976 and 2000.6 I propose that exploration of religion in presidential politics via 
the approach of religious rhetorical form is valuable because it provides a conceptually 
nuanced understanding of the phenomenon.  
This study also provides additional clarification of the ongoing scholarly 
conversation about the relationship between form and genre in two important ways. First, 
this dissertation gives more definition to the concept of rhetorical form by explaining 
how religious rhetorical forms are recognizable patterns of discourse, with intellectual 
histories, that address the mythical needs of rhetorically-constituted publics. This 
clarification is an improvement upon prior studies of rhetorical forms such as the 
jeremiad, which tend to focus only upon the discursive pattern itself. Second, this 
dissertation suggests that form transcends genre—at least in the context of the American 
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presidency. This finding is illustrated most clearly in the exploration of Bill Clinton’s use 
of the deliverance form in chapter VI. Clinton found the form to be equally useful in his 
1992 campaign for the presidency in 1992, in his 1993 and 1997 inaugural messages, and 
in his 1995 State of the Union Address. Defined by the metaphor of the “new covenant,” 
Clinton portrayed himself as a political centrist who could rescue the nation from 
gridlock and despair. Inaugurals, state of the union speeches, and campaign addresses are, 
of course, distinctive genres of presidential rhetoric each with their own unique demands 
and expectations. Yet, as the Clinton case study illustrates, the deliverance form was 
adequate to the task of promising renewal in each of these different situations. This 
finding suggests that additional scholarship should explore the interaction between genre 
and form in order to determine if other rhetorical forms can transcend genre in the same 
way as the forms explored in this dissertation.  
While religious rhetorical forms may be useful to American presidents, they can 
also become problematic on several democratic and political levels. First, religious 
rhetorical forms employed while articulating domestic or foreign policies can short-
circuit any sort of meaningful deliberation. Ronald Reagan’s Oval Office Address on July 
27, 1981 in support of the Economic Recovery and Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981 is perhaps 
the clearest example of this. The ERTA which Reagan championed was one of several 
proposals designed to stimulate the economy. Yet it was more aggressive than any of the 
other measures proposed, including across-the-board tax cuts by five percent in 1981, and 
ten percent in both 1982 and 1983.7 When he spoke to the nation that July night, Reagan 
framed support of his measure as a moral American imperative by casting the choice in a 
distinctively jeremiadic fashion:  
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In a few days the Congress will stand at the fork of two roads. One road is  
all too familiar to us. It leads ultimately to higher taxes. It merely brings us 
back to the source of our economic problems, where the government decides 
that it knows better than you what should be done with your earnings and, in  
fact, how you should conduct your life. The other road promises to renew the  
American spirit. It’s a road of hope and opportunity. It places the direction of 
your life back in your hands where it belongs. . . . In these 6 months, we’ve  
done so much and have come so far. It’s been the power of millions of people  
like you who have determined that we will make America great again. You  
have made the difference up to now. You will make the difference again. Let us  
not stop now.8 
 
Reagan’s speech was a smashing political and rhetorical success. As thousands of 
telephone calls and letters supporting Reagan’s position streamed into the White House, 
his political opposition from House Democrats virtually melted away and the legislation 
was passed within days. While this episode could be viewed as just a simple instance of 
an American president using the available rhetorical resources in support of a political 
effort, even the staunchest supporters of Reagan must admit that his use of the potent 
jeremiad form enabled him to bypass any further debate with the Congress on the 
legislation.  
As profiled in chapter V, George H.W. Bush used the appealing religious 
rhetorical form of atonement to stifle public debate over whether or not to take the nation 
to war with Iraq in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Time and again 
Bush dismissed the concerns of war protestors by saying that, in contrast to the political 
divisions of the Vietnam War, there could now be no mistaking “what Americans think”9 
about the war. While the presidential strategy of “going public”10 is a common feature of 
the modern presidency, there is something insidious (but often effective) about publicly 
using religious forms to muzzle dissenting voices—particularly those of average citizens. 
Thus, one of the dangers of religious rhetorical form in presidential rhetoric is that the 
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implicit moral authority—or “pastoral power” as Michel Foucault calls it—of such forms 
can stifle the vigorous debates so necessary to a healthy democracy.11 
 Religious rhetorical forms may present another danger—one more immediate to 
American presidents themselves. The type of certainty which often comes with the use of 
religious form makes it exceedingly difficult for a president to reconsider a previously-
held position when either wisdom or politically desirability indicate that a change may be 
necessary. For instance, Jimmy Carter found himself the victim of his own dire jeremiad. 
As profiled in chapter III, Carter not only blamed himself and the nation collectively for 
national problems, but then promised bold action and failed to deliver it. By projecting 
the energy crisis in such stark moralistic terms, Carter set rhetorical and policy making 
standards that were too high for himself and his administration.  
George H. W. Bush also found himself to be a victim of his own use of religious 
rhetorical form. As the Persian Gulf War was ending with the obvious military success of 
the American-led coalition, Bush proudly proclaimed that the nation had destroyed the 
doubts and anxieties left over in the public consciousness of the Vietnam era. As he said 
in a radio address to the U.S. military as the war was ending: “The specter of Vietnam 
has been buried forever in the desert sands of the Arabian Peninsula.”12 Yet, Bush found 
that his future foreign policy decisions about Iraq—particularly with regard to the 
controversial decision not to support the Kurdish and Shiite rebellions with military 
force—continued to be constrained by the specter of Vietnam. Bush’s oft-repeated pledge 
that Iraq would not be another Vietnam essentially tied his own hands and precluded any 
further policy changes—even ones which might have further undermined Saddam 
Hussein’s hold on power in Iraq.  
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Normative Considerations 
 No thorough treatment of the rhetorical intersection of religion and politics would 
be complete without at least some discussion of the normative concerns inherent to this 
subject. Few scholars or American citizens would be troubled by the fact that a president 
may be (as many of them have been) personally religious. Yet many have justly raised 
concerns about the proclivity American presidents have for integrating religion into their 
political discourse. For one thing, the First Amendment’s disestablishment clause and 
Article Six of the Constitution provide that religious faith and practice can be neither 
officially endorsed by the government nor used as a test for office-seekers. Any sort of 
official “wall of separation” (to use Thomas Jefferson’s words) is complicated, and 
perhaps even compromised, by the invocations by clergy prior to inaugurals and the daily 
work of Congress. The increasing complexity of both American society and religion 
present further problems when American presidents use religious language in ways that 
appear to be endorsements of a particular faith or denomination. During one speech 
touting his faith-based initiatives program in 2002, George W. Bush held up a Bible he 
had borrowed from one of the audience members and proclaimed it to be “a universal 
handbook” and “a good go-by” for childcare programs receiving federal funds.13 Bush’s 
open declaration that faith should be a deciding factor for organizations who receive 
federal funds raises issues about the use of religious rhetoric in presidential discourse 
based on pluralistic grounds. How can the person who is arguably the most visible 
representative of the nation and is a definer of the national identity,14 speak about religion 
in a way that is complimentary of his or her own while still respectful of the diversity of 
American society? Although this difficult question is beyond the scope of this 
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dissertation, it is an important consideration about religious expression in politics which 
will remain within the public consciousness for years to come.  
 Humanities scholar Wendy Olmsted observes that the absolutist character 
inherent to religion itself “often seeks truth as distinguished from mere verisimilitude or 
probability.”15 This quality of religion leads to other problems when employed by 
American presidents who must not only engage in deliberation with political adversaries, 
but must navigate the notoriously uncertain waters of domestic and foreign policymaking. 
“The difficulty of mixing religion with politics . . .,” writes rhetorical scholar James A. 
Aune “is that it requires one to believe that one’s opponent is not merely mistaken, but 
evil. . . . [I]t can be remarkably powerful in mobilizing people for action, yet it is 
extremely corrosive of democratic politics, since it undermines the possibility of a loyal 
opposition.”16 Even Richard John Neuhaus, who believes that religion ought to play an 
important role in public deliberation, admits that: “When it is the Lord’s battle you are 
fighting, politics takes on an aura of deadly earnestness.”17 
Although the use of religion in politics can be problematic for these and other 
reasons, one should consider if the use of religion, particularly religious rhetorical form, 
in the public sphere need be so harmful? In order to engage this question it is necessary to 
turn to American rhetorical history which, although beyond the immediate scope of this 
dissertation, is full of instances whereupon religious language and religious rhetorical 
form played a vital role in the advancement of American society. The earliest rhetoric of 
the abolitionist movement was deeply imbued with the idea that human slavery was not 
only an affront to man but to God as well. Black abolitionist David Walker—a rhetorical 
precursory to later better known figures such as Henry Highland Garnett and William 
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Lloyd Garrison—pricked the consciences of northerners and southerners with his Appeal 
to the Coloured Citizens of the World. Walker’s modified jeremiad18 contained numerous 
prophetic injunctions against the people of America for allowing slavery in Americans 
hypocritically claimed to be a Christian nation. Walker seized upon the hypocrisy of a 
political establishment that perpetuated slavery in the face of its defining political 
document which claimed that all were created equal: 
See your Declaration Americans!!! Do you understand your own language? 
 Hear your own language, proclaimed to the world, July 4th 1776—‘We hold  
 these truths to be self-evident—that ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL!! 
 that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that  
 among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness!! Compare your 
own language above,. . . with your cruelties and murders inflicted by your 
cruel and unmerciful fathers and yourselves on our fathers and on us—men 
who have never given your fathers or you the least provocation!!!19 
 
While the proponents of slavery such as the Reverend Thornton Stringfellow also 
claimed that God was on their side of the slavery debate,20 there can be little doubt that 
religious arguments and rhetorical forms were powerful weapons in opposition to slavery.  
 One should also look to the soul-stirring oratory of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. for 
an example of the powerful potential of religious rhetoric and religious rhetorical form in 
public affairs. King’s famous “I Have a Dream” and “I’ve Been to the Mountaintop” 
addresses are not only beautiful artifacts of American rhetorical history, they are prime 
examples of religious rhetorical form—a harsh, but hopeful jeremiad in the case of “I 
Have a Dream” and an example of what rhetorical analyst Thomas Rosteck calls “the 
exodus narrative” in “I’ve Been to the Mountaintop.”21 These powerful instances of 
religious rhetorical form helped American society advance toward that day—regrettably 
still too far off—where all are treated as they should be in socio-political custom and law.  
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 One should also not overlook the religious character of the compelling arguments 
advanced for suffrage and women’s rights. In 1837 Sarah M. Grimke responsed to the 
Congregational Ministers of Massachusetts who admonished her for speaking to mixed 
audiences of men and women (promiscuous) in the name of ending slavery. Grimke 
called upon the rhetorical resources of religion to argue that the “doctrine of dependence 
upon man is utterly at variance with the doctrine of the Bible. In that book I find nothing 
like the softness of woman, nor the sternness of man: both are equally commanded to 
bring forth the fruits of the Spirit, love, meekness, gentleness, &c.”22 Physician, 
suffragist, renowned lecturer, and ordained Methodist minister Anna Howard Shaw used 
a jeremiad challenging the nation to live up to its republican ideals in her famous speech 
“The Fundamental Principle of a Republic.” Like David Walker, Shaw used this form to 
point out the nation’s hypocrisy in proclaiming itself a republic when it was obvious that 
not all of the citizens could vote for their representatives. This hypocrisy was a violation 
not only of the meaning of a republic, but of what America itself claimed to be. Shaw 
quipped: “We might call ourselves angels, but that wouldn't make us angels, you have got 
to be an angel before you are an angel, and you have got to be a Republic before you are 
a Republic.”23 Shaw’s use of this form allowed her to articulate with clarity the position 
that full suffrage for both women and men was the only way the nation could be at 
harmony with itself and with the natural order of the world: “Men and women must go 
through this world together from the cradle to the grave; it is God's way and the 
fundamental principle of a Republican form of government.”24 
 The reform impulse of what has become known as the American Progressive Era 
owes at least some of its success to the influence of postmillennial rhetoric. Although not 
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a religious rhetorical form in its own right, postmillennialism (as noted in chapter IV) 
inspired reformers with a vision of a better world achievable by responsible governmental 
action and the good works of conscience performed by individuals and groups whether 
religious or secular.  
 Taken together these examples indicate that it is possible for religious rhetoric 
generally and religious rhetorical form in particular to interact with the public sphere in 
ways which are helpful to American society. However, the perceptive reader will notice a 
difference between these examples and the instances of religious rhetorical form explored 
within this dissertation. None of these occurred within the confines of the American 
presidency or any other form of government. This fact certainly does not mean that such 
a use of religious or religiously-oriented rhetorical form could not be or has not been used 
to good societal ends by an American president. Indeed, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
use of the war metaphor, which is often laden with religious elements such as the concept 
of an ultimate battle between good and evil, was quite useful in helping his 
administration combat poverty.25 Additionally, Robert Bellah cited extensively from the 
presidential speeches of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson to support his civil 
religion thesis. Nevertheless, the case studies profiled here reveal that religious forms as 
used in the contemporary presidency are often rhetorical tools used by presidents to help 
them enact their political agendas. Could it be, as Aune suggests, that the use of religious 
form in political discourse is inherently corrosive because it automatically precludes any 
possibility of deliberation or compromise? While this interpretation is seductive, 
particularly with regard to religious forms employed in the context of war, I posit that 
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there are certain aspects of the contemporary American presidency which make the use of 
religious rhetorical form less constructive and more partisan.  
The agonistic character of the contemporary presidency appears to be a 
particularly significant difference between the way presidents use religion as contrasted 
with the way American socio-political movements have historically used such rhetoric. 
While the founders certainly designed American government to operate under something 
of an adversarial model, they certainly could not have envisioned the explosion of 
technology and media that has given rise to the twenty-four hour news cycle. Nor did 
they envision the tremendous political power that would reside within the office and the 
person who holds it.26 Although any presidency is an institution comprised of people who 
believe they are working in the best interest of the nation, it is also a partisan institution 
headed by an ambitious individual. As noted in the chapters profiling Ronald Reagan, 
George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton, contemporary presidents seem willing to use nearly 
any means necessary to achieve their objectives. It is not so much that presidents seek to 
use religious rhetoric in hopes of corrupting it or the institution of the presidency—they 
simply use it because it is available and generally effective. Certainly religious rhetoric as 
used by some presidents can be corrosive to democratic politics, but I contend that it is 
the hyper-competitive, agonistic character of the contemporary presidency that inherently 
corrupts presidential discourse rather than the fact that such discourse is influenced by 
religious rhetorical form. Religious form can be corruptive, but it is the manner of use 
rather than the religious character of the form that is inherently corruptive to political 
deliberation in this country.  
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Limitations 
As with any study, this analysis has its limitations. First, its findings are 
somewhat limited by the scope of presidential rhetoric it explores. Future explorations of 
religious rhetorical form in American politics could expand upon the present study by 
looking to presidents outside the period of 1976-2000. Future scholarship could examine 
the use of religious rhetorical form in political institutions aside from the presidency such 
as the Congress or the judiciary. This study is also somewhat limited by its orientation 
toward rhetorical form. Although part of my objective was to explore the degree to which 
religion operates within the rhetorical presidency by way of religious rhetorical form, it is 
important to note that these rhetorical forms are not the only way in which it does so. 
Narratives, metaphors, prayers and the like are also ways in which religious rhetoric 
manifests within the American presidency and other forms of political rhetoric.  
Future Scholarship and the Future of Religion in American Politics 
As of this writing, religious rhetoric and many elements of religious rhetorical 
form have already begun to play a prominent role in the 2008 presidential election. In the 
summer of 2007, the Cable News Network (CNN) held a forum on the subject of faith in 
politics with all of the leading Democratic presidential candidates—John Edwards, 
Barack Obama, and Hillary Clinton. Each of the contenders discussed their respective 
experiences with religion. John Edwards and Hillary Clinton both claimed that faith had 
gotten them through painful personal crises such as the loss of Edwards’ son and 
Clinton’s very public marital difficulties. Obama was less personal and seemed more 
public-minded, invoking faith to challenge the war in Iraq and to address domestic issues 
such as education and crime.27 In the early months of the campaign Obama likened his 
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candidacy and the ongoing struggle for civil rights in the United States by directly 
referencing the deliverance form with his proclamation that he and his colleagues were 
members of the “Joshua generation.”28 
Republicans, too, have sought to employ similar shibboleths. The quintessential 
example has been the presidential candidacy of former Arkansas Governor (and Southern 
Baptist minister) Mike Huckabee. Huckabee’s appeal to religious conservatives is largely 
grounded in his willingness (like George W. Bush) to share his personal religious 
testimony. Huckabee’s expressions of religion go further than Bush’s since he has spoken 
at length about his views on the controversy between science and religion and offers a 
more nuanced discussion of how his Christian faith informs his political positions.29 
Former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney also engaged the subject of religion during 
the 2008 presidential race—but undoubtedly not in the manner he wanted to. Persistent 
questions about his Mormon faith from religious conservatives within his own 
Republican Party, and concerns that he would be unable to build an effective electoral 
coalition which included them once the primaries began, prompted Romney to deliver a 
speech entitled “Faith in America” in College Station, Texas on December 6, 2007. “I am 
an American running for President,” Romney explained “I do not define my candidacy by 
my religion. A person should not be elected because of his faith nor should he be rejected 
because of his faith.”30 Romney’s speech—quite reminiscent of John F. Kennedy’s 
engagement of the subject of his Catholic faith in his “Address to the Greater Houston 
Ministerial Alliance” in 1960—lauded the importance of religion in public life, but 
reaffirmed the basic American value of religious tolerance. The political considerations 
which prompted Romney to engage public prejudices about his religion indicate that, for 
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good or ill, many Americans look to the personal religion and religious expressions of 
political candidates as a potential source of identification.  
Beyond individual candidates, religion and religious discourse became part of the 
cultural context of the 2008 campaign. Indeed, a Christian website (beliefnet.com) 
dedicated to exploring how religious issues interact with the American public sphere 
created the “God-o-Meter” which “scientifically” measures a candidate’s “rate of God-
talk.”31 Despite the sketchy details of the God-o-Meter’s methodology, the very presence 
of such an interactive website indicates that religious rhetorical elements are very much a 
part of the 2008 presidential contest and that there is a degree of popular public 
fascination with the phenomenon.  
It is impossible to know precisely what role religious rhetorical form will have in 
future presidential elections or administrations. Yet, in light of the findings of this 
dissertation it is safe to project that the use of religious forms as political shibboleths will 
continue for the foreseeable future. Although I have offered some normative judgments 
of the phenomenon in this concluding chapter, I am generally reticent to claim that such 
discourse is either inherently good or bad. Like any other form of communication, the 
morality of such rhetoric is dependent upon the intentions of the rhetor, the characteristics 
of the discourse, and the ultimate results of the message. My primary aim has been to 
show that a variety of religious rhetorical forms exist as an important component of 
American presidential discourse. With this premise established, there is now much 
scholarly work to be done. Scholars of American public address should explore the 
rhetorical forms (religious and otherwise) which exist within our politics. They should 
also consider why they appear to speak to so many Americans at the mythological level. 
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Explorations of how our political discourse is informed by rhetorical forms (religious or 
secular) and the implications of these forms upon not only the presidency but all other 
components of our government and society will present scholars with daunting tasks for 
years to come. Yet, these important endeavors will ultimately prove to be worth our 
efforts.  
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